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Abstract 
This study contributes to the well-established effîciency literature with respect to 
transition économies and developing counties. Although bank effîciency has been a 
populär research area in both developed countries and less developed nations, it has 
been scarce in China mainly due to the lack of data. This study is considered as the 
first study that comprehensively investigates bank performance using multiple 
méthodologies of financial ratio analysis and stochastic frontier analysis for the 
period of 1995-2005. The effects of a variety of governance changes have also been 
differentiated in order to providing policy recommendations for the on-going banking 
reform. Meanwhile. this study has addressed a number of methodological issues and 
has developed a more comprehensive stochastic distance function model by 
combining advantages of existing modets, approaches. methods and procédures. 
Having experienced fundamental banking reforms for more than a quarter of Century, 
the Chinese banking System has stridden towards a modem banking System with 
significant improvements in profitability, capitalization, and assets quality. Despite 
of thèse observed improvements, the banking System is still associated with relatively 
low profîtability and capitalization, poor asset quality, and less liquidity, when 
benchmarking to 7 selected international renowned banks. One of the most 
impressive progresses has been the significant decrease in both outstanding NPLs 
balance and N P L ratio. However, it has noticed that the threat of NPLs problem to the 
economy as a whole remains unsolved. 
This study has rationalized economic foundations for the banking reform in China 
being the principal-agent theory and the budgetary constraint theory. The 
performance of Chinese banks has been improved and the estimated effîciency level 
is consistently at 75% in terms of technical effîciency, cost effîciency and profit 
effîciency. Employing the method of Berger et al. (2005), this study has jointly 
analyzed the static, sélection and dynamic effects of governance changes. Joint-stock 
ownership has resulted in outstanding performance, whiie state ownership has been 
associated with low technical effîciency and profit effîciency but high cost effîciency. 
Foreign banks are more profit efficient but less cost and technical efficient (static 
effects). Foreign investors have rationally made their investment décisions by 
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selecting more cost and Technical efficient domestic banks, while less profitable 
domestic banks have been chosen for going public in line vvith government intension 
of reforming the unprofitable SOCBs (sélection effects). 
Attracting foreign stratégie investors and encouraging banks going public are two 
major partial privatization stratégies, which have been generally proved as effective 
reform measures. The former tends to have positive impacts on technical efficiency 
and cost efficiency, while significant short-term gains in profit efficiency have faded 
in the long-term. The expected profit advantage of foreign ownership seems to take 
an even longer time to be realized. Going public strategy has resulted in performance 
improvement in the long-term after short-term losses (dynamic effects). 
We can not form a conclusion on whether the reform has succeeded, while what we 
can conclude is the reform is on the track with right direction. It is important to 
construct good corporate governance, but it is more important to ensure the good 
governance functioning. If those deep-rooted problems, such as government 
intervention and NPL problem, can not be dealt with properly in the near future, the 
chance of success is very small. Thus, our policy recommendations include 
consolidating up-to-date reform achievements, improving bank's managerial and 
operational skills, and reducing state's share in banks to lessen government 
interventions. 
Estimated efficiency is found to be sensitive to the différences in the définitions of 
Outputs and inputs, especially in the présence of high level of NPLs. The income-
based model is superior to the earning assets-based model in the estimation of 
technical efficiency. Similarly. profit efficiency appears to be more appropriate 
performance measures over cost efficiency. However, we suggest the use of multiple 
models and measures to reveal more valuable information. Moreover. in estimating 
cost function and alternative profit function, market average input priées are found to 
be more appropriate than banks' specific input prices. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 China's economy and financial sector 
Since 1978, a reform and open policy initiated by the Chinese government has made 
significant economic success. China has been playing an increasingly important role 
in the world economic system. After 28 years of reform and opening up practice, its 
GDP has increased dramatically by 12 times from only RMB 364.52 billion ($216.5 
billion) in 1978 to RMB 20.94 trillion ($2.7 trillion) in 2006 and the average GDP 
growth rate has been kept at about 10 % year-on-year (China Statistical Yearbook, 
2006 and Xie, 2007). China has become the fourth largest economy in the world since 
2005 by overtaking Britain and has moved closer to Germany during 2006, although 
the per capita GDP is lagged far behind about only one-fifth of the world average. 
With a double-digit GDP growth of 10.7 % in 2006, the Chinese economy has been 
projected to grow at 8 % in 2007 (Hu, 2007), suggesting that the Chinese economy is 
highly likely to continue a steady and fast growing path during the Eleventh Five-
YearPlan (2006-2010). 
Further economic growth and prosperity require the financial sector to be modern and 
efficient. In order to better serve the economy, the Chinese government initiated 
reforms in financial sector from the early 1980s along with its economic reform. 
Considerable progress has been made in both the real economic sector and financial 
sector reforms. According lo the International Monetary Fund's (IMF), China's 
financial sector has become one of the largest financial sectors in the world, not only 
in relative terms as percentage of GDP but also in absolute terms. Backed by the 
sparkling achievements and promising perspective of the economy, Chinese financial 
sector has become more and more influential in the world financial market. For 
instance, after the successful IPO in both domestic and foreign capital markets in 
2006, by August 2007, ICBC has become the largest bank and the third largest listed 
company in the world in terms of market value, overtaking Citigroup and Microsoft. 
Notably, during the second half of 2006 and early 2007, the performance of Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges has exhibited significant implications on the 
performance of global capital markets. In less than 18 months, the market value of 
the listed companies in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges rose ten-
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fold. Whether there is a big bubble in the stock market is not certain. but the booming 
size of the equity market in China has been largely led by the IPOs of three large 
state-owned banks (ICBC, BOC and CCB) and one state-owned insurance company, 
the P L A (People's Ufe Assurance). 
In China, the fmancial sector is dominated by the banking system that has performed 
outstandingly in channelling savings into investment. Banks play a major role in 
financial intermedíation, accounting for 75% of the capital in the economy. The 
increase in loan financing vvas equivalent to 23% of GDP, while equity and bond 
financing only accounted for 1% and 0.3% in 2003 (Maino and Maino, 2007). This 
situation is unlikely to be changed fundamentally ín the near future, although capital 
and bond markets have been much developed. 
On the other hand, the Chinese banking system is rather weak and inefficient. The 
banking system is dominated by state-owned banks and lacks the experience in credit 
assessment and risk management. Banking reforms have made progress on improving 
assets quality and performance, resulting in signiñcant reduction in non-performing 
loan (NPL) ratio and a dramatic increase in profitability. However, these 
improvements are largely attributable to the transfer of NPLs from banks to asset 
management companies and the cleaning up of SOCB's balance sheets, which have 
an immediate positive impact. Whether the banking reform could succeed and 
whether Chínese banks could be viable in the long run on their own feet are unknown 
and will be examined by this study. 
In contract to the significant influence and development of the banking system, the 
capital and bond markets in China are among the smallest in the world. Equity market 
is still underdeveloped since the establishment of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange in 1990. Equity market capitalization only accounted for 17% of GDP in 
2005 compared with 60% or more in other emerging markets. As the results of the 
bullish market run and the reform of government owned non-traded "legal person" 
shares, the share of the equity market capitalization to GDP rose substantially to 50% 
in 2006. By July 2007, the equity market capitalization surpassed the valué of GDP, 
breaking the record of R M B 21 trillion. due to the rather unexpected bullish 
performance Ín the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. At the time of writing 
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up this thesis, the Shanghai Stock Exchange Index is marching towards the 5,200 
level, which is five times as high as the level in early 2006. The majority of investors 
pursue capital gains rather than investing in real sectors by speculative trading. 
Insider trading also prevails in the markets due to ineffective regulations. The 
corporate bond market is far more underdeveloped, accounting for just 1% of GDP, 
compared with an average of 50% in other emerging markets. The underdevelopment 
is largely attributable to the mass and tight regulations, limited variation in interest 
rates, and more importantly, the required approval from the government. 
The financial sector has long been subject to government intervention to finance less 
productive state-owned enterprises (SOEs), presumably in order to preserve jobs and 
maintain social stability. Private companies have prospered and contributed to the 
total GDP by a rapidly increasing proportion over the last two decades. Their 
productivity is double that of SOEs even after many SOEs have been restructured and 
become profitable. Nevertheless, private sector has only received 27% of loans and 
most investments have been channelled to SOEs (Farrell and Lund, 2006). 
Meanwhile, the limited capital market has been utilized mainly by SOEs. Companies 
have been selected by state regulators to be listed until early this century. With 
multiple objectives, rather than pure profitability, the financial sector has inevitably 
allocated funds less efficiently. 
In balance, despite significant progress on banking reforms and impressive 
performance of the capital market, the Chinese financial sector as a whole is 
rudimentary and inefficient. Inefficiency is an aggregate result of many factors, such 
as political pressures on capital allocation to SOEs, inefficient operation of the 
dominant banking system, and the underdevelopment of bond and equity markets. A 
good financial sector should balance the development of each component—banking, 
bond markets, equity markets, the payments system and institutional investors. A 
modern financial sector should base lending decisions on market conditions in order 
to allocate funds to more productive projects or sectors and focus on sustainable 
economic development with a long-term and forward-looking view. There is a large 
gap between where the financial sector is and where a modern financial sector should 
be for such an amazing economy. To close this gap, further reforms are required not 
only from the government but also for the financial institutions. 
3 
1.2 China's banking System and its reform 
Since 1949, the Chinese banking System had been a mono-banking system, entirely 
dominated by the People's Bank of China (PBC), the only bank in the country. Along 
with economic reforms. China has adopted a rehabilitation approach to reforming its 
banking system, in contrast to most transition économies in Eastern Europe where a 
shock therapy approach was adopted. One clear aim of the reform is to transform the 
banking system from a state-owned, monopolistic and policy-driven to a multi-
ownership, compétitive and profit-oriented one. Despite drastic institutional and 
structural changes, the pace of banking reform has lagged behind the rapid 
development in the real economic sectors. 
Tang (2005) divides the three-decade banking reform into four periods. The first 
period, 1979-1984, focused on initial institutional restructuring. PBC was broken up 
into a central bank and four specialized state-owned banks, namely Agricultural Bank 
of China (ABC), People's Construction Bank of China (the bank was later changed to 
'China Construction Bank' in 1996 and to 'China Construction Bank Corporation' in 
2004. It is abbreviated as CCBC in the rest of this thesis), Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC), and Bank of China (BOC). The primary shape of the two-tier 
banking system was initially constructed. The second period, 1984-1994, was centred 
on developing the two-tier banking system. New regional and joint-stock commercial 
banks were established and they were allowed to compete with state-owned banks in 
order to create a compétitive market environment. Nevertheless, State banks 
dominated the banking system and they served their designated sector of the economy, 
which effectively ruled out the compétition in the banking market (Wong and Wong, 
2001). Moreover, it was a transitional period. State-banks were used as governmental 
agents to help the reforms of SOEs. Fréquent government intervention in banks' 
opérations resulted in mounting non-performing loans. 
Düring the third period, 1994-2003, the government commenced the 
commercialization process of state-owned banks. State-owned banks were legally 
defined as state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) by the commercial bank law 
enacted in 1995 and their policy lending functions were officially taken away by three 
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newly established state-owned policy banks. However, commercialized state-owned 
banks still played important rôles in policy lending. As a resuit, government 
intervention persisted and banks lending décisions were not truly based on 
commercial considération. The banking reform vvas regarded as unsuccessful by the 
end of this period. 
Since 2003, the banking reform has entered into the fourth reform period by 
implementing the most radical reforms. The more comprehensive reform was 
triggered by China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. 
China committed itself to opening up not only the real économie sectors, but also the 
financial and banking System completely within a five-year grâce period. Under WTO 
opening up schedule, domestic commercial banks will have to be in face-to-face 
compétition with foreign banks on the basis of an international marketplace without 
any governmental protection from 2007. Facing thèse challenges, the government has 
accelerated and deepened bank reform through ownership restructuring and partial 
privatization of state-owned commercial banks. 
To date, the government has made considérable efforts on banking reform. A séries of 
comprehensive and concrète reform measures have been initiated, such as upgrading 
prudential régulations, tightening constructive supervisory framework, improving 
asset quality and provisioning, advancing lending practices, strengthening accounting 
and disclosure standards, constructing sound capital structure, lessening government 
intervention, removing crédit quota and so on. Given the dominant rôle of SOCBs, 
the banking reform has been focused on improving their efficiency in order to 
transform them into internationally compétitive commercial banks, 
The most significant reform efforts made by the government are the tvvo rounds of 
SOCBs bailouts in the forms of capital injection and NPLs divestment. In order to 
construct a sound capital structure, the government lïrst injected capital of R M B 270 
billion into four SOCBs in 1998 through bonds issuing. Later, the government 
injected capital of US$22.5 billion into BOC and CCBC respectively in 2003 and 
US$15 billion into ICBC in 2005 by using the state's massive foreign exchange 
reserves. Meanwhile, in order to clean up a stubbornly high level NPLs on SOCBs' 
balance sheet, the government implemented two rounds of NPL divestments. NPLs of 
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SOCBs were transferred to four newly created state asset management companies by 
the amount of RMB1.4 trillion in 1999, RJvlB 475 billion in 2004, and R M B 705 
billion in 2005. 
Having enlarged capital base and cleaned up their balance sheet, SOCBs are to be 
modernized through partial privatization to construct good functioning corporate 
governance. The latest strategies include attracting foreign strategic investors and 
encouraging SOCBs to go public. The former is motivated by the much-needed 
capital and the expectation of importing superior management and technology from 
foreign owners, while the latter is encouraged by market disciplining role to solve the 
agency problem. These measures were intended to fundamentally solve the problems 
of SOCBs, enabling them to become fully listed commercial banks that can compete 
and survive in the international financial market. 
The strategy of attracting foreign ownership is positively re-acted by foreign investors 
who aim at having a well-positioned strategic seat before the full opening up of the 
market. They started with prudent trial investments in domestic banks since 2001, 
followed by a surge in 2004 and the subsequent years. Surprisingly, SOCBs have also 
received much attention and have attracted worldwide influential strategic investors. 
For instance, in 2005, Bank of America acquired a 9% stake in CCB and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland, together with Merrill Lynch and Li Ka-shing, bought a 10% stake 
in BOC. Goldman Sachs, Allianz and American Express signed a memo of 
understanding with ICBC to acquire a 10% stake. By 2006, most international banking 
giants and financial institutions have acquired equity stakes in domestic banks. 
The second strategy of encouraging SOCBs to go public has also been implemented 
soon after financial restructuring and NPLs divestments. BOC, CCBC and ICBC have 
successfully made their initial public offering in the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock 
Exchanges. The market reaction to these IPOs was highly positive from the second 
half of 2006. Their share prices rocket by up to 150%, making them among the few 
largest firms in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Measured by market values, ICBC 
became the largest bank in the world measured by market value in August 2007, 
surpassing that of the Citigroup. These successful IPOs and subsequent 
extraordinarily performance in the stock markets provide a sound cornerstone for the 
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overall success of China1 s bank reform in the future. These remarkable achievements 
will undoubtedly have far-reaching economic implications. not only for China, but 
also for the world as a vvhole. 
The banking reform has turned to a comer and the banking system is moving on the 
track toward modernization. Although considerable progress has been made, 
challenges, uncertainties and thorny problems remain. Building up good corporate 
governance is the first step of transforming SOCBs to modern enterprises. What 
could guarantee the ultímate success of Chínese banking reform is the substantial 
behavioural changes in management and operations toward that of world class banks. 
However, Podpiera (2006) finds no clear evidence on whether SOCBs have changed 
behaviour and have become market oriented in management and operations. Given 
the most radical reforms of SOCBs only implemented recently, it inevitably needs 
more time for such fundamental behavioural changes to take root. 
Whether behaviour in management and operations could change depends on the 
extent to which government intervention exists. As long as government could 
exercises power over bank lending decisions in favour of fulfilling government 
political goals, there would be no behavioural changes toward modern banking 
practices and moral hazard problem would lead to inefficiency. Thus, the ultímate 
success of Chínese banking reform largely depends on whether banks can escape 
from government intervention. 
Existing information and evidence suggest that government intervention in lending 
decisión still persists but less explicitly and it is uncertain whether this implicit 
intervention could be reversed in near future (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). The 
eleventh Five-Year Pían has addressed the growing rural-urban and regional 
inequality and has projected to balance the urban and rural development through 
urbanization. Governments obviously need to créate more employment to absorb 
surplus labour forcé from rural-urban migrants and the role of banks in the 
achievement of the overall goals is uncertain. SOCBs are more likely to be required 
to support the development goals and provide necessary finance to politically 
preferred projects in the sacrifice of the economic objectives of profitability and 
effíciency as commercial banks. There exists a contradiction between the government 
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influences on SOCBs to support overall economic development goals and commercial 
banks' role to allocate credit to more productive borrowers. The implied government 
influence will defer the process of transforming SOCBs to truly commercial-based 
banks. Without carefully addressing and dealing with these conflicts, uncertainties 
and contradictions, the success of the bank reform is doubtful. Dobson and Kashyap 
(2006) argüe that if economic growth slows these contradictions will become 
apparent and the upshot will be another round of government bailout. 
1.3 Undcrlying theories of the banking reform in transition economies 
The importance of a well functioning banking system for economic growth and 
development has been well appreciated by governments in developing and transition 
economies (La Porta et al., 2002). As a result, the reform of banking system has 
become a high priority on the policy agenda of these countries in recent years. 
Banking systems in transition economies share many commonalities, such as the lack 
of skills, underdeveloped management and credit analysis system, and poor oversight 
institutions and legal frameworks. Earlier market-oriented reforms are similar by 
creating a two-tier system along with deregulation and financial liberalization. 
Subsequent reform strategies follow different paths concerning the privatization of 
state-owned banks. 
One prominent feature of banking systems in transition economies is the prevalence 
of state ownership. The argument for the existence of state ownership in banks is that 
governments are able to channel funds to sectors and projects that cannot attract 
prívate capital due to low financial but high social returns. In such a case, profit-
oriented private sector is undependable to balance social and economic goals 
(Huibers, 2005). However, both political and economic theories suggest the 
association of low efficiency and state ownership for a number of reasons. First of all, 
political theory suggests that state ownership in banks facilitates government to 
finance inefficient but politically desirable projects, i.e. SOEs. State-owned banks 
pursue múltiple, often conflicting, goals, which lead to inefficiency. Secondly, the 
free-rider problem is rather serious in state-owned banks. A l l citizens are theoretical 
co-owners while they are unable to effectiveiy influence the management of state 
banks, leaving the government the only influentiai agent. Consequently, they have no 
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incentive to monitor state banks5 opérations (Huibers, 2005). Thirdly, state-owned 
banks commonly face a soft-budget constraint that causes moral hazard problems 
resulting in inefficiency. Finally, the lack of discipline for state-owned banks' 
managers fosters their pursuit of quiet life and lessens their incentive to operate more 
efficiently. Empirical studies generally report low level of efficiency for state-owned 
banks in most developing and transition économies. Consequently banks reform in 
thèse countries commonly ends up with the privatization of state-owned banks. 
Whatever stratégies being used, the main goal of forming a modem market-oriented 
banking system is to improve efficiency by creating a well-functioning corporate 
govemance structure for banks, especially for state-owned banks. Governments of 
thèse countries have implemented banking reform addressing the sources of 
inefficiency and reform stratégies have been well formulated in accordance with two 
économie théories: the agency theory and the soft-budget constraint theory. 
The first theoretical perspective on the banking reform is related to the agency theory 
developed in 1970s. The principal-agent problem arises in an agency relationship 
where one party (the agent) acts on behalf of another party (the principal) under 
principal's délégation. The moral hazard problem refers to the situation that agent 
(employée or manager) makes low level efforts on work or pursues its own interest 
because of différences in risk-taking préférence and possibly conflicting desires and 
goals between two parties. When the agent does not bear the appropriate adverse 
conséquences of its actions, the moral hazard problem may arise. It reflects the 
possible effect of information asymmetry on people's behaviour. The agent possesses 
more information than the principal does, which makes it difficult or costly to 
corroborate actual actions taken by the agent and to monitor the behaviour or 
performance of the agent. The principal-agent problem becomes more prominent in 
the case of state ownership in banks. Being the only influential représentative of 
principals, the state has multiple and maybe conflicting commercial and social goals 
to pursue. Its rôle is ambiguously defined being both the owner and regulator. This 
rather complex situation makes the agents (the bank managers) unclear regarding 
what the principal exactly expects from them. Thus, the principal-agent problem is a 
source of inefficiency. The solution is to provide appropriate incentive so that agents 
are more likely to act in the best interest of the principal. Bank ownership reform 
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aims to turn the state-owned banks into joint stock enterprises with multi-ownership 
to enhance the corporate governance. The changed incentive structure is expected to 
better solve the agent-principal problem and therefore to improve bank efficiency. 
A second theoretical perspective on the banking reform is related to the budgetary 
constraints theory first introduced by Kornai (1979). When a firm can expect to get 
financial subsidies in the future in case of financial distress and economic failure, it is 
considered to face a soft budget constraint. One argument for soft budget constraint is 
that government bailout appears necessary when the political price of the bankruptcy 
of firms is high due to unemployment that could lead to social unrest and when the 
sector, like financial sector, is of strategie importance for stability of the economy. 
However, it is generally believed that a soft budget constraint is also a major source 
of inefficiency because it intensifies moral hazard problems in State banks. The theory 
suggests that the State needs to abandon the role of being the last resort for state-
owned banks and should never have to bail banks out in the future. 
1.4 Bank efficiency literaturę 
Over the past half a Century, banking efficiency has been a hot research topie and 
extensive literaturę has been well established. In exploring the sources of inefficiency. 
earlier studies tended to focus on économies of scale and économies of scope. 
Economies of scale examines whether costs per unit can be reduced by increasing 
Output, while économies of scope examines whether costs per unit can be lowered by 
joint production. Empirical studies of scale and scope économies show significant 
scale économies for medium-sized banks of $100 million to $5 billion in assets in the 
1980s. Récent studies indicate that scale économies have increased substantially, 
existing for large banks of $10 billion to $25 billion in assets in the 1990s (Saunders, 
1999). The récent merger and acquisition in the UK banking sector provides a good 
example of scale économies involving huge commercial banks. Such examples 
include the merger of the Royal Bank of Scotland with the National Westminster 
Bank, the Bank of Scotland with Halifax, and the earlier acquisition of Midlands 
Bank by HSBC and the merger of Lloyds and TSB. As for scope économies, however, 
empirical studies reveal small cost inefficiencies. 
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More recently, efficiency research has shifted to more sophisticated performance 
measures of efficiency concepts, including technical efficiency, allocative efficiency 
and economic efficiency. Technical efficiency refers to the ability of optimal 
utilization of available resources either by producing maximum output for a given 
input bündle or by using minimum inputs to produce a given output. Allocative 
efficiency refers to the ability to achieve the optimal combination of inputs and 
Outputs under certain level of priées (Lovell, 1993). The economic efficiency is the 
product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. With price information, cost 
and profit efficiency are preferred performance measures since they are grounded on 
economic foundation by taking account of production technology and optimization at 
a given market priées and compétition condition. The cost (profit) efficiency 
measures how close a bank's costs (profits) to the minimum (maximum) possible 
costs (profits) of a best practiced bank that produce the same bündle of Outputs using 
the same bündle of inputs under the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 1997 and 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Well established efficiency literaturę has been mainly carried out in developed 
nations like the US and European countries. In gênerai, large inefficiencies have been 
found in the order of 20% or more of total costs, or about 50% of operational profits 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). The preferred methodology includes various frontier 
approaches to estimate an efficient frontier and measure the relative efficiency of 
financial institutions as performance indicator. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide 
a valuable summary on 130 studies of financial institution efficiency in 21 countries 
during différent time periods using différent estimation techniques. They find that 
results from various efficiency methods are inconsistent. Later on, Bauer et al. (1998) 
propose a set of consistency conditions by comparing différent frontier efficiency 
methods with a purpose of regulatory analysis. 
The focus of efficiency research in developed countries has been on the implications 
of efficiency results for financial institutions in the areas of government policy, such 
as deregulation, bank failure, merger and acquisition, and so on. Estimated efficiency 
results are regressed against a set of variables in order to identify possible factors that 
explain the différences in performance across financial institutions. Empirical studies 
have reached no agreement on the sources of the measured inefficiency différences. 
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During the last décade, banking reform in developing and transition économies 
prevail and bank efficiency in thèse countries has received considerable attention. The 
reform generally starts with financial liberalization and deregulation, followed by 
ownership reform through privatization usually in the forms of foreign ownership 
participation and/or going public. As a resuit, efficiency studies have focused on 
examining the effects of various reforms on bank performance. Ownership reform is 
one of the most important issues. The relationship between industrial ownership and 
performance has been examined extensively, especially in countries where state-
owned banks dominate its banking System. Primary concerns are optimal 
ownership/management structure and better convergence of management interest with 
that of owners. Most empirical studies generally show a négative association between 
state ownership and efficiency (Bonin et al.. 2005b and Fries and Taci, 2005). 
As to the relationship between privatization and performance, literature has generally 
documented improved post-privatization performance (Gilbert and Wilson, 1998; 
Williams and Nguyen, 2005). However, performance has improved only after the 
government surrendered control in those emerging and developing countries where 
partial privatization of state-owned banks is pervasive. This resuit has particular 
policy implication on the ongoing banking reform in China where the government 
remains a controlling shareholder of listed banks. 
One popular strategy of bank privatization is through attracting foreign stratégie 
investors who are expected to bring in modem banking techniques, superior 
management skills and advanced technology. Moreover, foreign owners are normally 
internationally well-known institutions, investment fund or international banks with a 
high profile that could help privatized banks to attract better clients, hire skilled 
labour and access cheaper sources of funding (Bonin et al. 2005a). Empirical studies 
(Boubakri et al.. 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; and Bonin et al., 2005a) provide strong 
évidence supporting this strategy. Another commonly used strategy of bank 
privatization is through encouraging state banks to go public, based on the premise 
that market discipline could improve bank efficiency by reducing the principal-agent 
problem. The theoretical argument has been supported by empirical studies, such as 
Berger and Mester (1997), Isik and Hassan (2003a) and Girardone, et al. (2004). 
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1.5 Research questions, objectives and contributions 
Chinese banking System has experienced drastic and comprehensive reforms for more 
than a quarter of century. The reform has achieved phased success, while challenges 
remain. Apparently, there is a need for an in-depth and comprehensive efficiency 
study to be carried out in Chinese banking. A number of research questions could be 
asked and this study focuses on questions arising from four main areas. The first area 
to be explored is the économie rationale of the banking reform. What are the 
theoretical foundations for the ongoing banking reform in China? Is the banking 
reform motivated by économie théories of the principal-agent problem or/and the 
budgetary constraint theory? The second area to be addressed is the status quo of the 
Chinese banking System and the performance of Chinese banks. What is the current 
state of the Chinese banking system? Are Chinese banks efficient enough to compete 
with foreign banks? Has bank performance improved? Which banks have performed 
better and why? The third area is to examine the effects of various institutional 
changes in banks on bank performance. Institutional changes involve mainly 
ownership changes in order to construct good corporate governance thereby 
improving performance. Does foreign ownership involvement in domestic banks 
improve performance? Does the going public strategy have positive impacts on bank 
efficiency? What short-term and long-term effects do thèse reform stratégies have? 
The fourth area is to explore policy implications regarding the Chinese banking 
reform. How should future policies be designed to improve compétition and 
efficiency of the Chinese banks after privatization, or partial privatisation? 
In answering thèse questions, this study concentrâtes on the current key issue 
concerned by the Chinese government. that is, how to transform its banking System 
into a modem banking system successfully. The overall success of banking reform 
dépends on the success of SOCBs reform because of their dominant rôle in the 
financial sector. At the second National Financial Work Conférence in 2002, 
deepening SOCBs reform was set on the top agenda of the Chinese financial reforms. 
The reform objective was clearly stated as the joint-stock restructuring of SOCBs in 
order to transform them into modem financial enterprises. Since then, the government 
has made breakthrough by sequential reforms of financial restructuring, joint-stock 
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restructuring and eventually listing three SOCBs on the stock exchanges with the 
forth SOCB under considération. For whatever measures, the paramount purpose of 
banking reform is to build up a better governance and incentive structure to improve 
efficiency. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest that three groups of people may benefit from 
bank efficiency studies: (1) policy makers by evaluating the effects of deregulation, 
mergers and market structure, privatisation, etc.; (2) researchers by illustrating and 
comparing différent méthodologies; and (3) bankers by identifying the possible 
sources of inefficiencies against the industrial best-practice. Accordingly, the main 
objective of this study is to provide recommendations for future bank reform to policy 
makers. Meanwhile, this study also addresses methodological issues to obtain more 
précise efficiency estimâtes, which will enhance the reliability of policy 
recommendations drawn upon them. 
Specific objectives of this study are fivefold. The first objective is to ascertain the 
theoretical économies grounds for the banking reform in China, answering questions 
arising from the first research area. To examine whether ownership reform and 
hardening budget constraints can improve efficiency. two hypothèses will be tested. 
First, joint stock banks are more efficient than the state-owned banks. Second, banks 
subject to a harder budget constraint are more efficient than banks subject to a softer 
budget. 
The second objective is to assess the current State of the banking System and the 
performance of banks after more than 25 years of reform, Using a ratio analysis, this 
study aims at providing an overall subjective assessment of the status quo of the 
Chinese banking system. This study also évaluâtes bank performance and 
distinguishes well-performing banks from poor-performing ones to identify better 
governance structure. Frontier analysis method distinguishes the best practice banks 
against which the relative performance of each bank is derived using a numerical 
efficiency score and ranking. Employing a stochastic frontier analysis approach, 
performance is measured by up-to-date efficiency estimâtes of technical efficiency, 
cost efficiency and profit efficiency. 
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The third objective is to make recommendaùons for future reform by scrutinizing the 
real impacts of various reform stratégies. The évaluation of the effectiveness and 
successfulness of the reforms could provide timely déviation remedy and faults 
correction. This is the most important objective of this study since it will ensure the 
success of the reform in the long term. 
The forth objective is to explore possible relationship between bank performance and 
bank specific characteristics and managerial différences in order to provide bankers 
some guidance to operate more efficiently and profitably. By identifying internai 
factors that are expected to explain the différence in efficiency scores or ranks, 
bankers are able to address and adjust where necessary thèse factors in business 
strategie planning in order to catch up with the best performer. This study addresses 
the features of risking taking behaviour using a set of financial ratios to represent 
capital risk, credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk. 
The final objective is to address methodological issues in order to provide 
information for future research. Issues discussed include efficiency concepts, 
functional forms, mode! spécifications and the use of market average input prices. 
The robust estimation of best performing frontier ensures the précision of efficiency 
estimâtes, which in turn improves the reliability of findings and conclusions drawn 
from thèse estimâtes. 
By achieving thèse objectives, this study contributes to existing literaturę on bank 
efficiency from the perspective of developing and transition countries. Despite the 
flourishing bank efficiency studies over the last several décades, the efficiency of the 
Chinese banking industry is sparsely researched. There are only a handful of studies 
carried out recently, including Yao et al (2007), Fu and Heffernan (2007), Wang et al 
(2005) and Berger et al (2007), and Chen et al (2005). This study attempts to fill in 
this gap by providing a comprehensive and in-depth efficiency study for the Chinese 
banking system. 
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1.6 Research methodology 
In bank efficiency literaturę, ho w to define and measure bank inputs and outputs is 
one of the controversial methodological issues because banks produce multi-outputs 
using multi-inputs. There are two main approaches: production approach and 
intermediation approach. The former is more appropriate when studying the cost 
efficiency of banks by addressing the operating costs while the latter is more 
appropriate when studying the économie differentiation by controlling overall costs. 
This study adopts the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) while it is 
modified by treating total deposits as an output but interest costs on deposit as an 
input. 
How to détermine the best-practice frontier to measure efficiency is another 
controversial methodological issue. Estimation methods are grouped into non-
parametric and parametric methods. Both are well established with no consensus 
regarding which is superior to another and each fits différent research issues. In 
empirical studies, they are roughly equally employed (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Non-parametric methods estimate best practice frontier within the dataset and allows 
efficiency to vary over time. They do not pre-specify a functional form for the best 
practice frontier and make no assumptions on the distribution of the inefficiencies 
across observations. This group of methods assumes no random errors influencing 
bank performance and therefore the effects of omitted errors may be dissolved into 
efficiency estimâtes. 
In contrast, parametric methods pre-specify a functional form for the best-practice 
frontier and make assumptions on the distributions of inefficiencies and random 
errors. Their principal advantage is that they allow for random errors, overcoming the 
main drawback of the non-parametric methods. However, parametric methods are 
critieized due to the pre-specification of a functional form for the best-practice 
frontier. This presumed precondition may lead to an inaccurate efficiency 
measurement due to a mis-specification of the functional form. Pries and Taci (2005) 
argue that parametric methods. in particular the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), is 
more appropriate over non-parametric methods in efficiency studies in transition 
économies where the problems of measurement errors and uncertain économie 
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environments are more likely to prevail. This study adopts parametric method, in 
particular SFA, to estimate the efficiency of the Chinese banks, given the fact that 
China has been experiencing a significant transition period with rapid economic 
development. 
Within the SFA framework, a primal approach is used to examine technical efficiency 
while a dual approach is used to estimate economic efficiency—cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency. Each approach has its own merits and this study employs both 
primal approach and dual approach to examining bank performance in order to 
provide a more complete picture for Chinese banks. The primal approach uses a pre-
specified production function as the representation of the production technology of 
the industry and estimates technical efficiency. The main advantages of primal 
approach are threefold. First, it makes no behavioural assumptions, such as cost 
minimization or profit maximization. Secondly, estimated parameters contain 
economic meanings when estimating standard Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Dual approach commonly estimates cost or profit function in Translog functional 
form where first order parameters have no economic meanings because of the 
inclusion of too many intersect terms. Finally, it does not require input price 
information, which not only reduces the downside effect of inaccurate data on input 
prices but also makes research possible when input prices are not available. 
The primary approach generally lacks the ability to accommodate the technology of 
producing multi-outputs using multi-inputs. Traditionally, when examining the 
efficiency of an industry with multi-outputs multiple-input nature, studies has been 
done through two compromising ways—either to aggregate multiple outputs into a 
single index of output or to take each output one time as the dependent variable. 
Addressing this drawback, a breakthrough has been made by applying a distance 
function to estimate technical efficiency. The distance function approach is first 
introduced by Shephard (1953, 1970) after proving the duality between input distance 
function and the cost function and between the output distance function and the 
revenue function in 1953 and 1970, respectively. This approach requires no input 
price information while accommodating a multi-outputs multi-inputs technology. It 
makes efficiency studies possible for industries employing multi-inputs and multi-
outputs technology in the absence of input price information and behavioural 
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assumptions. Under certain circumstances, it is impossible for the dual approach to 
estimating cost function or profit function. For instance, price information may be 
unavailable or inaccurately measured and/or behavioural assumptions may not be 
appropriate or realistic. As distance function usually takes Translog or more flexible 
Flourier functional form, estimated parameters are lack of economic meanings. 
This study employs both traditional primal approach and the more advanced distance 
function approach to estimate technical efficiency of Chinese banking system. 
Traditional primal approach is used to rationalize the theoretical foundations of the 
Chinese banking reforms by estimating a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
(Chapter 5). The main argument for this choice is that this model distinguishes the 
impacts of each hypothesis without compounding effects of other factors, such as the 
appropriateness of behavioural assumptions and the reliability of price information. 
Moreover, unlike other complex functional form, the interpretation of Cobb-Douglas 
production function is straightforward and estimated parameters have economic 
meanings. This would provide adequate information to examine the rationale of 
Chinese banking reform. This study also employs the recently developed distance 
function approach to provide more precise technical efficiency estimates for Chinese 
banks and differentiates the impact of various institutional changes on bank 
performance (Chapter 6). 
Although the primal approach has its merits, a dual approach is preferred to evaluate 
performance of industries producing multi-outputs using multi-inputs when input 
price information are reliable and behavioural assumptions are appropriate. A dual 
approach examines industrial performance in terms of cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency that are grounded on economic foundation by accounting for not only 
production technology but also optimization at given market prices and competition 
condition (Berger and Mester, 1997). When estimating profit efficiency, alternative 
profit function is particularly chosen by assuming that banks can exercise a degree of 
market power in setting output prices. An important advantage of the alternative 
profit function over standard profit function is the proper examination of the profit 
efficiency when there are no reliable price measurement of certain outputs, such as 
transactions services and fee-based transactions (Berger and Mester, 1997 and 
DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). In order to provide more comprehensive information on 
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the performance of Chínese banks, this study also estimates cost efficiency and profít 
efñciency using a dual approach (Chapter 7). 
Efficiency analysis using SEA commonly consists of two parís. It first estimates a 
pre-specified cost or profit function and decomposes error terms into a random error 
and inefñciency. The inefñciencies are assumed to follovv an asymmetrical half-
normal distributíon, while random errors follow a symmetric standard normal 
distribution. In the second part of the study, the estimated inefñciencies are regressed 
against a set of variables that are expected to explain the differences in inefñciencies 
across firms. A commonly employed tvvo-step estimation procedure conducís the two 
parts of the analysis by two sepárate steps, while a recently developed one-step 
procedure simultaneously estimates the best-practice frontier and identifies the 
possible factors responsible for the variation in efficiency from a single estimation. 
The former is consídered to be inferior to the latter as the former suffers from serious 
econometric problems due to its contradictory assumptions on the independence of 
the inefficiency effects in two sepárate steps (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
This study uses a one-step estimation model. proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) 
in which non-negative cost inefñciencies are a function of firm-specific variables. It 
assumes that the inefficiency effects are independently distributed as truncations of 
normal distributions with a constant variance, but with means that are a linear 
function of observable variables. Berger et al. (2005) highlight the importance to 
analyze all the relevant govemance effects in the same model and they propose a 
method jointly examines static, selection and dynamic effects of govemance changes 
on bank performance. This method is incorporated into the second part of the analysis 
in this one-step procedure to examine the effects of banks' institutional changes on 
their performance. 
The data on Chínese banks cover the period 1995-2005 and are collected mainly from 
BankScope produced by the Bureau van Dijk. It is a reputable datábase, including 
data on more than 10.000 banks world-wide with monthly update. The latest issue of 
the BankScope datábase used in this study is May 2007. Other important 
complementary data sources include Almanac of China's Finalice and Banking 
(1986-2006), China Statistical Yearbook (1996-2006) and the website of regulatory 
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bodies and commercial banks. In the awareness of the questionable data quality in 
China, data have been carefully cross checked where possible and have been adjusted 
where necessary in order to improve the reliability of research findings. With the best 
available data, this study provides fruitful and rich information on the performance of 
the commercial banks and useful policy recommendations for the ongoing banking 
reform in China. 
1.7 The structure of this study 
The next chapter traces back the history of the Chinese bank system and portrays its 
évolution. The purpose is to describe the development process of the banking system 
and to provide comprehensive background knowledge about the banking system and 
its on-going reform. It starts with the origin of the banking System and its rôle in the 
centrally-planned economy about half a century ago. Then it deptcts the reform 
process that transforms the banking system serving a centrally-planned economy into 
the one to be viable in a market-based economy. The whole reform process has been 
divided into four sub-periods. For each sub-period, this chapter discusses in détail the 
motivation of reform, problems being dealt with, policy responses, objectives and 
outcomes. It not only provides good understanding on the Chinese banking system, 
but also identifies remaining problems and new challenges from a forward-looking 
perspective. 
Chapter 3 reviews the bank efficiency literature. This chapter first introduces basic 
efficiency concepts and frontier estimation techniques and discusses their inherited 
merits and shortcomings. After a brief review on bank efficiency literature Worldwide 
in gênerai, particular attention is paid to bank efficiency studies in developing 
countries and transition économies, Banking Systems in thèse nations share many 
commonalities and most of them are either completed reform or being reformed 
toward profit-oriented market-based modem banking system. This chapter focuses on 
reviewing the effects on bank performance of various banking reforms, such as 
deregulation, privatization, ownership refomi, foreign banks entry, and foreign 
ownership participation in domestic banks. Literature review provides guidance for 
this study in terms of theoretical foundation. research direction, objectives, and 
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methodologies. Moreover, critical review of existing literature helps identify gaps to 
be filled in. 
Chapter 4 describes data and assesses the current state of the banking system. It first 
discusses where data have been collected and how the sample has been constructed. 
Then it assesses the current state of the Chinese banking system using conventional 
financial ratio analysis. The assessment provides comprehensive information of the 
Chinese banking system for the period spanning from 1995 to 2005 when the banking 
system experienced the most drastic reforms. Borrowing financial indicators from the 
macro-prudential analysis framework, the performance and financial condition of 
Chinese banking industry is analyzed in terms of profitability, capital adequacy, asset 
quality, and liquidity. These indicators are also compared with those of well-know 
international banks. Any favourable or downside trends will be investigated in depth 
to reveal underlying reasons and problems. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
identify strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese banking system from a financial 
perspective. 
Chapter 5 examines whether concrete banking reform measures initiated by the 
government are based on the agency theory and budgetary constraints theory. The 
purpose is to uncover the economic rationale of the ongoing bank reform in China. 
SFA and Cobb-Douglas production function are employed to test two hypotheses. 
First, by hypothesizing that joint-stock banks are more efficient than state-owned 
banks, it tests whether ownership reform would better solve the agent-principal 
problem and thus improve bank performance. Secondly, by hypothesizing that less 
capitalized banks (facing a hard budget constraint) are more efficient than well 
capitalized banks (facing a soft budget constraint), it tests whether hardening budget 
constrains could improve banks performance. Empirical evidence supports two 
hypotheses and justifies the economic motivation of bank reform. 
Chapter 6 evaluates bank performance in term of technical efficiency to examine 
whether the performance has improved after more than two decades of unremitting 
reform efforts. The impacts of various institutional changes on bank performance are 
differentiated using static, selection, and dynamic governance indicators. Two 
important reform strategies are of particular research interest, namely the attracting 
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foreign ownership strategy and going public strategy. The purpose is to examine the 
impacts of thèse stratégies on bank performance and therefore to evaluate the 
successfulness of ongoing reform in terms of technical efficiency. Results show more 
favourable impact of foreign ownership participation than the IPO strategy. This 
chapter also contributes to the development of research methodology. Concerning the 
frontier estimation, this chapter develops a comprehensive stochastic distance 
function model by constructively and innovatively combining the advantages of 
existing model, procédure and method. This will enhance the reliability and improve 
the précision of estimation results. Exploring the sensitivity to the définition of inputs 
and outputs, this chapter compares results from income-based spécifications and 
earning assets-based spécifications, providing valuable suggestion for efficiency 
study in banking Systems with high level of non-performing loans. 
Employing a dual approach, Chapter 7 estimâtes cost efficiency and alternative profit 
efficiency of Chinese banks to assess bank performance from more concrète aspects. 
When priée information is available and behavioural assumption is appropriate, thèse 
économie efficiency concepts are preferred because of their économie foundations. 
Similar to Chapter 6, the impacts of various reform stratégies are differentiated in 
order to probe policy implications and to provide recommendations for future reform. 
Evidence is mixed but generally supporting privatization stratégies under review. 
Meanwhile, this chapter also addresses two issues concerning methodology of the 
estimation of cost efficiency and profit efficiency. The purpose is to choose better 
functional form and input price proxy to improve the quality and précision of 
estimated results and usefulness of policy implications and recommendations. It 
examines the influences of using différent functional forms as présentation for cost 
and profit function. By comparing results from the standard transbg functional form 
and Fourier flexible functional form, the latter is preferred because of slightly better 
estimation. Another issue is the use of bank spécifie input priées in most cost and 
profit efficiency studies, which violâtes the assumption of exogeriously determined 
input priées for cost minimization and profit maximization to be held. This chapter 
compares bank spécifie input priées and market average input priées and find that 
market average input priées lead to better estimation results, 
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Chapter 8 draws conclusions by summarizing comprehensive findings of this research 
that have been discussed in detail throughout the thesis. It first looks at the soundness 
and stability of the Chinese banking System and point out its strengths and 
weaknesses by looking at bank profitability, capital adequacy, N P L problem, and 
liquidity. Having justified economic rationale for the banking reform policy, this 
chapter provides an overall performance assessment for the banking System as a 
whole and for différent types of banks taking into account ail of technical efficiency, 
cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. The impacts of différent reform 
stratégies on bank performance measured by différent efficiency concepts are 
summarized. These findings have important policy implications. By taking füll 
account of the Chinese reality, three policy recommendations are made for future 
banking reform. This chapter also summarizes findings concerning mythologies, 
which provides valuable suggestion for future efficiency research not only for 
developing countries and transition économies but also for other countries in the 
world. 
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Chapter 2 the Chínese banking system 
2.0 Preamble 
This chapter attempts to draw an overall picture for the Chínese banking system in 
order to provide background information for this research. It starts with a brief review 
on the history of the banking system in section 2.1. Since 1978. the banking system 
has entered a reforming period, which can be divided into four sub-periods. Section 
2.2 to section 2.5 go through each sub-period with detailed discussion on reform 
purposes, challenges, outcomes, remaining problems, and necessary policy responses, 
respectively. As the results of more than a quarter of century of comprehensive 
reform, the former policy-driven banking system has been transformed much closer to 
a market-based modern banking system. Section 2.6 sketches the status quo of this 
system and points out possible future challenges when taking full account of the 
China's speciality and reality. 
2.1 A brief history of Chinese banking system 
The new China's banking system was established in 1949, when the People's 
Republic of China (hereafter China) was founded. Over half a century, the banking 
system has gone through two distinctive evolutionary periods: mono-banking period 
(1949—1978) and reforming period (1979—now). The mono-banking system was a 
highly centrally-planed unitary banking system. dominated by the PBC, the only bank 
in the country. PBC was in charge of nearly all financial functions: the conduct of 
monetary policy, exchange policy, foreign reserve management, deposit taking, 
commercial lending and investment. The PBC essentially combined the roles of the 
central bank and the commercial banks. Its operation was subject to strict cash and 
credit plans set in accordance with the production plans projected by the State 
Planning Commission (Wong and Wong, 2001). 
Although a few banks were established during this period, the structure of the 
banking system was unchanged and the dominant status of PBC was never challenged. 
The People's Construction Bank of China was founded in 1954 but it was a 
subsidiary of Ministry of Finance. BOC, initially founded in 1912, became a 
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subsidiary of the PBC dealing with foreign currency transactions exclusively since 
1950:s. A B C was established in 1951 but lately ceased. 
Thèse banks were wholly state-ovvned and served the state centrally-planed 
production projects. Under central planning, banks passively collected household 
savings and channelled funds in accordance with national production plans. They 
were merely accounting agencies, keeping track of the financial transactions on 
planned allocations. Banks* opérations were driven by government needs rather than 
profit Thus, the banking System played only a limited role in promoting économie 
growth. Normal commercial banking skills. such as risk management and project 
sélection, were totally ignored (Yang, 2002). 
This centrally-controlled mono-banking System had lasted until 1978 when Deng 
Xiaoping started his reform and open up policy in China. Since then, the banking 
System has entered a graduai reform period and has experienced drastic institutional 
changes toward a market-based banking system. Along with China's comprehensive 
économie reforms, the government has launched a series of concrete reforms with 
respect to its banking system in order to transform it into a more open and 
compétitive banking system. According to Tang (2005), the reform period can be 
divided into four sub-periods: (1) the period of initial institutional restructuring 
during 1979—1984; (2) the period of state-owned specialized banks during 1984— 
1994; (3) the period of commercialisation during 1994—2003; and (4) the period of 
modernization since 2003 onward. 
2.2 The period of initial institutional restructuring during 1979—1984 
Since the économie reform started in 1979. the centrally-planned banking system was 
no longer fitted for the need of économie development. This called for institutional 
reform to sepárate commercial banking opérations from the regulatory and 
supervisory body of the central bank. This institutional reform was kicked off in 1979 
by the introduction of a two-tier banking system. This was regarded as the first 
milestone in the transformation of the mono-banking system into a modem one. The 
government removed the monopolistic position of PBC by breaking up PBC into two 
arms: the central bank and the commercial opérations. The central bank retained the 
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name of PBC. The primary objective of the central bank was clarified as maintaining 
price stability, enforcing strict supervision over financial institutions, conducting 
clearance, and issuing bank notes. The headquarters were also in charges of issuing 
and implementing monetary policy, formulating a credit plan in accordance with the 
national economic plan. 
The commercial opérations of PBC were stripped off to four specialized state-owned 
banks. The A B C reopened in 1979 and took over PBC's rural wholesale and retail 
banking businesses and responsibilities for supervising a network of rural credit 
coopératives (RCCs) that had been providing small-scale rural banking. The People's 
Construction Bank of China was specialized in dealing with medium to long-term 
credit for fixed assets Investment of the govemment and urban large construction 
projects in the 1980"s. It was lately renamed as China Construction Bank in 1996 and 
was restructured as China Construction Bank Corporation in 2004. BOC was 
specialized in handling foreign currency transactions and trade finance in 1979. ICBC 
was established in 1984, taking over commercial banking activities in urban areas 
from PBC and it used to be the major financier of funds to China's urban areas and 
manufacturing sector (Yang, 2002). BOC and ICBC were also restructured as joint-
stock banks in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
These four state-owned banks provided services mainly to SOEs within a designated 
sector of the economy. They operated as well-encapsulated monopolistic institutions, 
with no responsibilities and incentives to penetrate and compete across régions and 
sectors. Each of them had provincial and local branches and each branch operated 
within a designated région under the administrative control and guidance from the 
respective local authority. As a resuit, ail banks and their local branches had their own 
serving niches, effectively ruling out any possibility of free compétition. 
The achievement in this period was the breaking-up of mono-banking System 
replaced by a central bank and four specialized state-owned banks. This represented 
the first step to establish a two-tier banking System where four state-owned 
specialized banks were the mainstay. They were designed to serve différent sectors of 
the economy and they were the officiai source of fïnancing for state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) within each assigned serving realm. There was no stock and 
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corporate bond market, leaving the entire role of financial intermediation to them. A 
soft-budget constraint was common practice. even more explicit for state-owned 
banks since they financed SOEs inherently as a government agent regardless of their 
profitability. They hardly had autonomy to make lending décisions, so no chance to 
make such décisions based on commercial considérations. There was no compétition 
at all in the banking industry. 
2.3 The period of state-owned specialized banks during 1984—1994 
Düring this period, the reform purpose is to transform the policy-driven banking 
System to a market-oriented one. The government advanced institutional restructuring 
in an attempt to increase compétition in the banking system and to create a market 
compétitive atmosphère. Two major refbrm measures include the allowance of 
foreign bank and new domestic bank entry to inject new source of compétition into 
the market and the removal of the restrictions on state-owned specialized banks' 
business scope to release State banks for compétition. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the majority of nationwide or regional joint-stock 
commercial banks (JSCBs) were launched. The most important feature of these banks 
is the shareholding ownership structure, which was an institutional breakthrough in 
the Chinese banking industry. In 1986, the Bank of Communications was re-launched 
as the first national wide JSCB. It was originally founded in 1908 and merged by 
PBC and People's Construction Bank of China in 1949 except for opérations in Hong 
Kong. Afterward, JSCBs burgeoned and most JSCBs were established during this 
period, including CITIC Industrial Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shenzhen 
Development Bank Co., Ltd, Industrial Bank Co. Ltd. Guangdong Development Bank, 
China Everbright Bank. Huaxia Bank, and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank. 
JSCBs were operated as commercial banks with the main objective of profit 
maximization. In this period, the central bank has given JSCBs more room to develop 
their business scopes and geographica! présence in order to accelerate the émergence 
of market discipline. For example, JSCBs were allowed to boost their size and obtain 
capital through listing on stock exchanges. 1t is arguable to distinguish JSCBs from 
state-owned specialised banks since the key shareholders of JSCBs were still local 
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govemments and the state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. However, JSCBs 
were more competitive, and more profit-oriented, and more performance-conscious 
because of less government intervention, flexible personnel management as well as 
better overall management (Wong and Wong, 2001). 
RCCs and urban credit cooperatives (UCCs) were also set up in the 1980s to diversify 
the banking system and to channei funds to projects in áreas where resources were 
scarce. The main business of RCCs and UCCs were to finance small and medium-
sized rural or urban enterprises and individuáis. Their lending policies were governed 
by the local public authorities. Thousands of RCCs played an important role in 
mobilizing rural household savings, channelling funds to town and village enterprises, 
agricultural activities, and other development projects in rural áreas. These financial 
institutions were supplementary to the banking system, 
In 1985, the authorities removed the restriction that specialized state banks had to 
serve their respective designated economic sector in order to increase competition in 
the banking system. The four state-owned specialized banks were permitted to 
enlarge their business scope and to compete with each other as well as JSCBs across 
their original boundaries. State-banks were institutionally released and had same 
opportunities to compete for attracting deposits and extending loans to better quality 
clients as JSCBs (Wong and Wong, 2001). 
By 1994, the initial institutional restructuring of banking system was completed. The 
two-tier banking system took shape, which was dominated by state-owned banks, 
along with joint-stock commerciaí banks as growth engine and UCCs and RCCs as 
supplementary. However, the reform failed to achieve the main goal of transforming a 
policy-driven banking system to a market-oriented system. Competition in banking 
market was increased but insufficient to créate a market-based banking atmosphere. 
The banking system remained as policy-driven while the role of state-owned banks 
became rather vague and contradictory. Banks were officially expected to compete 
with each other as well as JSCBs and to be profit-driven institutions. This expectation 
was overwhelmingly diminished by the strong role of governmental agencies 
responsible for promoting macroeconomic stability and maintaining economic growth. 
State-owned banks still acted as government arms to help implement production plans 
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projected by the State and Regional Planning Commissions. Banks' operations were 
frequently intervened by the central and local governments. The local branches were 
under government control and much of their lending activities were still driven by the 
needs of policy makers. 
Policy-driven banking system extended loans to SOEs on the basis of fulñlling the 
national and regional production plans and to maintain employment, regardless of 
proñtability. Although SOEs reform had made some progress on improving 
enterprises profitability, about two-thirds of SOEs were still loss maker during this 
economic transition period, of which one-third were even unable to genérate 
sufficient earnings to cover interest payments, The pace of SOEs reform was 
constrained by the concerns over social stability and public support for reforms, and 
the rather poor performance of SOEs (Karacadag, 2002). 
An inevitable result was a huge amount of non-performing loans and losses for their 
financing banks—state-owned banks. These NPLs and losses were regarded as the 
costs of institutional transition of the economy and the state were expected to be 
responsible for cleaning them up. Thus state banks were implicitly guaranteed by the 
government and enjoyed a soft budget constraint when SOEs were subject to 
hardening budget constraints. Commercial banking practice and skills were hardly 
developed, given the prevalence of policy lending practice. These problems stood on 
the way of successfully transforming the banking system to a market-oriented system. 
2.4 The period of commercialization during 1994—2003 
Banking reform was considered as unsuccessful in contrast to the rapid economic 
development to date, suggesting the commercialization of state-owned banks could 
no longer be postponed. Furthermore, after joining WTO in December 2001, China 
committed itself to opening up not only the real economic sectors, but also the 
financial and banking system completely within five years. The domestic commercial 
banks would have to compete with foreign banks and other o verseas financial 
institutions on the basis of an international marketplace. However, the banking 
system in China at that time was still under enormous financial stress due to the high 
prevalence of non-performing loans (NPLs), low capitalization and poor management. 
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índeed, its Iow efficiency and mounting NPLs made the reform more and more 
difficult and challenging. In the ominous words of Gordon Chang (2001), WTO 
membership would lead to bankruptcy of domestic banks and would shut down the 
national credit system. 
Facing these challenges and opportunities, Chínese authorities initiated the second 
wave of banking reform, centring on the separation of commercial lending from 
policy lending and the management of NPLs. Comprehensive and concrete reform 
measures emphasized four aspects: (1) Legal environment and . institutional 
restructuring; (2) financial restructuring of SOCBs; (3) financial liberalization and 
opening up; (4) strengthening prudential regulatory and supervisory framework. 
2.4.1 Legal environment and institutional restructuring 
In the recognition that policy lending practice of state-owned banks was detrimental 
to the health of the whole banking system, the government established three policy-
banks to take over policy lending activities from state banks in 1994. They were 
expected to focus on long-term development finance and other policy-lending 
activities. The intention was to move the state-owned specialized banks away from 
being driven by policy towards being driven by profit and competition. 
Three policy banks include the China Development Bank, the Import-Export Bank of 
China, and the Agricultural Development Bank of China. The China Development 
Bank, the largest policy bank, was designed to deal with long- and medium-term 
lending to finance construction projects in infrastructure and strategie industries. 
Later, it also planed to launch a new policy to provide financia! support to promising SMEs 
in collaboration with city commercial banks in order to promote SMEs expansión and 
employment. The purpose is to mitígate the impact of China's entry to WTO that 
unemployment would raise in the short run because WTO would accelerate China's structural 
reforms and urbanization process. Import-Export Bank of China was responsible for 
providing loans to import and export companies. Agricultural Development Bank of 
China was supposed to finance the procurement of agricultural produets and 
development projects determined by central government. The main capital sources of 
these policy-lending banks were borrowings from PBC and issuíng of bonds domestically and 
intemationally, although the Agricultural Development Bank of China accepted deposits on a 
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limited scale. These three policy-lending banks were guided by individual charters 
rather than the Commercial Bank Law enacted in 1995. Since their establishment, policy 
banks expanded quickly. For example, total assets of three policy banks increased from RMB 
747 billion in 1995 to RMB 3369 billion in 2005. They played an important role in the rapid 
development of the Chinese economy 
The objective of establishing policy bank is to improve State banks' performance by 
freeing the Big Four from extending policy loans to loss making SOEs. 
Notwithstanding this purpose. the Big Four still played a significant role in policy 
lending activities. The roles of the commercial banks and the policy banks were not 
well defined in actual practice. In theory, the Big Four became commercial banks 
governed by the Commercial Bank Law erected in 1995 and they were granted with 
operational autonomy. The Big Four were expected to operate on a pure commercial 
basis. However, in practice, the serving and lending capacity of the policy banks were 
unable to meet the need for policy lending previously provided by the Big Four due to 
the lack of a branch network and capitals. Taking total fixed asset as a rough indicator 
of the network serving capacity, total fixed asset of policy banks expanded from 
R M B 0.75 billion in 1995 to RMB 13.6 billion in 2005, while that of the Big Four 
was R M B 103 billion and RMB 329 billion in 1995 and 2005 respectively. Therefore, 
the Big Four were frequently subject to pressure from both the central and regional 
authorities to make loans to their preferred sector and enterprises with less 
considération of the profitability and recoverability of loans. On the other hand, 
policy banks, except for the Agricultural Development Bank of China, actually served 
more profitable sectors of the economy. For example, the China Development Bank 
provided finance to industries and infrastructure projects such as electricity, energy, 
roads and télécommunications. The Import-Export Bank of China aimed to support 
export and import firms in order to promote profitable foreign trade. Those losing-
making SOEs previously served by the Big Four were still left in their hand although 
less explicitly. 
Meanwhile, the four specialized banks and the urban credit coopératives were 
transformed into commercial banks. In 1995, the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks enacted and laid foundations for commercially oriented 
banking institutions. The four state-owned specialized banks were legally defined as 
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wholly state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). They were expected to operate 
under the principles of profitability, safety, and liquidity and were responsible for 
their own profits and losses. They were supposed to be operationally independent and 
have the freedom to choose the clientele on a pure commercial basis. Although efforts 
were made to release SOCBs from being govemment agents, they still played a 
significant role in policy lending to support the economic development and to 
maintain social stability. 
In the same year, PBC was legally confirmed as the central bank by the Law of the 
People's Bank of China. However, the central bank still was not an independent 
regulatory body. It was ultimately overseen by the State Council (the cabinet)—the 
central government. Local governments also had the right to appoint senior managers 
for the local branches of PBC and the SOCBs. Thus, governments had the power to 
force banks to lend in accordance with their preference and government intervention 
in SOCBs' operations was common practice at that time. In order to eliminate 
govemment intervention, the central bank was reorganized at the end of 1998. 
Provincial-level branches were merged into nine large regional branches, located in 
Shenyang, Tianjin, Jinan, Nanjing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, and 
Xi'an. This reorganization made local govemments no longer had such strong power 
to intervene SOCBs' lending decisions and commercial banks were released (Wong 
and Wong, 2001). 
Since the mid-1990s, City Commercial Banks (CCBs) were created by the way of 
restructuring and consolidating former urban credit cooperatives. CCBs adopted a 
shareholding ownership structure and were restricted geographically within their own 
localities. Capital was provided by urban enterprises and local government. CCBs 
serve mainly the smali and medium-sized enterprises, co!lective and local residents in 
their municipalities. In the meantime, rural credit cooperatives were restructured as 
independent financial institutions. By then, the second layer of the banking system 
consisted of two parts: (a) commercial banks subject to prudential regulations and 
P B C s supervision, including TSCBs ; CCBs, SOCBs, foreign banks, and rural credit 
cooperatives and urban credit cooperatives; and (b) three state-owned policy banks. 
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2.4.2 Financial restructuring of SOCBs 
By the end of the 20 t h century, SOCBs became ñnancially insolvent because of a 
stubbornly high level of accuinulated NPLs and resultant low capitalization. The 
Chinese economy experienced overheating and transitional reform of SOEs was 
deepened in the 1990s. NPLs in SOCBs grew even faster accompanied by steadily 
declining capital adequacy ratios. By 1999. the total amount of NPLs in SOCBs was 
estimated as RMB3.3 trillion under four-category loan classification system, 
accounting for 41% of GDP for the year. Capital adequacy ratios were unavailable to 
public until 2004 but they were estimated to be much less than international standards 
of 8% in the 1990s (See chapter 4 for more detail). The banking system became rather 
weak and vulnerable. 
Low capitalization and massive NPLs constituted a direct threat to the Chinese 
banking system. The threat must be dealt with carefully since any failure would cause 
a fínancial crisis and jeopardize social stability. A financial crisis could tremendously 
damage the economy and wipe out years of economic achievements, as clearly 
demonstrated by the Asían Crisis in 1997. As discussed before, SOCBs bore the costs 
of the structural transition of the economy from a centrally-planned to market-
oriented economy, and the costs of any misconduct in the economic development. 
Henee, the govemment was responsible for making this worsening situation good and 
restoring the health of the banking system. Perhaps alerted by the Asian fínancial 
crisis in 1997, bank reform was postponed to the 1990s. In 1998, in order to control 
NPLs growth, the authorities had introduced 'lifetime responsibility system' to 
penalize bank managers responsible for bad loans even after their retirement. 
During 1998-1999, the central govemment, as expected, commenced the first round 
of SOCBs bailout in the forms of capital injection and NPLs off-loading. In 1998, 
R M B 270 billion was injected into four SOCBs through issuing long-term treasure 
bonds. The fresh capital raised SOCBs capital adequacy ratios to 8%, in line with the 
requirement of the Basel Capital Accord. In 1999, in dealing with NPL problem, 
Chinese govemment created four asset management companies (AMCs), namely 
Cinda Asset Management Company. China Great Wall Asset Management Company, 
Oriental Asset Management Company, and China Huarong Asset Management 
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Corporation, paired with CCBC, A B C , BOC and ICBC, respectively. Subsequently, 
NPLs worth R M B 1.4 trillion (about 15.6% of the combined total of outstanding 
loans) were transferred from SOCBs to AMCs at book value, This action beautified 
SOCBs' balance sheets and prevented the four SOCBs from having to write-down large 
amount of NPLs in their loan portfolios. AMCs were expected to repackage the NPLs 
into viable assets and sell them off to the investors so that maximize NPLs recoveries, 
They adopted recovery methods including debt-for-equity swap, restructuring of debt 
terms, debt collection, sale or lease of real property, direct sales of packaged or individual 
NPLs, and securitizations. 
NPLs problem, in fact, was unsolved and the government merely put this 'hot potato' into 
AMCs ' pocket. However, AMCs faced a number of institutional and operational 
plights preventing them from successfully disposing of NPLs. First, the governance 
structure of AMCs was problematic. As non-banking financial institutions, they were 
heavily supervised by a multiple political agencies with Supervisory Board Members 
from the CBRC, the Ministry of Finance, and the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. Flowever, they had their own agenda and none of these individually 
powerful bodies took the overall responsibility, leaving AMCs much less regulated in 
practice. Moreover, the President of the Big Four also involved in the operations of their 
corresponding AMC by serving as the Party Secretary. With this intertwining relationship 
with banks, AMCs were unlikely to act as independent commercial entities to dispose 
of NPLs. Furthermore, AMCs themselves were wholly state-owned companies, 
suffering from agent-principal problem and moral hazard problem which generally 
resulted in poor performance and low efficiency. 
Second, the transfer price of the NPLs in 1999 was far from their true value. The 
recovery ratio was estimated to be below 20 percent, resulting in an inevitable significant 
loss for the AMCs and therefore provided no incentive for them to maximize the recovery 
price. This situation changed from 2004 when AMCs were allowed to purchase NPLs 
from state-owned banks through an auction. For example, in July 2004, Cinda (an A M C 
originally paired with CCBC) won an auction to purchase RMB 278.7 billion of NPLs 
from CCB and BOC. Cinda paid 50 percent of the face value and promised to recover 33 
to 34 percent by the end of 2005. Although the transfer price remained higher than the 
estimated recovery value, it was a right step towards providing the proper incentives to 
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AMCs. Moreover, the Chinese government provided cash incentives to AMCs for 
maximizing returns and accelerating recovery rate, which would further help increase the 
commercial orientation of these entities. The Chinese government also encouraged 
AMCs to partner with internationally reputable foreign investors and advisors with 
substantial expertise in management of distressed assets in order to maximize NPLs 
recovery. 
Third, AMCs were government vehicle companies with no real resources to finance 
their operations independently. Each of them had only 10 billion capital paid by the 
State when they were established in 1999, which was too small in contray to the scale 
of NPLs they were handling. Their purchases of NPLs were fínanced by central bank 
lending and the issue of special bonds guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. AMCs 
had no resources to repay principal (even interests) that would probably turn out as 
bad debt in the future. AMCs ' managers had no means to make it better and therefore 
they understood they would not be responsible for losses, giving rise to the moral 
hazard problem. 
Fourth, the transpareney of AMCs' operations was deficient. In fact AMCs were exempt 
from external audits by independent parties, Compounded with above factors, problems 
such as corruption and inadequate controls were vvídespread at the AMCs, very similar to 
or even worse than their banking counterparts. The Chinese National Audit Office had 
discovered ¡ilegal practices in AMCs including collusion, insider trading, connected 
transactions, improper appraisal processes, fraudulent bidding and auction processes, lack 
of internal controls, embezzlement and mismanagement of assets. 
Ovcr the lasl few years, Chinese authorities have realized these problems and undertaken 
other proactive measures to solve the NPLs problem. Now China has started making 
progress in improving its legal framework, setting more reasonable NPL transfer price to 
AMCs, and revamping the cultures of AMCs. 
Despite of unsolved NPL problems in AMCs, financial restructuring of SOCBs had 
improved the soundness and stability of the banking system. As immediate results, 
the total amount of NPLs of SOCBs decreased to R M B 1.9 trillion, accounting for 
22% of GDP in 2000. The rapid declining return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) was also stabilized. Capital adequacy ratios of SOCBs were increased 
to the minimum requirement of 8% of the Basel Accord 1988. However, the process 
of restoring financial health was far more complicated than expected. Favourable 
outcomes of this refomi were short-lived and problems of high level of NPLs and low 
capitalization re-visited the Chinese banking system shortly. In 2001, the total amount 
of NPLs rebounded to RMB 2.3 trillion under the newly adopted five-category loan 
classification system. The increase of NPLs level was partially due to the change 
from the four-category classification system before 2001 to the five-category loan 
classification system afterward. The former was estimated to underestimate NPLs by 
14% suggested by a PBC internal study since it provides leeway to retain NPLs 
unreported. Capital adequacy ratio of SOCBs and JSCBs dropped to 4.6 % and 6.83% 
respectively in September 2003. The real capital adequacy ratios may be even lower 
when allowing for the deficiency of provisions for loan losses (Luo, 2003). 
However, the main reason was that this round of bailout only solved the non-
fundamental problems without addressing the deep-rooted causes of these problems. 
SOCBs' major clients were still SOEs of which the majority remained inefficient and 
unprofitable. Despite progress being made, SOEs suffered from deep-rooted problems, 
such as weak enterprise management and low operational efficiency, limited outside 
governance mechanisms and excessive workforce (Karacadag, 2002). Moreover, this 
round of bailout seemed to send out a message that the government was the last resort 
of help once banks are in distress. Hence, a soft budget constraint was still in place 
and the moral hazard problem remained. Given the high demand for capital in the 
rapidly growing economic environment, bank managers lent relentlessly or even 
colluded with clients, resulting in loans that would never be recovered. 
2.4.3 Financial liberalization and opening up 
During this period, financial liberalization was started by removing the credit quotas 
and reducing direct lending in 1998. The credit plan for both working capital loans 
and fixed investment loans was abolished. Instead, an indicative non-binding target 
was activated as a reference for commercial banks to plan their business. It was 
regarded as another milestone of the Chinese banking system reform since SOCBs 
were granted more responsibility and autonomy in making lending decisions. 
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Government intervertí ion in commercial lending activities was explicitly forbidden 
(Wong and Wong, 2001). 
Interest rate had been fíxed by the manipulation of the monetary authority in China. 
From 1996, interest rate liberalization started from wholesale markets in which 
Interbank Offered Rate and repurchasing and trading interest rates of treasuries, for 
example, vvere allowed to be deterniined in accordance with the market conditions. In 
1998. floating range on lending interest rates vvere raised to 20% for financial 
institutions and 50% for rural credit cooperatives, giving more room for varying 
lending rates charged on different clients (Berger et al. 2007). Also during this period, 
reserve requirement for commercial banks were lowered from 20% to 8%, further 
down to 6% (Herrero and Santabárbara, 2004). However, the pace of liberalization 
was too slow. Commercial banks were still subject to an interest rates ceiling for 
deposits and a floor for lending, slowing down the development of a market-based 
banking system. 
The most crucial milestone of financial liberalization was China's accession to the 
WTO in 2001. Chinese government committed itself to fully open up the banking 
market to foreign banks after a five-year grace period, which had prominent influence 
and implications for the banking reform. Under the opening up schedule of the WTO 
accession, foreign banks were allowed to conduct foreign currency business for 
foreign clients immediately and for domestic clients one year later. In 2003, foreign 
banks were allowed to carry out domestic currency business at wholesale level. By 
the end of 2006, foreign banks started to enjoy national treatment without any 
restrictions. 
Foreign banks had grown at a snail's pace in Chinese banking market although 
Chinese economy was growing at about 10% per year. In early 1980s, Chinese 
government opened the door of financial market just a crack to foreign financial 
institutions. Foreign banks were first allowed to open representative offices and were 
subsequently permitted to open operational braches in Special Economic Zones. This 
geographical restriction was extended to 23 coastai cities during íhe first half of the 
1990s and foreign banks were allowed to open branches across China in 1996. 
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However, there were high enîry barriers and business restrictions for foreign banks, 
such as géographie restrictions and entry requirements. Foreign bank opérations were 
restricted within some designated geographical zones. They must have launched and 
operated a représentative office for two years before it could apply for establishing 
branches. Even being granted to operate, foreign banks were restricted to serve 
foreign companies and résidents and to conduct foreign currency business only. 
Given about 2% share of the banking total assets and limited geographical présence, 
foreign banks were not compétitive to domestic banks. China's entry into WTO 
implied a fastened removal of the barriers and restrictions blocking foreign bank entry. 
In fact, China's WTO membership has twofold implications. On the one hand, it 
represents challenges to the Chinese banking System. Thèse challenges are not only 
real and imminent, but also threatening in many aspects to domestic banks, both state-
owned and non-state-owned. Foreign banks had played a positive but rather limited 
rôle in the Chinese banking System in the past. Now they have accelerated the pace of 
intégration in China by launching branches (représentative offices) or/and 
establishing alliances with domestic banks. For instance, HSBC acquired 8% stake in 
Bank of Shanghai in December 2001. On the other hand, the WTO accession présents 
an unprecedented opportunity to expedite the building up of a modem and 
internationally viable banking System. Foreign banks are advantageous at high 
technology and operational skills and expertise. Foreign banks could induce more 
compétition in Chinese banking market and accelerate the "catching-up" process of 
Chinese banks. 
2.4.4 Tightening prudential régulation and supervision 
The régulation and supervision of financial sector in China had been far behind 
international standards. With deepening banking reform, prudential régulations and 
accounting standards were tightened to help formulate a well functioning market 
based banking System. Capital adequacy requirement was first introduced in 1995 in 
Shenzhen. Since 1998. the central bank started to internally monitor bank capital 
adequacy in accordance with the Basel Capital Accord, until 1 March 2004 the 
Régulation Governing Capital Adequacy of Commercial Banks came into effect. 
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Commercial banks were given a transition period up to 1 January 2007 to meet the 
minimum capital adeąuacy requirements. 
Authorities shortly found these requirements to be unenforceable due to the inability 
of banks to raise capital. There is a huge gap between capital demand to meet the 
capital adequacy requirements and funds availability. Half of JSCBs raised capital in 
the capital market, but SOCBs were unable to raise funds in the capital market 
because of its Iow profitability and high level NPLs. Since SOCBs were owned by 
state and could, in theory, only rely on the state provision of capital. which would 
result in a soft budget and Iow efficiency. The only possible way out of this dilemma 
was the fundamental ownership reform of SOCBs after cleaning up their balance 
sheets. This was effectively triggered the first round of SOCBs bailout during 1998-
1999 and the second round of bailout started in 2003 in preparation for a further 
reform to list the SOCBs on the stock markets. 
In 1995, in accordance with the newly enacted commercial bank law, authorities 
redefined commercial banks business scope. Commercial banks were required to 
divest investment banking affiliates and were prohibited from engaging in iiwestment 
banking business, such as securities trading and underwriting, investment in non-bank 
financial enterprises and productive enterprises, and investment in trust business. The 
separation of commercial banking activities from investment banking activities aimed 
to reduce risk taking and protect depositors. 
In order to better control asset quality, the authorities introduced an internationally 
accepted five-category loan classification system in 1998 by a trial application in 
Guangdong province. Although it was applied to all commercial banks national wide 
sińce 2002, few banks followed this prudential norm. Most banks continued to use a 
conventional Chinese-style four-category classification system as it classified loans 
based on the length of arrears and tended to underestimate non-performing loans. 
Later, authorities had to reinforce the application of five-category loan classification 
system and all banks were required to fully comply with it by the end of 2005. 
In April 2003, China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established as a 
regulatory and supervisory body in order to strengthen regulatory and supervisory 
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framework and introduce modem banking managerial practices. It took over the 
responsibility and functions from the central bank to regúlate and supervise ail the 
banking institutions. CBRC became in charge of the strength of banks, capital 
adequacy issues and reform of the banking System. PBC started to be responsible for 
monetary policy and liquidity of the ñnancial sector by managing the interest rate 
bands for loans and deposits, the reserve requirement and other instruments. This 
séparation highlighted the importance of well functioning supervisory and regulatory 
framework in improving internai management, risk control, and governance of banks. 
This also reflected the governmenfs resolution to ensure-safe, sound and efficient 
opération of the banking industry through strengthened supervision and enhanced risk 
control capacity (www.cbrc.gov.cn). 
In short, during the past decade, some progress had been made on banking 
commercialization, but notwithstanding government's considerable efforts. One 
important reason is that China adopted a graduai approach to économie reform rather 
than a shock therapy approach. The government had to balance between rehabilitating 
the banking System and maintaining social stability and économie growth. By 2003, 
the banking System was still characterized by poor asset quality, high level of NPLs, 
deteriorated solvency ratios, low profitability, the lack of risk management skill, and 
so on. The reform was far away from complete and the tough nut of reform remained 
to be cracked. Incoming WTO challenges were real and called for more 
comprehensive and radical reform of SOCBs. 
In the face of the increasing challenges from globalization and WTO, Chinese 
authorities set the reform of SOCBs on the top agenda of fmancial reform at the 
second National Financial Work Conférence in 2002. The objective of SOCBs reform 
was clearly defined as "To transform thèse banks into internationally compétitive 
joint-stock commercial banks with appropriate corporate governance structures, 
adéquate capital, stringent internai controls, safe and sound business opérations, 
quality services as well as désirable profitability (Liu, 2005)." Concrete reform 
stratégies covered issues on recapitalization, existing and generating new NPLs. and 
corporate governance. Changing SOCBs' corporate governance of SOCBs became 
the paramount issue. The goals for next step reform were outlined as: (1) diversifying 
ownership structure preferably with the participation of foreign stratégie investors; (2) 
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properly defining responsibilities for the shareholders, board of directors, and board 
of Supervisors; (3) maximizing profits; (4) restructuring the existing organizational 
structure to fît the change (Luo, 2003). 
2.5 The pcriod of modernization since 2003 omvard 
Since late 2003, the government has accelerated and deepened banking reform 
through tvvo main stratégies—attracting foreign stratégie investors in domestic banks 
and encouraging domestic banks to go public, ahead of the füll opening of its 
financial industry. The joint-stock reforms of SOCBs have been implemented 
progressively step by step foliowing a three-phase roadmap. The first phase is the 
financial restructuring to résolve the NPLs bürden accumulated for historical reasons. 
The second phase is to transform SOCBs into modem financial enterprises with 
optimized corporate governance structure and mechanisms. The third phase is to list 
SOCBs on the capital market, subjecting their opérations to market discipline. These 
reform stratégies not only solve problems like high levelNPLs and low capitalization, 
but also focus on the rooted causes of thèse problems (Tang, 2004). 
At the end of 2003, BOC and CCBC were selected as pilot banks to undergo financial 
restructuring. The government commenced the second round of capitalization and this 
long-awaited bailout was in the form of capital investment by Central Huijin 
Investment Company Limited, a government vehicle Company. Each of BOC and 
C C B C reeeived half of the total capital infusion of $45 billion out of the country's 
abundant foreign-exchange reserves. This was the boldest and toughest décision of 
the government to convert SOCBs into truly commercial institutions to date. This gift 
provides banks with highly liquid tier 1 capital, resulting in an increase in capital 
adequacy ratio close to international minimum capital requirement of 8%. Following 
staged success in two pilot banks. the same measure was applied to ICBC that 
received a capital injection of $15 billion in April 2005. It was argued that the capital 
infusion into SOCBs had the effect of killing two birds with one stone—recapitalizing 
SOCBs and reducing the pressure of the Chinese currency appréciation. 
As part of financial restructuring, the government conducted the second round of 
NPLs divestment from SOCBs. NPLs were off-loaded from BOC and CCBC by 
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RMB 475 billion in 2004 and from ICBC by R M B 705 billion in 2005. BOC and 
C C B C finished financial restructuring in 2004 and ICBC in 2005. The assets quality 
improved significantly and balance sheets were strengthened. For instance, NPL ratio 
of SOCBs dropped to 10% in 2005 from 20% in 2003 and the total amount of NPLs 
shrunk to RMB 1 trillion accounting for 6% of GDP in 2005 from R M B 1.9 trillion 
and 17% of GDP in 2003 (See more detail in Chapter). 
After financial restructuring, the reform of SOCBs has moved on to the second phase 
of joint-stock restructuring. The reform has addressed "three transformations*'—the 
transformation of ownership, the transformation of corporate governance structures 
and mechanisms, and the transformation of internal controls (Liu, 2005). The main 
purpose is to improve corporate governance, risk management and internal control, 
and the management of finance, debt and human resource. BOC and ICBC have been 
restructured as Bank of China Ltd. and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd. 
respectively, while CCBC has been decomposed into two entities, namely China 
Jianyin Investment Co. Ltd. and China Construction Bank Corporation. Thus, they 
have been organizationally transformed into modern enterprises, which have paved 
the way for forging ahead partial privatization through ownership diversification 
strategies of attracting foreign ownership and going public. 
Attracting foreign strategic investors for domestic banks has been a common reform 
strategy to privatize state-owned banks in developing countries and transition 
economies. Prior to 2004, there were only a few foreign institutions acquiring shares 
in domestic banks. In 1996, Asian Development Bank acquired 1.9% share in China 
Everbright Bank made the latter the first domestic bank with foreign ownership. This 
practice was followed by a few foreign institutions, such as International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), and 
Citigroup, which acquired equity stakes in carefully selected JSCBs and CCBs. 
Motivated by the desire of attracting foreign strategic investors for domestic banks, 
the authorities have relaxed the provisions relating to business cooperation and equity 
links between the Chinese and foreign banks. At the end of 2003, the maximum 
equity share of the total overseas investment in any Chinese financial institution was 
increased to 25%, of which the maximum equity share of a single overseas investor 
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was 20% (vAvw.cbrc.Rov.cn). This particular policy has been welcomed, resulting in 
a surge of foreign direct investment in domestic banks in 2004 and the following 
years. For instance, British-based HSBC bought 19.9% of Bank of Communications 
for $1.74 billion and Newbridge Capital became the biggest shareholder of Shenzhen 
Development Bank in 2004. In 2005, total foreign investment in Chinese banks 
reached $24 billion (including $8 billion and $1.9 billion raised by CCBC and the 
Bank of Communications in their IPOs in Hong Kong stock exchange). Among 
others, the most significant achievement in this year was three newly joint-stock 
restructured SOCBs having successful attracted foreign stratégie investors. CCBC 
was acquired by Bank of America, BOC by the Royal Bank of Scotland, Merrill 
Lynch and Li Ka-shing, and ICBC signed the M O U with Goldman Sachs, Allianz and 
American Express signed. 
Meanwhile, to honour WÏO commitments, the CBRC has been continuously 
speeding up the opening up of the banking System, in an attempt to create a level 
playing field for both domestic and foreign banks. Since 2003, CBRC has gradually 
loosened geographical customer and business restrictions imposed on foreign banks. 
Foreign banks have been given greater access to the local market by (1) allowing 
them to conduct local currency business with local companies from 1 December 2003; 
(2) lowering the minimum capital requirement to R M B 500m for foreign financial 
institutions to set up a full-service branch; (3) expanding to 18 cities that have been 
fully opened to foreign bank engagement in local currency business. 
Given a favourable environment. foreign banks have prospered in the Chinese 
banking market, attracted by the rapidly growing financial services markets and the 
promising prospective of the economy. As of September 2003, there were 191 foreign 
banking institutions granted licenses to operate in China. Foreign banks only 
accounted for about 13% of the foreign currency lending market (Luo, 2003). Only 
two years later, as of end-September 2005, 69 foreign banks from 20 countries 
established 232 operational entities. The market share of the foreign exchange lending 
rose to about 20 % (Liu, 2005). 
In contrary to opening own branches, the majority of foreign investors have chosen to 
acquire equity stake in domestic banks. The strategy is rationalized by the immédiate 
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access to well-developed distribution networks and the hope to well-position a 
strategic seat before full opening up of the banking market. Although foreign banks 
and institutions will be granted a full range of banking services and financial products 
to domestic customers in 2007, most of them have chosen to acquire equity stake in 
domestic banks as means of entering this emerging and attractive markets. By doing 
so. foreign investors avoid suffering from low efficiency generally associated with 
foreign-owned banks in developing and transitions countries. They also avoid 
significant investment in establishing a branch network sufficient to serve their 
customers. 
Foreign strategic investors come from more than 20 countries around the world, 
targeting all types of Chinese domestic commercial banks. They are also trying to 
participate in the management of the partner bank and exert influence on the business 
development. Chinese banks, on the other hand, benefited by obtaining much needed 
capital, advanced technology, management skills, operational expertise, good 
corporate governance structure, and so on. To date, twenty-five Chinese commercial 
banks have teamed up with 18 overseas strategic investors, attracting equity capital of 
more than $18 billion. Obviously, the opening up policy have achieved a "win-win" 
situation between the Chinese and foreign banks. 
Shortly after joint-stock restructuring and attracting foreign strategic investors, the 
joint-stock reform of SOCBs was proceeded with to the third phase of going public. 
The going public strategy is motivated by the much-needed capital to improve capital 
adequacy. This institutional change of diversifying ownership helps build up a good 
corporate governance structure and harden the budgetary constraints faced by SOCBs. 
The strategy is also encouraged by the role of market discipline to better solve the 
agent-principal problem and thus improve efficiency. C C B C and BOC have been 
successfully listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2005 and 2006 when they raised 
USDS8 billion and $9.7 billion through their initial public offering (IPOs), 
respectively. ICBC was simultaneously listed on both Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 27 October 2006. It raised about US$21.9 billion in 
Hong Kong (H-shares) and Shanghai (A-shares), becoming the world's largest IPO to 
date. The market reactions were unexpectedly positive. At the end of 2006, ICBC 
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outstandingly became the second largest bank in the world measured by market valué. 
By July, 2007, ÍCBC became the world's largest bank in terms of market valué. 
The authority understood that listing SOCBs on stock exchange to raise new fresh 
capital ¡s not the end of the reform but a short run goal. The long run goal is to 
transform SOCBs into modern and internationally competitive banks with good 
corporate governance in place. Building up well-functioning corporate governance is 
the key to the success of Chinese banking reform since it ensures improvement in 
performance sustainable in the long term. CBRC set out ten requirements for good 
corporate governance benchmarking the top 100 largest banks globally. Against 
these benchmarks, CBRC monitors the pace of SOCBs moving toward modern 
enterprises and their performance. These requirements cover corporate governance 
structure, diversified ownership, goal of profit maximization. prudent accounting 
practices, market-oriented human resource management, etc. CBRC has further 
tightened prudent regulation by setting out seven performance indicators to monitor 
the SOCBs performance. These indicators include ROA, ROE, the cost/income ratio, 
the NPL ratio, the largest exposure, and the NPL provisioning coverage ratio 
(www.cbrc.gov.cn'). 
Synchronously, the reform of the RCCs has been carried out since 2004, based on the 
experiences drawn upon the trial RCCs reform in eight provinces and municipalities. 
The reform covered 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions across the 
country with only Hainan province and Tibet autonomous región not being included. 
The trial experiences show improvement in RCCs capability to better sever rural 
households and agricultural production (www.cbrc.gov.cn"). It goes without saying 
that the government has made every effort on banking reform. ranging from SOCB to 
CCBs and RCCs to prepare for the full opening of the banking market by the end-
2006. 
2.6 The status quo and future challenges 
China's unremitting efforts on banking reform have resulted in a comprehensive and 
multi-layered banking system. The structure of the present banking system is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1. PBC and CBRC are two supervisory bodies at the top of the 
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banking system. The former is China's central bank formutating and implementing 
monetary policy under the oversight of the State Council. It maintains the banking 
sector's payment. ciearing and settlement systems, manages official foreign exchange 
and gold reserves, and oversees the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. CBRC 
is in charge of the regulation and supervisión of banks, asset management companies, 
and trust and investment companies as well as other deposit-taking financial 
institutions in order to maintain a safe and sound banking system (www.cbrc.gov.cn ). 
SOCBs. together vvith other banking institutions of various types, provide a full range 
of banking producís and services to the economy. 
Figure 2.1 The structure of the Chinese banking system 
PBC and CBRC 
I 
Policy Banks Foreign Banks 
Domes tic 
Commercial Banks RCCs and UCCs Others 
SOCBs JSCBs CCBs 
Notes: l 'BC = People's Bank of China, C B R C = China Banking Regulatory Commission, R C C and U C C = rural 
and urban crédit coopératives, SOCB = state-owned commercial bank, JSCB =joint stock commercial bank, C C B 
= city commercial bank. 
According to a récent CBRC report, as of 2005, the banking industry is" made up of 
more than 30,000 institutions, including 3 policy banks. 4 state-owned commercial 
banks, 13 joint-stock commercial banks, 115 city commercial banks, 54 rural 
commercial and coopérative banks, 681 urban crédit coopératives, 30,000-plus rural 
crédit coopératives, 225 foreign bank branches and subsidiaries, 4 asset management 
companies, 59 trust and investment companies, 74 finance companies, 12 financial 
leasing companies, 5 automobile financing companies, as well as a large number of 
postal savings institutions. 
SOCBs are the key players in the Chinese financial sector. Despite co-existence of 
various financial institutions, the banking system dominâtes the financial sector, 
which in turn is overwhelmingly dominated by SOCBs in terms of total asset, 
deposits, branch network and employées. By September 2005, the banking system 
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controlled 90% of the total financial assets in China, amounting RMB 42 trillion. 
While their market shares are declining, SOCBs still domínate the banking System by 
possessing more than half of the total assets and liabilities of the banking sector. After 
more than two decades of development JSCBs have grown steadily, accounting for 
16%) of the total assets of the banking industry. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of a highly concentrated market structure of the Chinese 
banking System in which SOCBs, JSCBs and CCBs control 74% of total fixed assets. 
Despite rapid growth, the total assets of foreign banks only accounted for 2%. Other 
banking institutions, including rural commercial banks, urban credit coopératives, 
rural credit coopératives, finance companies, trust and investment companies, 
financial leasing companies and postai savings, together accounted for 24%. 
Table 2.1 The distribution of banking assets by groups (in September 2006) 
Total assets (RMB billion) Share % 
SOCBs 21,950 52 
JSCBs 6,637 16 
CCBs 2,421 6 
FBs 830 2 
Others 51,913 24_ 
Total 42,085 100 
Source: www.cbm.Eov.cn 
Moles: SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, C C B = city commercial 
bank. FB = foreign bank. 
Needless to say, significant progress has been made in the modernization of the 
Chínese banking system. By the end of 2006, the average NPL ratio notably dropped 
to 7.5% and more than 100 Chinese banks met the capital adequacy requirement of 
8%. In April 2007. three restructured and listed SOCBs were among the world's top 
ten banks in terms of market capitalízation (Tang, 2007). After drastic institutional 
changes, basic governance structure has been in place and started functioning, 
supported by strengthening risk management and prudent operation. The soundness 
of supervisory framework and ef'fectiveness of supervisory approaches have been 
improving. CBRC has committed to comply with all the essential elements of the 
Basel Core Principies for effective banking supervisión by the end of 2006 and a 
broad compliance with the Basel Core Principies 6 years later. 
47 
As Tang (2007) concludes thaí "China's banking system reform as a whole has made 
a success but it still needs to proceed deeper and wider." Despite impressive progress, 
the banking system still faces a few difficulties. Most Chinese banks are weak in 
corporate governance. risk management capacity, innovations in human resource 
management, and pricing skills. Moreover, external environment in terms of credit 
culture, accounting standards and taxation arrangements are less favourable. While 
promising future of the Chinese economy provides unprecedented opportunities and 
greater chance for banking reform to be successful, challenges remain. It will be 
particularly difficult and demanding for future reform, regarding how to prevent the 
rebound of the NPLs, how to consolídate the outcome of reforms, and how to 
improve the performance to maximize shareholders wealth in the long term. 
Fortunately, they have been well addressed by CBRC in its future reform plan. 
However, these challenges and difficulties by themselves may not be serious 
obstacles to a successful banking reform. What is more problematic is the partial 
privatization of SOCBs in which the government remains majority shareholder. An 
absolute controlling stake enables the government to exert political pressure on banks 
that may íend to less productive SOEs in order to reduce unemployment pressure and 
maintain social stability. Chinese banks, especiaíly SOCBs, have conflicting 
objectives. On the one hand, they are required to transform themselves into 
commercially viable modern corporate entities with a profit maximization goal. On 
the other hand, they are under pressure to sustain employment and maintain social 
stability (Dobson and Kashyap, 2006). 
World class commercial banks typically evalúate and manage risks based on market 
principies and make credit decisions accordingly without political consideration and 
personal connections. When proceeding with future banking reform, Chinese 
authorities need to address and solve this contradiction rather than ignoring it. 
Without clear clarification of the government role in the bank operation and 
objectives, it is more likely to disappoint the expectation that banks will behave like 
commercial banks. 
48 
The fate of the Chinese domestic banking institutions, especially SOCBs, would be 
determined by their economic performance and market viability, rather than by the 
willingness and power of the government. In the process of this intense and 
challenging reform, how to improve banking productivity and efficiency is one key 
objective of the future banking reform programmes. Therefore. from our review on 
Chinese banking reform, the ultimate success remains to be seen and the reform is 
going to be a long and challenging process. 
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Chapter 3 Literature review 
3.0 Preamble 
Over more than 40 years, efficiency research has been extensive, highlighting the 
importance of efficiency study. This has resulted in a well-established literature on 
fundamental efficiency concepts and methodological framework. In this broad 
context, substantial researches have evaluated the efficiency of financia! institutions, 
providing fruitful information not only serving the purposes of régulation and 
management, but also contributing to the development of research methodology. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide an outstanding survey that summarizes the 
main conclusions of 130 financial institutions' emptrical efficiency studtes in 21 
countries employing différent efficiency estimation methods. 
This chapter reviews literature on bank efficiency by referencing a number of 
classical and récent innovative papers. It also consults with books on efficiency 
research, including Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli et ai (1998), Ray (2004), 
and Cooper et al. (2000). It will provide a theoretical background and a 
methodological framework for this study. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces basic concepts in 
efficiency study. Section 3.2 reviews literature on efficiency estimation techniques, 
including the ways of defining inputs and Outputs, and incorporating internai specific 
characteristics and external environmental variables. Section 3.3 reviews bank 
efficiency literature in general and on developing countries and transition économies 
in particular. 
3.1 Basic concepts 
Farrell (1957) proposes a path-breaking way of measuring operational efficiency 
(economic efficiency) of a firm, which is defined as the product of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency, also called technological 
efficiency, refers to the ability of optimal utilization of available resources either by 
producing maximum output given an input level or by using minimum inputs given 
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an Output level. Allocative efticiency reflects the ability to achieve the optimal 
combination of inputs and Outputs for a given level of priées. 
In FarrelFs simple example, firms produce a single Output (y) using two inputs 
(x,andx 2), assuming constant returns to scale. The technical inefficiency of a firm 
that uses inputs to produce a unit of output at the point P can be expressed by the 
distance QP shovvn in Figure 3.1. A i l inputs could be proportionall y reduced by the 
distance QP without afïccting output levef. The technical efficiency of a firm is 
defined as the distance to a production frontier that provides the upper boundary of 
production possibilities. In particular, technical efficiency is measured by the ratio 
OQ/OP in Figure 3.1 that is less than 1. Isoquant of SS' represents fully efficient 
firms and used as a benchmark to measure technical efficiency of other less efficient 
firms (Coelli et al, 1998). 
Figure 3.1 Farrell efficiency (Coelli étal, 1998) 
x2/y 
0 xjy 
When input price information is available, the allocative efficiency of the firm located 
at point P is represented by the ratio OR/OQ. It captures inefficiencies due to a sub­
optimal input combination picked by the firm for given input priées. It requires the 
use of right input mix in producing the correct output mix in the light of their 
respective prevailing prices. The economic efficiency is defined in a similar fashion 
being the distance to an economic frontier. Assuming that SS' represents a cost 
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frontier in Figure 3.1, cost efficiency is measured by the ratio OR/OP, suggesting a 
theoretical possible cost réduction by the amount of RP (Coelli et ai., 1998). 
It is important to distinguish efficiency concepts when studying efficiency. Economie 
efficiency requires both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technically 
efficient fïrms could economically inefficient and vice versa, due to the différences in 
managers' ability to use best technology and their abilities to respond to market price 
conditions (Bauer et al., 1998). Siems and Barr (1998, pl3) have figuratively 
summarized that "technical efficiency is about doing things right, allocative 
efficiency is about doing right things, and economic efficiency is about doing right 
things right." 
Efficiency concept is closely related to the concept of input and output orientation. 
An input-orientated efficiency measure addresses input conservation without 
changing the output quantifies produced, while an output-orientated measure focuses 
on output augmentation without altering the input quantities used. The différence 
between the input-orientated measure and output-orientated measure can be 
demonstrated graphically in Figure 3.2. Assuming that a firm uses one input 
producing single output under decreasing returns to scale technology f(x), the Farrell 
input-orientated measure of technical efficiency is represented by the ratio of AB/AP, 
while the output-orientated technical efficiency measure being the ratio of CP/CD. 
Figure 3.2 Input- and output-orientated efficiency measures (Coelli et al., 1998) 
y 
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Input-oriented and output-oriented efficiency measures can be derived from models 
with the same respective orientation. Essentially. the Output- and input-orientated 
models estimate exactly the same frontier and identify the same set of best-practice 
firms but the efficiency measures of inefficient firms may differ (Coelli et ai, 1998). 
Sélection of the orientation dépends on over vvhich quantifies the managers have most 
control. Input-orientated efficiency measure is more frequently chosen arguably 
because the input quantities are the primary décision variables. 
The development of duality theory provides a framework for economic 
représentations of production technology using cost, revenue, and profit functions. 
When information on input and output prices is available and a behavioural 
assumption is appropriate, economic efficiency can be explored. In particular, cost 
efficiency, revenue efficiency and profit efficiency, can be derived against cost, 
revenue and profit frontiers, respectively. Economie concepts are commonly used in 
efficiency studies for industries employing multi-inputs and multi-outputs production 
technology. 
Cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of minimum feasible costs to observed actual 
costs. It is bounded between zéro and unity, reflecting the proportion of costs or 
resources is used efficiently. The estimated cost inefficiencies can be further 
decomposed into input-oriented technical inefficiency reflecting for using more 
inputs to produce the same output bündle and input allocative inefficiency for not 
optimally using inputs mix given inputs prices. Cost efficiency concept is most 
commonly used in efficiency research. The majority of 130 efficiency studies 
reviewed by Berger and Humphrey (1997) have concentrated on cost efficiency. 
Cost efficiency is derived by estimating a cost function. In a cost function, total costs 
is a dépendent variable and explanatory variables are exogenously given variables, 
including output quantities, input prices, netput quantities (fixed inputs or fixed 
Outputs), environmental factors, and a composite error term lhat consist of bank 
managerial inefficiency and random errors. A gênerai version of a cost function in a 
natural log form is shown in Equation (3.1) 
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InC = /^(In^Jn w,lnz.ln*/) + (ln« f +lnv r) (3.1) 
where fc represents a particular functional form for the cost function, such as 
Cobb-Douglas, translog form, or Fourier-flexible functional form; C is total costs 
(including both operating and interest expenses); q is a vector of output quantities; 
w is a vector of input prices; z is a vector of netputs' quantities; d is a vector of 
economic and environmental variables that may influence cost performance; 
(lni/L. + lnv c) is a composite error term comprising an inefficiency factor ue where 
uc denotes an inefficiency factor that induces the bank's cost above the minimum 
feasible costs, and random error v c. 
According to Berger and Mester (1997), the cost efficiency of a specific bank is 
defined by Equation (3.2) 
C o : t E j f > - ¿ , m " - °*p[fo'-*'• >db) 1*«a»"»r) ¿r 
C" e x p | / ( 9 ' , w 4 , z * , r f ' ) J x c x p ( l n « c 4 ) « ' ' 
where w™n is the minimum of the w* across all sample firms. 
When assuming that producéis face output prices and seek to maximize revenue for a 
given level of input, revenue efficiency can be measured against revenue frontier. 
Revenue efficiency is defíned as the ratio of actual revenue of a firm to máximum 
revenue that could be raised if the firm is fully efficient. lt is bounded between unity 
and zero. Revenue efficiency can also be decomposed into the output-oriented 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of inefficient outputs production in the 
light of their prevailing prices (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Revenue efficiency is 
rarely used alone in practice and it is essentially incorporated into profit efficiency. 
It is more common to assume profit maximization which requires costs minimization 
as well as revenue maximization. Profit efficiency is defíned as a ratio of actual profit 
to máximum attainable profit. It is cannot be greater than unity but can be below zero 
because of possible negative actual profit. A firm's profit efficiency reflects the 
proportion of máximum profit the firm has earned (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
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Profit efficiency is an integrated performance measure and it is considered to be 
superior to cost efficiency and revenue efficiency. It takes into account both the 
efficiency in raising revenue and the efficiency in reducing costs. To maximize profit, 
a firm needs to be technically efficient, allocative efficient, and to require scale 
efficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997). The décomposition of estimated profit 
efficiency is more complicated than those of cost efficiency and revenue efficiency, 
depending on the orientation of technical efficiency measures. Despite the prevailing 
application of cost efficiency concept, profit efficiency has attracted increasing 
attention. Many studies employ profit efficiency as a performance measurement in the 
récent literaturę, including Bonin et al. (2005), Hasan and Marton (2003), Humphrey 
and Pulley (1997), Berger and Mester (2003), Williams and Nguyen (2005), and Patti 
and Hardy (2005). 
Subject to différent exogenous business conditions, profit efficiency has two variants, 
namely standard profit efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. Standard profit 
efficiency measures the extent to which a firm produces the maximum possible profit 
for a given level of input and Output priées. Producers are assumed to face 
exogenously determined input and output priées in compétitive factor markets. They 
have to make décisions on the mixture of inputs to use and the mixture of Outputs to 
produce. 
Standard profit efficiency is derived from a standard profit function where profits are 
the only dependent variable and the right-hand side variables usually include input 
priées, output priées, netputs quantifies, environmental factors, and a composite error 
that consists of bank managerial inefficiency and random errors. A gênerai version of 
the standard profit function in log form is given in Equation (3.3) 
l n (* + &) = f(p,w,z,d) + (In ur + ln v j (3.3) 
where fc w, z , d, and (lnwT-i-lnv^) are defined as in the cost function; 
/r représenta the profit of a bank; 9 is a constant added to every firm's profit to 
ensure that natural logarithm is taken on a positive number in case there is a 
negative profit figure; p is a vector of output priées. 
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Likewise, Standard profit efficiency of a specific bank can be defined by Equation 
(3.4) (Berger and Mester, 1997). 
(3.4) 
exp f(p\wb,z\db)\xexp{\nü™) -& 
where ü™" is the maximum of the z/* across all sample firms. 
Alternative profit efficiency measures the extent to whic-h a firm earns maximum 
profits when facing exogenously determined input prices and Output quantities. 
Output prices are no longer taken as given as in the Standard profit maximization 
scenarios. Instead, firms are assumed to have some degree of pricing power over their 
Output markets and both output prices and quantities are to be determined under the 
market demand conditions. Only input prices are part of external conditions 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Alternative profit efficiency is derived from a profit function which is identical to the 
Standard profit function except for output prices replaced by output quantities (Berger 
and Mester, 1997). The alternative profit function in log form is given in Equation 
where all variables are the same as defined in the Standard profit function except 
for>, which is defined as in the cost function. 
The alternative profit efficiency is defined in Equation (3.6) (Berger and Mester, 
1997). 
(3.5). 
ln(/r + 0) = f{yt w, z, d) + (In m„, + In vair) (3.5) 
ÄltnEff = an 
e x p [ / ( / , wh, zb, dh)\x exp(ln wf lT) - 9 
exp / ( / . w", z" Mb)ix exp(ln üba!!) - 6 (3.6) 
an 
where ü'™" is the maximum of the üban across all sample firms. 
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3.2 Literature on methodology 
Performance appraisal has been carried out using conventional ratio analysis. With 
the development of estimation techniques, performance is evaluated by more 
sophisticated techniques, such as least-squares econometric production models, total 
factor productivity (TFP) indices, and efficiency frontier. The former two methods 
assume that ail firms are technically efficient and provide measures of technical 
change and/or TFP, largely based on aggregate time-series data. The efficiency 
frontier approach provides performance measures of both technical change and 
efficiency change, without making such an assumption and using panel data set 
(pooled time-series and cross-section). The approach can explore the différence in 
efficiencies across firms and identify possible factors causing the différences (Coelli 
et ai, 1998). The frontier approach is increasingly preferred because it objectively 
quantifies relative performance by removing the effects of many exogenous factors 
affecting the standard performance ratios (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Efficiency measures are defined by the distance departing from the best-practice 
frontier that in practice is unknown. How to estimate the efficient frontier from the 
sample data is one of the controversial issues in the efficiency literature. Farrell (1957) 
has suggests two broad directions for estimating efficiency, resulting in two main 
methods to estimate the best-practice frontier. Following the fîrst direction, a piece-
wise-linear convex isoquant is constructed under a non-parametric mathematical 
programming framework. The second direction suggests a parametric, stochastic, 
statistical framework to construct the best-practice frontier by fitting a pre-specified 
parametric function. Parametric methods can be sub-classified into three main 
approaches: SFA, distribution free approach, and thick frontier approach, while non-
parametric methods can be divided into data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free 
disposai hull. Thèse approaches distinguish from each other by différent assumptions 
with respect to the shape of the efficiency frontier, the treatment of random errors, 
and the distributing assumptions imposed on random errors and inefficiency (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). 
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3.2.1 The estimation of best-practice frontier: parametric methods 
A i l parametric methods specify a functional form but they distinguish from each other 
by the shape imposed on the frontier and the distributional assumptions imposed on 
random errors and inefficiency. Distribution free approach does not make specific 
distributional assumption on efficiency but it requires a panel data set. It assumes 
"core" efficiency or average efficiency for each firm that is stable over time and 
assumes that random errors are averaged out over time (Berger and Humphrey. 1997). 
Criticism cornes from thèse arbitrary assumptions because of the danger that 
persistent influence on costs of other factors may be counted as inefficiency (Bauer, 
et al., 1998). The efficiency of each firm is measured as the différence between its 
mean residual and the fmancial institutions' mean residual on the frontier, truncating 
the extreme residuals. Empirical applications of the distribution free approach include 
Clark and Siems (2002), Berger and Hannan (1998), Berger and Mester (1997), 
Nikiel and Opiela (2002), and Patti and Hardy (2005). 
The thick frontier approach first runs régression using only the ostensibly best 
performers in the data set, and then uses thèse estimated parameters to estimate the 
best-practice for the data set as a whole. It imposes no distributional assumptions on 
inefficiency and random errors. Instead, the thick frontier approach assumes that 
inefficiencies differ between the highest and lowest quartiles and random errors exist 
within thèse quartiles. In particular, it assumes that (1) random errors are represented 
by the déviations from the predicted efficiency within the lowest and highest quartiles 
of observations (stratified by size); (2) inefficiencies and exogenous différences in the 
regressors are represented by the déviations in the predicted performance between the 
lowest and highest quartiles (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
Firnis in the lowest average cost quartile are assumed to have above-average 
efficiency and to form a "thick frontier". Measured inefficiencies are embedded in the 
différences in the predicted costs between the lowest and highest cost quartiles. 
Estimâtes from the thick frontier approach provide an overall level of efficiency 
rather than point efficiency estimâtes for individual firms. It is of limited use when 
firm level efficiencies are concerned. Moreover, arbitrary assumptions that the lowest 
average cost quartile within each size class is an adéquate "thick frontier" of efficient 
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firms make the estimated levels of efficiency susceptible. This approach has been 
employed in studies of Humphrey and Pulley (1997), Casu et al. (2004) and Bauer, et 
al. (1993). 
SFA specifies a functional form for the frontier and assumes a composite error term 
consisting of random errors and inefficiency. These two components are separated by 
making two different distributional assumptions. The estimation strategy involves two 
steps. The first step is to use the Maximum likelihood estimation technique to 
estimate parameters describing the structure of the stochastic production frontier. The 
subsequent step is to decompose the maximum likelihood residual terms to derive 
efficiency for each producer, conditional on the estimated parameters of the stochastic 
production frontier. Depending on different distributional assumptions, a number of 
models have been developed to decompose the error terms into a random error and an 
inefficiency component, including the Half-Normal Model, the Normal-Exponential 
Model, the Truncated-Normal Model, and the Normal-Gamma Model (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000). SFA is one of the most commonly employed methods in efficiency 
study, resulting in a wealth of literature emerging. 
Using the parametric method, one important issue is to choose a particular functional 
form to present the structure of the production technology. Popular forms in the 
literature include Cobb-Douglas, translog, and the Fourier flexible functional form. 
Each has certain advantages and disadvantages. The Cobb-Douglas form has been 
conventionally used in empirical frontier literature because of its simplicity and self-
duality. However, the simplicity comes with two problems. The first problem is the 
inability to accommodate a multiple outputs production technology. The second 
problem is that the over-simplified structure of production technology may compound 
un-modelled complexity into the error terms, resulting in biased efficiency estimates. 
The translog form, originated by Christensen, et al. (1971, 1973), is the most popular 
functional form with no restrictions on returns to scale or substitution possibilities. It 
has several virtues over the Cobb-Douglas form. First, it may accommodate multiple 
outputs without necessarily violating the curvature conditions. Secondly, it is flexible, 
providing a second-order approximation to any well-behaved underlying cost frontier 
at the mean of the data. The flexibility diminishes the possibility of mixing up input 
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allocative inefficiency with a misspecification of the underlying functional form. 
Thirdly, it bases much of the empirical estimation and decomposition of cost 
efficiency on a system of equations. 
On the other hand, the translog form suffers from a serious multi-collinearity problem 
among the regressors. This is likely to lead to biased estimates of structure parameters 
in the model and therefore incorrect information on the two error components. It also 
suffers from the problem of degrees of freedom. Although these problems can be 
eliminated by estimating a system of equations and the use of panel data, it comes 
with more complex computation. On balance, the benefit of the flexibility is likely to 
be offset by the costs of the statistically insignificant parameter estimates 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Fourier-flexible functional form is recently developed and has been frequently used in 
bank efficiency studies like Deyoung and Hasan (1998), Berger and Mester (1997) 
Berger and Mester (2003). Fourier-flexible functional form is more flexible than the 
translog form since it consists of a standard translog plus Fourier trigonometric terms. 
In addition to a local approximation of the data by the embedded translog form, the 
Fourier-flexible form provides global approximation to virtually any cost or profit 
function by adding trigonometric terms. It suffers from the same disadvantages as the 
translog form due to the inclusion of too many regressors. 
3.2.2 The estimation of best-practice frontier: non-parametric methods 
A non-parametric approach provides a piecewise linear frontier to envelop the 
observation points using mathematical programming. The most commonly used non-
parametric approach is DEA since free disposal hull is a special case of D E A by 
excluding the points on the lines connecting the DEA vertices. DEA presumes that 
linear substitution between observed input combinations is possible on an isoquant. 
Free disposal hull has no such assumptions and considers the isoquant as a step 
function. Free disposal hull analysis measures firm efficiency based on its dominance 
relations to observed input-output bundles and involves a more restricted version of 
the mathematical programming problem than does DEA (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). 
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D E A is originally introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). DEA 
generalizes Farrell's (1957) single-input/single-output efficiency measures for 
decision-making units to the multiple-outputs/multiple-input measures. Since their 
innovative work, DEA studies have been extensive. It represents another camp of 
frontier estimation and is frequently used by researchers. Examples can be found in 
Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Drake and Hall (2003), Chen et al. (2005), and Drake et al. 
(2006). 
D E A employs linear programming methods to estimate a nonparametric piece-wise 
surface over the data and measure the efficiency of decision-making units. In 
particular, DEA frontier is a piecewise liner combination of a set of thèse best-
practice observations, forming a convex production possibility set. The convexity 
assumption ensures that given feasible input-output combinations, any weighted 
average of the input bundles can produce a similarly weighted average of the 
corresponding output bundles (Ray, 2004). The sole requirement is that each 
decision-making unit lies on or below the extreme frontier. Those units on the frontier 
are the best practice institutions, while the inefficiencies of other units below the 
frontier are measured by the distance from the best-practice frontier. Thus, efficiency 
measurement from DEA is a relative standard rather than an absolute standard 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
A mon-parametr i c method seems more applicable because it allows efficiency to vary 
over time and does not require prior assumptions on the distribution of inefficiency 
across observations. However, the DEA approach has been arguably less accepted by 
some economists because of its nonparametric feature. Without the estimation of a 
production, cost, or profit function from the data, the usual conclusions about the 
technology are hard to be derived. Moreover, DEA takes no account of market priées 
and therefore it focuses on technical efficiency rather than economic efficiency. In 
other word, it neglects allocative efficiency—the price effects on efficiency. 
A more fundamental drawback of DEA is the non-statistical nature. The linear 
programming solution of DEA does not allow the existence of standard errors and 
therefore does not distinguish inefficiency from random shocks. Any déviation from 
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the frontier is treated as inefïiciency and there is no provision for random shocks (Ray, 
2004). If the random error in a single observation that is on the efficient frontier, 
efficiency of ail other firms will be affected by comparing with a linear combination 
on the frontier. In reality, random errors are likely to exist due to a number of sources, 
resulting in inaccuracy of estimated efficiency. By ignoring the existence of potential 
errors, the effects of omitted errors may be composed into the efficiency estimâtes 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). This feature also leads to the inability to test 
hypothesis. 
Addressing this drawback, efforts hâve been made to add a stochastic dimension to 
DEA, including chance-constrained programming to reduce the noise effect and 
bootstrapping to genérate Statistical inference (Grosskopf, 1996). Among several 
différent lines of research underway, bootstrapping (Simar, 1992; Simar and Wilson, 
2000) appears to be most promising and is becoming increasingly popular. It is 
combined with DEA to gain empirical distributions for the efficiency measures of 
individual firms (Ray, 2004). 
DEA also suffers from a self-identifiers and near-self-identifiers problem. When 
imposing constraints like quality controls and environment variables on the model, 
some firms may be self-identified as 100% efficient simply because no other firms or 
linear combination of firms are comparable in so many dimensions. When there are a 
smali number of observations relative to the number of inputs, Outputs and other 
constraints, it is difficult for a large proportion of the observations to match in ail 
dimensions (Bauer et al, 1998). 
The robustness of efficiency measure is arguable because of various approaches 
available to estímate efficiency. Literaturę is inconclusive regarding which is superior 
to others. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Berger and Mester (1997) find little 
invariant in average estimated efficiency employing différent estimation techniques. 
Parametric and non-parametric methods estímate similar average efficiency values 
but dissimilar ranking of financial institutions using estimated efficiency levéis. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) review 130 studies employing at least five main 
approaches, of which parametric method (60) and non-parametric method (69) are 
roughly equally adopted. On average, there is about 20% cost inefficiency and about 
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half of the industry's profits inefficiency in US banking. Sludies employing a non-
parametric method obtained lovver average efficiency estimâtes and greater dispersion 
than the studies using a parametric method. For example, in the US studies, the 
average efficiency score estimated by non-parametric methods is 0.72, while this 
score estimated by parametric methods is 0.84. Balcombe et cd. (2006) compare a 
wider range of frontier méthodologies: Bayesian, classical SFA and DEA. They find 
point estimâtes of technical efficiency are différent across différent models but the 
rank of firm level technical efficiency is consistent. 
Bauer et al. (1998) argue that it is unnecessary to identify the single best frontier 
approach to estimating efficiency in order to provide useful information to concerning 
parties. The estimated efficiencies from différent approaches should be consistent 
over time and coincide with market compétitive conditions in terms of efficiency 
levels, rankings, identified best and worst firms. They outline six consistency 
conditions and examine four frontier estimation methods using a panel data of US 
large banks. Their results show a high degree of consistency within parametric 
methods and within nonparametric methods, whereas parametric and nonparametric 
methods are not generally mutually consistent. Parametric methods appear to be more 
consistent with the compétitive conditions in banking market and non-frontier 
performance measures such return on assets. 
3.2.3 The définition of Output and input variables 
How to define input and Output variables is another controversial issue, causing a 
long-standing debate in bank efficiency literature regarding methodology. Unlike 
manufacturing firms that produce physical goods, banks produce a wide range of 
products that are unidentifiable intermediation services. A few measures of bank 
Outputs, such as assets, liabilities and revenues, have been employed in early 
efficiency research. The number of deposits and loans accounts has been suggested as 
bank Output because financial services are provided to owners of these accounts 
directly. Alternatively, the dollars in each account have also been recommended as 
bank Output since the dollar amount in each account is a substanfial source of profits, 
which générâtes usable funds and services. More funds in accounts need more 
services to account owners (Goddard et ai, 2001). 
63 
A services flow to customers appears a better proxy of bank output by focusing on the 
basic nature of the production process rather than stock variables. However. this 
causes a problem: how to measure this services flow? In the literature, a production 
approach and an intermediation approach are two popular approaches, while a value-
added approach and a user cost approach are two less commonly used ones. In 
defíning bank ínputs and outputs, the value-added approach classifies all balance 
sheet items into inputs or outputs; depending on whether their contribution of adding 
or reducing the valué to a bank (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). A user cost approach 
takes productes net contribution as a criterion to differentiate input or output (Aly et 
ai, 1990 and Sathye, 2001). 
The production approach addresses physical inputs, such as capital and labour, and 
treats banks as fírms producing different deposits and loan accounts. Banks deal with 
transactions and documents for its customers who own these accounts. The number 
and type of transactions and documents are thought of as the best measure of bank 
output. The idea is great theoretically, but it is impracticable because such specific 
data are generally unavailable. In practice, the number of deposit and loan accounts is 
usually used as the measure of bank output rather than detailed data on transaction 
and documents. Ferrier and Lovell (1990), and Fried et al. (1993) are examples 
employing this approach to define bank output. 
The intermediation approach, pioneered by Sealey and Lindley (1977), treats banks as 
financial intermediaries that channel funds between depositors and creditors. In the 
bank production process, the valué of bank loan and investment is thought of as 
output, while labour, deposits and capital are treated as inputs. This approach is 
distinguished from the production approach by adding deposits to input, which result 
in consideration of both operating and interest costs. This approach has been more 
frequently applied in the empirical literature. Examples of this approach include 
Avkiran, (1999), Drake and Hall (2003): Casu and Moiynuex (2003), Fries and Taci 
(2005). 
Among these approaches, loans and other earning assets are widely accepted to be 
treated as outputs. The role of deposits has been controversial as deposits have both 
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input and output natures. Deposits could be considered as input because the interest 
expenses should be paid for it. Deposits could also be thought of as an output because 
deposits are associated with a certain amount of liquidity, safekeeping and payments 
services provided to depositors. Previous studies have shown that the treatment of 
deposits is sensitive to measure efficiency. Recently. a dual approach becomes 
prevailing that deposits are treated as an output. while interests paid on deposits are 
treated as an input. 
None of these approaches is perfect, they are complementary instead. Each approach 
emphasizes one side role of financial institutions that process transactions and 
documents and channel funds between depositors and creditors. In fact, these 
alternative approaches to defining bank outputs give rise to a doubt on the robustness 
of the estimated efficiency levéis, especially the on-going debate on the specification 
of output variables in the empirical literature. It is an important área to be addressed 
with caution when carrying out empirical research on bank efficiency. 
3.2.4 The incorporation of environmental factors 
Although assessing firm performance using efficiency estimates is an important part 
of efficiency studies, identifying factors that explain the variation in performance is 
of more research interests since information could shed lights on policy implications. 
Earlier studies find that producer performance could be influenced from three very 
different dimensions during the production process. The first dimensión is the 
efficiency of internal management in the process of arranging production activities. 
The second dimensión is the features of the external environment in which production 
activities are carried out. The third dimensión is the impact of random noise, such as 
good and bad luck, which would be captured in a random error term in a regression-
based approach to measure producer performance (Fried et al., 2002). It is important 
to sepárate the effects of different factors when assessing firm performance. 
Efficiency is a superior performance measure over conventional financial ratios 
because efficiency study has the ability to distinguish one effect from the others. It 
provides an objective best-practice benchmark for evaluating the performance of 
firms. Meanwhile, it could differentiate the impact of various factors on firm 
performance by examining how and to what extend they influence firm efficiency. 
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Efficiency analysis commonly consists of two stages. The first stage concerns the 
estimation of a best-practice frontier against which to measure the efficiency of 
producers during the time period under consideration. The frontier may be 
constructed by a non-parametric method or estimated by a parametric method 
discussed in the previous sections. The main task of this stage is to obtain efficiency 
estimates of producers in employing inputs to produce Outputs, under certain 
behavioral or/and distributional assumptions. In this stage. the robustness of the 
estimation is important, affecting not only the reliability of efficiency estimates but 
also the usefulness of the results from the second stage. 
In the second stage explores the reasons for efficiency differences across producers 
by incorporating bank specific characteristics and exogenous environmental variables 
into the estimation. External environmental variables may include a rather wide ränge 
of macroeconomic and regulatory factors, such as private consumpüon expenditure, 
government expenditure, GDP, net export, discount window base rate, unemployment, 
current account balance, ownership, location characteristics, and government 
regulations. These variables are out of managerial control but they could influence 
producer performance although they are neither traditional inputs nor Outputs. The 
objective of the second stage is to identify possible sources of inefficiencies by 
investigating the relationship between Variation in bank efficiencies and Variation in 
the exogenous environmental variables (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Environmental variables have been taken into account in efficiency analysis in a 
variety of ways. Employing a parametric method, external factors are assumed to 
affect either the structure of the frontier through which conventional inputs are 
processed into Outputs, or directly affect technical efficiency. Assuming that external 
environmental variables have a direct effect on the production structure, they are 
included in the frontier function as control variables, In other words, eacli producer is 
assumed to face a different production/cost frontier (Drake et ai, 2006). If external 
environmental variables affect efficiency directly, they can be incorporated into a 
second stage regression against estimated efficiencies to quantify their effects. In 
practice, it is a matter of judgment on whether an exogenous variable charactering the 
production technology or determining productive efficiency. 
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In the context of employing SFA, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide a summary 
on how to incorpórate exogenous environmental variables in three different ways. 
The First vvay assumes that a vector of exogenous variables z influences the structure 
of the production process (therefore the production frontier) by which inputs x are 
converted to Outputs y. Vector z is generally beyond the control of management in the 
production process but describing the environment in which the production process 
takes place. In this case, vector z is included along with x as netput in a stochastic 
production frontier as shown in Equation (3.7). 
In y, = In / ( j . , z , ; ß ) + v, - u, (3.7) 
where ß is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
This approach can be interpreted as a more accurate characterization of production 
possibilities and therefore more precise estimates of producer effíciencies. However, 
it provides no information on the sources of inefficiencies across producers and 
therefore it is of limited use for policy analysis. 
The second way of incorporating environmental variables is to link the Variation of 
estimated efficiency to the Variation in exogenous variables using a two-step 
procedure. A stochastic frontier is first estimated by excluding the exogenous 
variables and then the estimated effíciencies are regressed against the exogenous 
variables in the second step. The rationale of this approach is that the vector of 
exogenous variables z is assumed to indirectly influence the output vector y by their 
direct effects on efficiency. The objective of the second stage regression is to explain 
the Variation in estimated effíciencies. The elements in z are assumed to be correlated 
with estimated effíciencies u, or wi th^tw^ -w.), This approach provides detailed 
explanation for the differences in estimated effíciencies and could provide valuable 
policy recommendations. 
However, this two-step procedure suffers from serious econometric problems. First of 
all, the variables in z must be assumed to be uncorrelated with the elements in x in the 
first stage. If this assumption does not hold, máximum likelihood estimates of a 
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stochastic frontier model are biased because of omitting relevant variables in z. As a 
resuit, this would induce biased estimâtes in the second-stage régression. Under this 
circumstance, the estimâtes from the second stage will be unreliable. Secondly, this 
two-step procédure makes two contradictory assumptions in each stage. In the fïrst 
stage, the inefficiencies are assumed to be identically distributed, but in the second 
stage, predicted efficiencies are assumed to have a functional relationship with z. This 
is the so-called 'schizophrénie approach*. 
The third way of incorporating environmental variables is one-step procédure. This 
approach assumes that exogenous variables influence effleiency, rather than the 
structure of production technology. A few valuable models have been developed 
within this one-step procédure camp. For example, Reifschneider and Stevenson 
(1991) develop a hybrid model, by combining a stochastic production frontier with a 
deterministic inefficiency relationship. Other proponents of this one-step approach 
include Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli (1995). This one-step procédure 
attempts to overeóme shorteomings of above-mentioned approaches. It provides an 
explanation for variation in efficiency and characterizes the production environment. 
In addition, incorporation of the exogenous variables in a single frontier estimation 
procédure avoids the problem of independence assumptions associated with the two-
step procédure. 
As a resuit, the one-step procédure has become popular in efficiency study and a 
model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), thereafter BC95 model, has been 
outstanding among others. In addition to the advantages of the one-step approach, 
BC95 model has been developed in a panel data context. It is particularly helpful in 
overcoming some Statistical problem, for example, the multi-collinearity problem 
associated with the translog functional form for a cost function. BC95 model assumes 
the time-varying nature of efficiency by including a time trend variable in its 
inefficiency effect régression. It also includes a time trend variable in the frontier 
function to capture technical change at a constant rate. 
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3.3 Literaturę on bank efficiency 
3.3.1 An overview of bank efficiency literaturę 
A large volume of research has contributed to a rich and well established literaturę on 
bank efficiency. As summarized by Berger and Humphrey (1997), the purposes of 
efficiency research have fallen ínto three broad directions, which are not mutually 
exclusive. The first set of purposes has been to inform government policy maker by 
assessing the effects of various regulatory methods on efficiency at industrial level. 
Regulatory variables include deregulation, mergers and acquisitions. foreign entry, 
market structure, privatization, financial liberalization, and so on.. By analyzing the 
impact of related variables in detail, efficiency study could genérate valuable 
information to guide policy makers to encourage, discourage or modify a specific 
policy. 
The second set of purposes has been concerned with research methodologies in order 
to improve the qualhy and robustness of estimation. íssues cover, for example, 
frontier estimation method, outputs and inputs definition, functional form, the use of 
particular models, etc. Studies address one or more specific issues and attempt to 
reach some degree of conclusión based on a variety of mathematical and statistical 
testing and modelling techniques. This direction of research would result in more 
reliable efficiency estimates and thus more useful information supporting authorities 
to make appropriate policy decisions. 
The final set of purposes has been to provide useful information for bankers to 
improve managerial performance of a specific bank or a bank group. By constructing 
a benchmarking frontier, banks on or near the efficient frontier may share some 
commonalities in management practices or bank specific characteristics. These banks 
are considered as "best practices". Banks located far away from the efficient frontier 
are regarded as "worst practices". By identifying similarities and dissimilarities 
across 'best practice' and 'worst practice', bankers will tend to adopt "best practices'* 
and use "worst practices" as a practical guidance to avoid making wrong decisions. 
The end result would be improvement of efficiency at industrial level. 
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Economies of scale and economies of scope have been popular research areas in 
earlier literature. Technically, economies of scale refer to "the rate at which output 
changes as all factor quantities are varied" (Molyneux at el., 1996, p 137). Economies 
of scale are concerned with whether costs per unit can be reduced by increasing 
output. A measure of economies of scale is the ratio of the proportionate change in 
output to a certain proportionate change in all inputs, expressed by using a production 
function or its dual cost function. The conventional notion of the U-shaped average 
cost curve indicates the existence of an optimal scale of production, at which point 
the production cost would be minimized. In particular, economies of scale mean that 
with an increase in output of a firm, its average costs of production fall. In contrast, 
diseconomies of scale mean that average cost increases as output increases. A special 
case—constant returns to scale, refers to the situation that average cost remains 
unchanged when output changes. In the banking industry, the purpose of economies 
of scale studies is to help financial institutions to explore potential cost savings 
(Molyneux at el., 1996). It might be one reason for the prevalence of mergers and 
acquisitions of banks in most developed countries. 
Economies of scope seek the possibility of lowering average cost by diversifying 
output over the same organization. In other words, it explores whether costs per unit 
can be lowered by producing two or more outputs jointly. It refers to "The ability of 
financial institutions to generate synergistic cost savings through joint use of inputs in 
producing multiple products". In contrast, diseconomies of scope are present if "The 
costs of joint production of financial institution's services are higher than they would 
be if they were produced independently" (Saunders, 1999, pp 293). The studies of 
scope economies may provide valuable guidance on developing potential cost savings 
for firms, especially for financial institutions with a distinguishing feature of multi-
products. This promotes banks to widen product lines. 
Both economies of scale and economies of scope focus on cost savings based on 
accounting information. Simple financial ratios have been analyzed to relate costs to 
outputs and identify possible sources of cost inefficiency. Earlier studies provide 
some evidence for economies of scale for both large and small banks (Goddard et ai, 
2001). Subsequently, a cost function has been employed in the estimation of scale and 
scope economies in the banking industry. Estimated economies of scale and 
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économies of scope become more robust tban using simple financial ratio that could 
be affected by a number of reasons or even be easily manipulated in accordance with 
management intention. 
Possible sources of économies of scale and économies of scope include niore efficient 
use of input, spreading fixed costs, information économies, risk réduction, and 
customer économies. Empirical studies show significant scale économies for 
medium-sized banks of $100 million to $5 billion in assets in the 1980s, while scale 
économies have increased substantially, existing for large banks of $10 billion to $ 25 
billion in assets in the 1990s in the US. The différence may be the resuit of 
improvement in research methods as well as technology, and the relaxation of 
géographie restrictions on compétition (Saunders, 1999). As to scope économies, 
empirical studies indícate small cost inefficiencies. 
More recently, the so-called X-efficiency has attracted much more research attention. 
X-efficiency, first coined by Leibenstein (1966), focuses on the intrinsic nature of 
human organization. It argues that people and organizations normally do not work as 
hard and effectively as they could for various reasons. X-efficiency, also called 
frontier efficiency, is regardless of firm size (scale économies) and the product mix 
(scope économies). Within a data set, the best-practice frontier can be estimated and 
X-efficiency measures déviations in performance from that of "best-practice" firms 
located on the efficiency frontier, holding exogenous market factors constant. In 
particular, différence between the best-practice frontier and the practice of a particular 
financial institution is the observed X-inefficiency and financial institutions can be 
ranked accordingly. 
X-inefficiency reflects the différence in managerial ability to control costs for any 
given scale or scope of production. X-inefficiency may be caused by overall objective 
déterminants, including knovvledge or capability of management, corporate 
governance problems, the difficulties of principal-agent relationships within 
organizations, application of technologies, and so on. It has been found that X -
inefficiency account for a considerable proportion of total costs and it is a much more 
important potential source for poor performance than both scale and scope économies. 
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Bauer et al. (1998) find a strong empirical association between X-inefficiency and 
higher probabilities of failures. 
In developed countries, the second part of efficiency research has been concerned 
with the impacts on performance of market structure and concentration, deregulation, 
and mergers and acquisitions. The impact of market concentration on the profitability 
of banks has been examined extensively by testing four hypothèses: the structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis, the relative-market power hypothesis, X-efficiency 
versus structure hypothesis, and scalę efficiency versus structure hypothesis 
(Kapopoulos and Siokis, 2005). It is argued that there is a positive profit-structure 
relationship. For, example, X-efficiency versus structure hypothesis argues that 
leading banks with superior efficiency will obtain a high market share and therefore 
more concentrated market (Evanoff and Portier, 1988). Nevertheless, mixed results 
from empirical literaturę unable to reach such a conclusion. 
Various forms of banking deregulation have been a popular tone in many developed 
countries, in an attempt to spur bank compétition and improve efficiency. Empirical 
literaturę, however, is inconclusive on the expected positive association between 
efficiency and deregulation. After deregulation, bank efficiency has been improved in 
some countries but worsened in other countries. For example, studies find post-
deregulation improvement in bank efficiency in Australia (Sturm and Williams, 2004) 
and in Spain (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005). In contrary to this fmding, Bauer 
et al. (1993) observe that the deregulation in early 1980s has litter effect on bank 
efficiency in the US. Berger and Humphrey (1997) attribute thèse distinct findings to 
the industry conditions prior deregulation and the deregulation measures being 
implemented. 
Mergers and acquisitions are another popular practice in banking industry in 
developed countries for their widely claimed positive effect on cost efficiency. 
However, again, literaturę has no such consensus due to mixed empirical findings 
about the relationship between mergers and acquisitions and bank efficiency. 
Empirical efficiency studies have found improved profit efficiency but none for cost 
efficiency. However, the improvement in profit efficiency is mainly attributable to the 
properly shifting portfolio to generate higher revenues and to improve the quality of 
72 
bank outputs by increasing revenues more than costs (Berger et al., 1999. Resti, 1998, 
Hughes et ai, 1999, Aviaran, 1999 and Berger and Mester, 2003). 
Banking systems in developed countries have rather different natures from those of 
developing counties and transition economies, in terms of external economic 
environment, characteristics of banking systems, and specialty of particular bank 
operations and management. Therefore, their respective policy makers and bankers 
might face different situations and problems and expect different information from 
effíciency research to serve their purposes. Possible determinants of variation in 
estimated efficiencies may also be quite different in developed countries from those 
in developing and transition economies. Conclusions from effíciency studies carried 
out in developed countries might provide valuable information for developing and 
transition economies, but they should be consulted with caution. Since this study is 
conducted using data from Chínese banks, the review of empirical literature will 
focus on studies in developing countries and transition economies in the next section, 
which might provide more useful guidance for this research. 
3.3.2 Bank effíciency in developing and transition economies 
Banking systems in transition economies share much commonality. In a centrally-
planned economy, banks acted as accounting agencies to keep records of the financial 
transactions and they were functionally segmented by economic sectors. Banks 
lacked management skills and credit analysis systems. The banking systems were 
commonly associated with prevalence of state-ownership, poor asset quality, poor 
oversight institutions, and weak legal frameworks. Earlier market-oriented reforms 
focused on creating a two-tier system and subsequent reform strategies followed quiet 
different paths. Claessens (1998) ideutified two approaches, namely rehabilitaron and 
new entry. Countries in Central Europe mostly followed the former by transforming 
and revitalizing the oíd state banking system, while most countries in the former 
Soviet Union took the second approach by creating a new banking system. 
During the past two decades, banking reforms have been highlighted on the policy 
agenda in order to transform banking systems into market-based ones in line with the 
economic development in those transition economies. The reform is also provoked by 
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the récognition that a vvell-functioning banking system is important for economic 
grovvth and development. Consequently, governments have devoted considérable 
efforts on reforming their banking System. The primary purpose is to improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation and to strengthen the financial foundation to the 
economy as a whole. Despite reform stratégies varying across countries, reform 
measures generally include lowering entry threshold for both private domestic and 
foreign banks, privatizing state-owned banks, enhancing the supervisory framework, 
liberalizing interest rates, removing credit controls, and reducing government 
intervention. 
Although a voluminous literature on bank efficiency has been documented, the 
majority of studies have been undertaken in developed countries like the US and 
European countries. In last two décades, bank efficiency study in developing and 
transition économies has received much attention and there has been a rapid 
development of empirica) research because bank reform has taken place in most of 
thèse countries. Différent from those of developed countries, most studies have 
focused on the effect of deregulation and financial liberalization, foreign bank entry, 
ownership characteristics, and privatization. 
Deregulation 
Bank reform in developing and transition économies commonly start with financial 
deregulation based on two theoretical motivations. Microeconomic theory suggests 
that any constraints, like régulations in resources allocation, increase the costs of 
production and induce inefficient resource allocation because of the lack of 
compétition. Deregulation aims at creating a compétitive and flexible environment 
and banks have more freedom over their opérations. The unleashed compétitive 
pressure forces banks to be more efficient by altering their input and output mix, 
upgrading technologies, and basing their operational décisions on market principles. 
Thus deregulation is expected to increase compétition and improve performance. 
Similar to the case in developed countries, this postulated positive effect of 
deregulation on bank efficiency has yet to be proved since the empirical évidence is 
mixed. Using a Malmquist TFP index, Isik and Hassan (2003b) show that the 
performance of ail types of Turkish banks improved significantly after the 
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implementation of fmancial Hberalization during 1980-1990. Similar findings are 
reported in Shyu (1998) for Taiwanese banks, Gilbert and Wilson (1998) for Korean 
banks, Leightner and Lovell (1998) for Thai banks, and Chen eí al. (2005) for 
Chínese banks. In contrast, Katib and Mathews (2000) and Okuda eí al. (2002) 
observe increased bank operational cosís and negative technological progress after 
fmancial Hberalization in Malaysia. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) find little evidence 
in favour of liberalization in Indian banks during 1985-1996. Other studies (Isik and 
Hassan, 2003b; Ataullah el al., 2004) find deregulation has different impact on the 
performance of banks of different types and sizes. Lying in between, Hao eí al. (2001) 
find little or no significant effect of deregulation on bank efficiency and argüe that the 
possible existence of positive association between deregulation and bank productivity 
in ÍCorea may not be sustainable in the long term, 
Ownership issue 
The importance of ownership has been híghlíghted in bank reform in transiíion and 
developing countries. Primary concerns are optimal ownership and management 
structure that better reconciles management interests to that of owners (Spong et al., 
1995). State-ownership has been supported by the notion that governments can act in 
the best interest of social wealth and therefore state-ownership is economically 
efficient. By controlling the banking systems, governments are assumed to behave 
benevolently and finances preferred economic projects or industrial sectors in order to 
pursue greater social returns in excess of fmancial returns (Megginson, 2005). 
However, in reality, state-owned banks do not function as expected, resulting in much 
more inefficiency than privately-owned banks. Levine (2004) argües that government 
maximizes its own welfare rather than social welfare, regardless of risk taking and 
poor allocation of assets in bank operation. 
Literature has been extensivo on the relationship between industrial ownership and 
performance, especially for countries where state-owned banks domínate the banking 
system. Empirical research has generally shown a negative association between bank 
efficiency and state ownership. Political-driven lending has been a major source of 
inefficiency, Although state ownership in commerciaí banks has a few advantages, 
the negative economic outcomes outweigh its claimed benefíts. On the other hand, 
prívate ownership is expected to promote efficiency gains by better tackling the 
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agent-principal problem and encouraging shareholders to exercise due diligence and 
monitor management performance. The most likeíy solution is the repeal of state 
ownership from bank and therefore privatization of state-owned banks is an obvious 
policy implication. 
Privatization 
Amongst interlinked and interactive banking reform measures, privatization of state 
banks is the linchpin of the success of bank reform since state banks are usually the 
dominant players in the banking system,. Over the last two decades, bank 
privatization has been prioritized on the policy agenda, involving more than 250 
commercial banks in 59 countríes in developed, developing, and transition economies 
(Megginson, 2005). This prevalence has been even more drastic in transition 
economies in Eastern-Central Europe, East Asia and Latin American. Privatization 
has brought dramatic changes in ownership of the banking systems from government 
control to private control and from domestic control to foreign control across the 
transition economies, and elsewhere (Berger et al. 2005). 
Literature on privatization generally suggests that privatized banks should outperform 
similar state-owned banks in terms of profitability and efficiency. Privatization aims 
at changing ownership structure (therefore the corporate governance structure), in the 
hope of improving bank efficiency and the long-term viability. To achieve successful 
privatization, efforts should be made on resolving the corporate governance problems 
associated with public and private ownership. Corporate governance issue in banks is 
more complicated than in other ñrms because banks are more opaque and highly 
regulated (Levine, 2004). Sound governance mechanisms could better tackle 
principal-agent problems and therefore improve efficiency. Fundamental changes in 
the ownership structure will evoke management incentives to perform better, while 
new shareholders will better monitor the management, especially with respect to risk-
taking. 
Empirical studies have disco vered clear performance improvements after 
privatization in developing countries and transition economies as most studies report 
a positive effect of privatization (Megginson and Metter, 2002; Gilbert and Wilson, 
1998; and Boubakri et al., 2005). Two studies particularly examine the effects of the 
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static, selection and dynamic governance changes on bank performance. Berger et al 
(2005) find that state-owned banks have poor long-term performance in Argentina. 
Dramatic improvements in performance have been observed after radical governance 
changes through bank privatization. Using a similar approach. Williams and Nguyen 
(2005) examine bank performance of five countries in South-East Asia in relation to 
privatization. They find bank privatization strategy is associated with superior profit 
efficiency and strong productivity over time relative to other types of bank 
governance. Disharmonie result has been reported in Croatia where Kraft et al. (2002) 
and Kraft et al. (2006) observe no performance improvement after privatization. The 
different results perhaps because the specialty of the unusual process of bank 
privatization. In Croatia, most banks were founded by real sector enterprises in the 
former Yugoslavia and the banking system was passively and indirectly privatized as 
a by-product of the real sector's privatization. 
Politics have played a decisive role in the nature, timing, and eventual success or 
failure of bank privatization by affecting the privatization approach that influences 
the future behaviour of the privatized banks. With political considerations, benefits of 
privatization could be diminished by preferential policies, such as continuation of 
ownership, restricting competition, and prohibition of foreign banks participation. In 
emerging and developing countries and most transition economies, partial 
privatization of state banks is common practice. Governments divest some shares but 
retain substantial shares in the privatized banks. The purpose is to eliminate and 
smooth the economic shock of the transition process by continuing government 
intervention in bank lending policies. La Porta et al. (2002) survey government 
ownership of banks for 92 countries around the world. They find that government 
ownership in the banking industry is large and pervasive at a mean of 41.6% in 1995, 
even after bank privatization had been completed in many countries. 
The rationale is that state influence is necessary to channel funds to sectors and 
groups with low financial but high social returns since the private sector is unlikely to 
best balance social and economic goals (Huibers, 2005). However, policy literature 
concludes that partial privatization is unlikely to improve bank performance. 
Government retaining too much bank equity makes it difficult to improve corporate 
governance. Continued significant government ownership stands in the way of 
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establishing market-oriented governance and decision-making systems in privatized 
banks, which encumbers operational efficiency improvements (Verbrugge et al., 
2000). Multiple objectives of government are more likely to limit the speed and 
depth of the fundamental reform necessary to improve the performance of the 
banking system. 
Empirical research provides evidence supporting policy arguments and suggests 
government to reduce its influence over privatized banks. In the Czech Republic and 
Poland, Clarke et al. (2003) observe no improvement in bank performance after 
privatization when government still retained a substantial stake whereas the 
performance did improve after the government surrendered control. Clarke et al. 
(2005) conclude that bank privatization improves bank performance and raises 
competition. Gains from privatization are further improved, in the situations of no 
government control over privatized banks, foreign strategic investors' involvement, 
foreign bank participation, unrestricted competitive environment. Their results are in 
sympathy with conditions set for successful bank privatization by Megginson (2005). 
Moreover, political lessons from Mexican and Argentinean experiences suggest 
government to exercise less dictation over the specific features of privatization. 
Strategies making privatization more politically palatable could invite the risk of 
banking crisis, while restricting competition to increase revenue has been proved 
short sighted (Clarke et ai, 2005). In South-East Asia, foreigners' participation has 
been strictly regulated in domestic financial markets. Following the serious financial 
crisis in 1997, most South-East Asian countries have deregulated. Banking markets 
have been open to foreigners, in the hope of strengthening competition, fostering 
efficiency, importing international best practice and advanced technology (Williams 
and Nguyen, 2005). 
To an extreme, partial privatization could result in disastrous consequences for banks, 
taxpayers, and governments, instead of the expected benefits from privatization. After 
costly repeated re-capitalizations of state banks, most successful privatizations have 
ended up with governments handing over control to private owners. Some transition 
economies benefit from privatization after selling banks to foreign strategic investors 
during the middle and late 1990s (Megginson, 2005). Based on the above discussion, 
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one conclusion is that for bank privatisation to be successful, complète divestments of 
government ownership are called for as partial privatization is unlikely to improve 
bank performance in the long run. 
Methods ofprivatising sîaîe banks 
Methods most commonly used to privatize state banks include attracting foreign 
strategie investors to participate in domestic bank ownership and making initial 
public offering for state banks. Participating ownership in domestic banks provides an 
entry method for foreign banks and financial institutions alternative to open their own 
branches. Bonin et al. (2005a, 2005b) highlight the importance of attracting a 
strategie foreign owner in privatization. Policy literaturę suggests that privatization 
with a controlling foreign ownership would improve the financial performance of the 
bank. This is because foreign owners bring in advanced modem banking techniques 
and upgrade technology. Foreign acquisitions of domestic bank normally lead to bank 
taking stratégies, such as cost réduction, more cautious in risk-taking, and using more 
prudential and sophisticated opération techniques. In addition, foreign investors are 
normally international institutions, investment fund or Worldwide international banks 
with a high profile, which facilitâtes privatized banks to attract better clients, hire 
more highly skilled labour and access cheaper sources of funding (Bonin et al, 
2005a). Consequently, foreign ownership participation in domestic banks is expected 
to raise bank efficiency, productivity, and technology levels, especially in developing 
and transition countries where initial levels are lower relative to developed nations. 
Foreign ownership involvement in domestic banks has been pervasive in the process 
of bank privatization, which has motivated great research interests to investigate their 
impact on bank performance. Empirical literaturę in transition économies and 
developing countries generally reports improved performance, providing évidence for 
the privatization strategy of selling large state-owned banks to strategie foreign 
investors after recapitalization and cleaning the balance sheets (Boubakri et al., 2005; 
Hao et al., 2001; Fries and Taci, 2005; Grigorian and Manole, 2002; and Bonin et al, 
2005b). For instance, Bonin et al (2005a) investigated the effects of strategie foreign 
ownership on banking efficiency in eleven transition countries. They found that 
privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency while banks with a 
foreign strategie owner have been found to be more cost-efficient than other banks. 
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Hungary is a successful example of inviting foreign financial institutions. The 
centralized mono-banking system has been replaced by a two-tier banking system in 
1987 as in most other transition economies. By 1998, a privately owned banking 
system has been established. successfully solved the burden of bad debts, massive 
under-capitalization, and high concentration. Hasan and Marton (2003) investígate 
how a stronger banking system has been successfully constructed in such a short 
period of time. They attribute the success to early reorganization initiatives, flexible 
approaches to privatization, and liberal policies towards foreign bank involvement 
with domestic institutions. Both cost and profit efficiencies have been steadily 
improved during the sample period from 1993 to 1997. Banks with foreign 
involvement are found to be more effícient than their domestic counterparts. The 
Hungarian case provides strong evidence that skilled and experienced foreign banking 
institutions have increased competition in banking market and have a positive 
influence on the domestic banking system. 
There are a few exceptional studies that find no or negative impacts of foreign 
ownership in domestic banks. In Pakistán, Patti and Hardy (2005) find improvement 
in efficiency immediately after privatization but the improvement is unsustainable in 
the subsequent period for most privatized banks. Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) 
report improved cost efficiency but lowered profit efficiency for banks with a 
majority foreign stake. Kim and Lee (2004) provide opposite evidence that higher 
levéis of foreign ownership did not lead to cost reduction and actually produced less 
profits in Korea. One possible explanation is that these banks address asset quality by 
taking higher loan provisions which reduce profit in the short run with a long-term 
view of viability. 
An IPO is another popular option to privatize state banks in recognizing the 
importance of market discipline. A lack of market discipline weakens the control over 
management and worsens the agent-principal problem by facilitating the agent 
pursuing its own interests which might confiict with those of owners (Altunbas et ai, 
2001; Williams and Nguyen, 2005). However, IPO strategy is considered to be a less 
effective method than selling state shares to strategic investors (Clarke et ai, 2005). 
Prívate sales, generally lead to a concentrated ownership structure and controlling 
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owners have incentive to monitor bank managers to spur better performance. In 
contrast, IPO usually leads to a dispersed ownership among individual owners and a 
weakened incentive to monitor management efforts. Henee, IPO is often associated 
with higher agency costs and poorer performance. This hypothesis has been 
confirmed by Boubakri et al. (2005) in which banks privatized trough share issued 
privatization is less efficient. 
Clarke et al. (2005, ppl925) suggest a general guide for successful bank privatization, 
that i s 
v'...not to sell banks to risk-loving owners, or lo provide government 
subsidies or bail outs, but to put better safeguards against expropriation in 
place, protect lenders' property rights better, and improve access to 
creditor information. " 
Based on policy literaturę and empirical findings, Megginson (2005) has outlined a 
set of detailed conditions and suggestions for bank privatization to be successful and 
the privatized banking system to be viable. The first essential condition is to privatize 
state banks in full rather than partial privatization in which government remains a 
controlling stake in privatized banks. In the case of government retaining partial 
ownership, it should act only as a passive investor, to prevent from continuing policy 
lending on some political or central-planning basís. 
The second essential condition is concerned with how to tackle existing non-
performing loans and control its new growth. Effective methods of coping with bad 
loans need to be launched before or/and during the privatization. This problem 
becomes more serious when uncollectible outstanding non-performing loans are 
mainly allocated to state-owned enterprises. It is therefore important to ensure that 
further loans can only be extended to thèse SOEs on the commercially arm-length 
basis after privatization. 
The third essential condition is development of a functioning bank regulatory and 
supervisory system and an advanced financial reporting system. The bank regulatory 
and supervisory body should be sufficiently independent from the government in 
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order to ensure the effectiveness of examinatíon, supervisión and monitoring of 
commercial banks. In order to protect investors' interests, financial reporting systems 
should be designed to ensure transparency with regard to asset quality, profitability, 
risk profile, and the Hke. 
The forth essential condition is concerned with deposit insurance schemes for 
privatized banks that probably lead to moral hazard problems. Although insurance 
schemes are necessary to be in place to protect depositors, it is desired to avoid 
setting up 100% deposit insurance schemes after privatization. Finally, foreign 
strategic ownership is desirable in the process of state bank privatization, in an 
attempt to attract capital, expertise, technology and financial legitimacy. 
Foreign bank entry 
As part of banking reform, foreign banks are commoníy invited by opening up 
policies. They bring in competition to the domestic banking system but also créate 
threat to domestic banks. As to whether foreign-owned banks outperform domestic-
owned banks. Berger et al. (2000) propose two alternative hypotheses: a home field 
advantage hypothesis and a global advantage hypothesis. The home field advantage 
hypothesis argües that domestic institutions are generally more effícient than foreign 
owned institutions. The advantage could arise from organizational diseconomíes to 
opérate and monitor an institution from a distance, the íack of understanding of local 
conditions, íimited access to soft qualitative information. Moreover, a variety of 
barriers against foreign institutions to be more effícient, including language, culture, 
currency, regulatory and supervisory structures, and country-specific market features 
(Berger et al, 2005). 
The alternative global advantage hypothesis argües that foreign institutions can be 
more effícient for a number of reasons (Berger et al, 2005; Berger and Mester, 2003; 
Buch, 2003; Weill, 2003). The first reason is that foreign shareholders may contribute 
their superior managerial skills, high quality human capital, best-practice policies and 
procedures, and sophisticated investment and risk management skills. Foreign banks 
with their state-of-art technology and international experience are expected to be 
more effícient than, or at least as effícient as, domestic banks especially in developing 
and transition countries. Secondly, foreign banks, generally being part of a large 
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banking Organization, face the same scaie économies and diseconomies as domestic 
banks. Thirdly, foreign banks always serve profitable multinational customers. 
Fourthly, foreign banks have better access to capital markets. superior ability to 
diversify risks, and the ability to offer some services to multinational clients not 
easily provided by domestically-owned banks. Fifthly, foreign-owned institutions 
from developed nations have access to superior information technologies for 
collecting and assessing 'hard" quantitative information, which is especially true in 
developing countries. Finally, foreign-owned banks may benefit from better control 
from private shareholders since thèse banks are mostly privately-owned, resulting in 
more incentive for managers to operate more efficiently. 
Given opposite arguments outlined in two hypothèses, it is unsurprised that empirical 
literaturę has no agreement on whether foreign banks outperform domestic banks or 
the other way around. Claessens et ai. (2001) carry out a comprehensive study on the 
effect of foreign bank entry on domestic banking using data covering 80 countries for 
the 1988-1995 period. They find a tendency that the home field advantage hypothesis 
holds in developed countries, while the global advantage hypothesis holds in 
developing countries. This finding is consistent with other studies. In developed 
countries, évidence supporting the home field advantage hypothesis can be found in 
Berger et al. (2000), DeYong and Nolle (1996), Sathye's (2001), Chang et al. (1998), 
Peek et al. (1999), and Mahajan et al. (1996). 
In developing and transition économies, the empirical results are less conclusive. The 
limited form of global advantage hypothesis is supported by Weill (2003), Bonin et al. 
(2005b), Kraft et al (2006), Leightner and Lovell (1998) and Jemric and Vujcic 
(2002). In contrast, Rao (2005) and Yao (2007) find alternative home field advantage 
hypothesis holds in United Arab Emirates and China, respectively. Other studies find 
mixed results regarding différent type of banks and efficiency concepts used. For 
example, foreign banks are more efficient than other domestic banks but inferior to 
state banks in India for the sample period 1992-1998 (Shanmugam and Das, 2004), 
while foreign banks are more cost efficient but less profit efficient in Poland during 
1997-2000 (Nikiel and Opiela, 2002). 
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3.3.3 Bank efficiency in China and the contribution of the présent study 
Despite the literaturę on bank efficiency in transition and developing countries has 
expanded rapidly, there are only a handful bank efficiency studies in China. The main 
reason for this deficit is the lack of data on the Chinese banking system to carry out 
meaningful analysis. These studies have generally reported improved efficiency over 
the sample period under considération and the second part of thèse studies has 
exclusively focused on ownership issue. Joint-stock commercial banks are 
consistently found to outperform state-owned banks, regardless of using SFA (Yao et 
al, 2007; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; and Berger et al, 2007) or DEA (Hu et al, 2006 
and Wang et al, 2005). One exceptional study is Chen et al. (2005) who show that 
state-owned commercial banks are the most efficient banks in China. 
To our knowledge, this is the first and most comprehensive efficiency study for the 
period employing différent efficiency concepts and méthodologies. This study 
contributes to the established literaturę on bank prîvatization, foreign ownership 
participation, and financial restructuring with respect to developing countries and 
transition économies using data of the Chinese banks. This study attempts to provide 
useful information for policy makers regarding the ongoing banking reform in China 
by examining the effects of various reform measures on bank "performance. It 
develops a more comprehensive distance function model by incorporating the 
advantages of existing models (distance function model), procédures (one-step 
procédures) and methods (Berger et al. 2005 method). It is one of the few empirical 
attempts investigating input price measurement by comparing the use of market input 
priées and bank specific input priées. Although limited, it helps bankers to understand 
their position in the market by benchmarking to industrial best-practice as well as 
international banking giants. 
Particularly, this study distinguishes itself from existing efficiency studies on the 
Chinese banking industry in following aspects. First, it is the first study that examines 
the effects of institutional changes in banks on bank performance. Berger et al. (2005) 
Highlight the importance of analyzing static, sélection, and dynamie governance 
changes effects on bank performance in the same model. This study particularly 
attempts to quantify the static, sélection and dynamie governance effects on bank 
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efficiency. Existing studies focus on static effects of different governance structure 
and none of them examines the selection and dynamic effects of governance changes. 
Secondly, the study collects data for 11 years up to 2005. which is a unique period 
with far-reaching changes in the banking industry brought about by gradually 
deepened and broadened reforms towards a market-oriented banking system. Since 
1995, the first year of our sample, all banks are legally considered as commercial 
banks under the Commercial Banks Law except for three state-owned policy banks. 
The examination of the cost efficiency and profit efficiency for our sample period 
becomes meaningful since the assumptions of cost minimization and profit 
maximization are more appropriate. 
Thirdly, this study employs different efficiency measures of technical efficiency, cost 
efficiency, profit efficiency, as well as a variety of financial ratios to comprehensively 
assess the soundness and performance of Chinese commercial banks. It draws a more 
complete picture for the Chinese banking system by providing valuable information 
from different perspectives.. 
Finally, it addresses a number of important and controversial issues in the literature 
regarding research methodology. It is among a few studies examining following 
issues: 
1) Models: employing Cobb-Douglas production function and developing a more 
comprehensive model based on recently developed distance function approach 
in estimating technical efficiency (Chapter 5 and 6); 
2) Definitions of input and outputs: earning assets-based model versus income-
based model in estimating technical efficiency (Chapter 6); 
3) Functional forms: translog versus Fourier flexible functional form (Chapter 7); 
4) Input price measurements: market average input prices versus bank specific 
input prices in estimating cost and alternative profit efficiency (Chapter 7). 
A recent trend of efficiency study in transition and developing countries has been a 
cross-county analysis. For instance, Fries and Taci (2005) examined cost efficiency 
for 289 banks in 15 eastern European countries using a one-step SFA, while 
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Grigorian and Manóle (2002) employ DEA to investígate 17 eastern European 
countries for the period 1995-1998. Other cross-country studies inciude Williams and 
Nguyen (2005), Weill (2003), Bonin et al. (2005a, b), Ataullah, et al. (2004), and 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2002). While these studies provide comprehensive 
information on banking reform across some transition and developing countries, 
criticism arises from the estimation of a cross-border best practice frontier. These 
studies have to make a strong assumption that fundamental cross-country différences 
can be controlled for. As argued in Kraft et al. (2006), différences in regulatory and 
economic environments across countries and especially developing and transition 
countries are very strong and it is doubtful to control these variations. 
A single country study can avoid an econometric problem of controlling for these 
across-nation différences and better account for the country's Specialties. In this 
regard, single country efficiency study has prospered. Examples include Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998), Matousek and Taci (2002), Jemric and Vujcic, (2002), Hasan and 
Marron (2003), Nikiel and Opiela (2002), Kraft et al. (2006), Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998), Leightner and Lovell (1998), and Hao et al. (2001). A single country study is 
considered to better address the ongoing banking reforms in China. Thus, this study 
pays attention exclusively to the Chinese banking system, given the increasingly 
importance of the Chinese economy and the prominent Specialties of its banking 
industry. 
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Chapter 4 Data and current State of the Chinese banking System 
4.0 Preamble 
Literature review, together with information on Chinese banking system introduced in 
Chapter 2 has established a research background and methodology framework for this 
study. Before undertaking any further econometric analysis, this chapter focuses on a 
financial ratio analysis in order to grasp a basic understanding of the Chinese banking 
system. Employing an analytical framework for macro-prudential analysis, this 
chapter assesses the current State of the Chinese banking system in terms of 
profitability, capital adequacy, asset quality and liquidity. In fact, more than two 
décades of graduai reform nécessitâtes an assessment of the performance, the current 
State, and the stability of the Chinese banking system. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes data sources and 
the sample construction. Section 4.2 conducts an assessment for Chinese banking 
system from four dimensions: profitability, capital adequacy, the asset quality and the 
current condition of non-performing loans, and the liquidity risk. Section 4.3 
concludes. 
4.1 Data and sample 
Data are collected mainly from BankScope which provides data for a huge number of 
banks in many countries of the world in the forms of balance sheets, income 
Statements, various ratios, and ovvnership information. This database is updated 
monthly and the latest issue of the BankScope database used in this study is March 
2007. Other critical supplementary data sources and information include Almanac of 
China's Finance and Banking (1986-2005) published by the China's central bank, 
China Statistical Yearbook (1991-2006) published by China Statistical Publishing 
House, IMF's international Financial Statistics, a wide range of press release, and 
statistics from the websites of PBC, CBRC, National Bureau of Statistics, and 
individual banks. 
Considering the evolutionary process of the Chinese banking industry and the 
organizational structure of banks, Chinese commercial banks are classified into four 
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mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups: state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks 
(CCBs), and foreign banks (FBs). Four SOCBs include B O C : ICBC, C C B C and A B C . 
By 2005. there were thirteen JSCBs. Eleven JSCBs are included, namely Bank of 
Communications, China Everbright Bank. China Merchants Bank. Minsheng Banking 
Corporation. China CITIC Bank. Guangdong Development Bank, Hua Xia Bank. 
Industrial Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, 
and China Evergrowing Bank. China Zheshang Bank and Bohai Bank are excluded 
since they were established in June 2004 and in December 2005, respectively. The 
final group of domestic banks is CCBs. Data on CCBs are much less complete. By 
the end of 2005, there were 112 CCBs. Due to the lack of data and the fact that most 
CCBs were established during 1997-1998 or even later, our dataset oníy consists of a 
small number of CCBs in the first half sample period and about 20 CCBs during the 
second half of the sample period. 
Regarding this cíassification of commercial banks, one might argüe that the 
separation of SOCBs from JSCBs is meaningless because the key shareholders of 
JSCBs are local governments and the state-owned or state-controlled enterprises. The 
only difference is whether the solé or major owners are the central government or 
local governments. However, although all JSCBs are subject to government influence, 
the degree of intervention is much less in JSCBs than in SOCBs. The latter take more 
responsibility for promoting macroeconomic stability and maintaining economic 
growth. Moreover, the remuneration system of JSCBs is more flexible as it is 
determined at provincial or city levéis, whereas that of SOCBs tends to be more rigid 
by being set in line with other central government officials. In addition, the personnel 
management of JSCBs is also different from that of those SOCBs. Therefore, JSCBs 
are more competitive, profit-oriented, and performance-conscious. 
One might also argüe that all CCBs have been constructed in the form of joint-stock 
banks with local enterprises and finance bureaux as major shareholders. The 
separation between CCBs and JSCBs in this study is based on two reasons. The first 
reason is that all JSCBs are allowed to opérate nation-wide, whereas CCBs are 
restricted to opérate within their municipalities' localities. The second reason is that 
JSCBs opérate on a commercially profit-oriented basis since they are subject to less 
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government intervention. CCBs are originally converted from urban credit 
cooperatives and they are subject to local government intervention. The managerial 
and operational skitls are generally poorer than JSCBs. CCBs have carried on all their 
previous operations and it takes time to direct their management styles toward a 
higher level for fully commercial based banks and to improve their operational skiíls. 
As to foreign banks, there were 254 foreign bank operating institutions by 2005. 
Foreign banks are not separated from joint venture banks because China treats a bank 
as a foreign bank if the share of one single foreign owner exceeds 20%. Data on 
foreign banks are not publicly available and the final dataset only include less than 
ten foreign banks. Including such a small number of foreign banks may not 
significantly impact on our analysis for two reasons. First, the total assets of foreign 
banks only accounts for less than 2%o of the banking assets. Second, the business 
scope and operations of foreign banks are highly restricted to a small number of 
geographical locations, meaning that they do not opérate on a level playing ñeld with 
domestic banks. Although the coverage is small, the inclusión of foreign banks and 
joint-venture banks may provide comparative and complementary information for our 
analysis. 
ít should be appreciated that the quality of data in China is questionable and the 
analysis should take into account this limitation. ín order to elimínate the effect of 
data quality on the reliability of research findings, data from BankScope have been 
carefully edited, complied with, and cross-checked for consistency with data from the 
above-mentioned sources. Following Bonin et al. (2005a), bank observations have 
been chosen against three criteria. First, when more than one set of financial 
statement are available, the Consolidated statements are chosen. Second, the sample 
used in Chapter 4 includes both commercial banks and state-ovvned policy banks in 
order to draw more complete picture for the current state of the Chínese banking 
system. The sample used in efficiency estimation in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 
7 consists of commercial banks only as this study focuses on the performance of 
commercial banks and the impact of institutional changes on bank performance. 
Finalíy, in Chapter the sample only include banks for which data are available at least 
for five years during 1995-2005, helping to sepárate bank inefficiencies from random 
noise in the error terms. 
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The final dataset includes 35 commercial banks with 310 observations. Due to the 
missing observations for a number of years and banks, the sample is unbalanced and 
its distribution is shown in Table 4.1. The observations range from 17 to 34 per year 
and spread relatively evenly over the sample period except for the first tvvo years 
during which there are only 17 and 18 observations. The sample Covers ail major 
commercial banks in China, accounting for more than 80% of the country's total 
banking assets. The sample period is characterised by fundamental and drastic 
financial liberalizatîon, reform, and opening up in the Chinese banking industry. 
Table 4.1 Overall structure of dataset (number of observations) 
Year SOCBs JSCBs CCBs FBs Total 
1995 4 10 1 2 17 
1996 4 11 1 2 18 
1997 4 11 3 4 22 
1998 4 11 5 5 25 
1999 4 11 9 6 30 
2000 4 11 14 4 33 
2001 4 11 13 5 33 
2002 4 11 14 5 34 
2003 4 11 14 5 34 
2004 4 11 14 5 34 
2005 4 9 12 5 30 
Total 44 118 100 48 310 
Noies: SOCB = state-owned commercial bank: JSCB = joint-siock commercial bank, C C B = city commercial 
banks, FB = forcign bank. 
4.2 The current State of the Chinese banking System 
An analytical framework for macro-prudential analysis is adopted to assess the 
current State of the Chinese banking System. The analytical framework has been 
developed after the Worldwide banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s. It has been 
advocated by IMF and the European Systems of Central Bank for improving the 
safeguards against instability of the global financial System. The macro-prudential 
analysis framework consists of three main steps. The first step is to assess the current 
State of a financial sector through backward looking at banks' past performance. The 
second step is to identify the type and size of actual and/or potential sources of risk to 
which banks are exposed by analyzing the main drivers of bank profitability and 
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solvency. The third step is to examine the resilience of banks to possible risks by 
assessing the impact of identified risks on the stability of the banking System 
(Mörttinen. et al., 2005). This study limits itself at the first step and will not go 
further into the other steps, since the main purpose is to provide a preliminary 
assessment of the current condition of the Chinese banking System. It merely borrows 
the framework of the financial soundness indicators to conduct a financial ratio 
analysis in a structured and informative way. 
In order to probe how the banking System has performed under the past economic and 
financial market conditions, a wide range of financial ratios are analyzed, covering 
the main development in income statements, balance sheet conditions, capital 
adequacy. and assel quality. IMF has finalized thèse ratios into a core set and an 
encouraged set of indicators in the Compilation Guide on Financial Soundness 
Indicators (2004). The core set indicators include key ratios of earnings and 
profitabilité, capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity and sensitivity to market risks 
(Mörttinen, et al., 2005). 
The assessment is essentîally ratio analysis rather than the estimation of régression 
models to obtain reliable inferences. Ratio analysis is widely applied to financial 
institutions because of its clarity and simplicity. Its potential limitation is that it 
assumes that ail other factors are held constant when considering a particular ratio. To 
overcome this limitation, the macro-prudential analysis framework employs a wide 
range of indicators to evaluate banks from différent dimensions. A variety of financial 
information from bank balance sheets and income statements are grouped into 
indicators of profitabilité, capital adequacy, asset quality, and liquidity. Data and 
ratios analyzed are raw data without any adjustment and déflation as usually done in 
régression models. The aim is to make a backward-Iooking trend analysis of bank 
performance over the past ten years. The comprehensiveness and intensiveness of 
information thereof enable us to probe policy implications and make policy 
recommendations. 
In addition to the trend analysis, financial ratios are also compared with those of 
seven selected internationally renowned commercial banks, namely JP Morgan Chase 
Bank, BNP Paribas, Bank of America, Barclays Bank, HSBC, Royal Bank of 
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Scotland, and Citigroup. These banks are selected as benchmark because not only are 
they leading banks in the world but also most of them are active foreign investors in 
the process of the opening up of the Chinese banking market. The comparability 
across Chinese banks and these international banks is questionable. There exist 
significant differences in terms of macroeconomic conditions, managerial skills, 
management style, market structure, culture, and the like. However, the aim of 
Chinese bank reform is to create a sound banking system and to transform domestic 
banks (specifically SOCBs) into internationally competitive banks. Benchmarking to 
the best performing international banks helps the Chinese banks to identify their 
weaknesses in order to improve their international competitiveness. In fact, for 
monitoring the ongoing bank reform, the government has already set out ten 
requirements for good corporate governance and seven performance indicators since 
2004. These measures have been benchmarked to the top 100 largest banks globally, 
focusing on risk management and improving corporate governance. 
4.2.1 Profitability 
Bank profitability is evaluated by Iwo frequently used performance measures of ROA 
and ROE. In additional, the ratio of interest margin to gross income and the ratio of 
costs to income are also analyzed to identify factors contributing to good/bad 
performance in an attempt to discover the strengths and weaknesses of banks' 
operation. 
ROA (ROE) is defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets (equity). ROE 
needs to be interpreted in connection with capital adequacy as it is affected by both 
profitability and capital adequacy. A high ROE could result from high profitability 
and/or low capitalization, or vice versa. Net income in ROA and ROE calculation is 
net income after extraordinary items and taxes, while the denominators take the 
average of the beginning and end-period positions of asset and that of equity, 
respectively. 
Figure 4.1 (a) and (b) plot the average ROA and ROE for different types of banks in 
China and seven selected international banks. The ROA of Chinese banks has 
declined steadily during the first half of the sample period and kept relatively stable 
92 
over the second half of the sample. Except for CCBs' ROE feil sharply in the first 
five years, other banks' ROE has remained stable for the entire period. On average, 
Chinese banks are less profitable compared with selected international banks. The 
average ROA and ROE of Chinese banks are 0.59% and 11% while those of 
international banks are 0.94 % and 16%, respectively. 
Figure 4.1 ROA and ROE of différent types of banks 
(a) ROA 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CCBs FBs —Ar- JSCBs - S i e - SOCBs —à—SOPBs —©—Inter 
(b) ROE 
CCBs FBs —à—JSCBs —X,— SOCBs —ù— SOPBs — é — inter 
Source: BankScopc 
Notes: ROA = rehmi on assets, ROE = rettirn on equity; C C B = city commercial bank, 1-B = foreign bank. 
JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. SOPB = state-owned policy 
bank, Inter = seven selected international banks. 
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Figure 4.1 shows that all banks suffered a systematic shock with différent extent in 
1997. reflecting the downside effects of the Asian financial crisis on the Chinese 
banking System. A subséquent decline lasted until 1999 when the Chinese 
government implemented the first round of SOCBs bailout in the forms of 
recapitalization and NPLs off-loading. FBs are the best performers measured by 
average ROA of 1.36% but much worse measured by average ROE of 6.87%. This is 
perhaps because foreign banks have small size of total assets but a relatively more 
adéquate equity-capital base, compared with their domestic counterparties. 
CCBs are more profitable than SOCBs but less profitable than FBs in terms of ROA. 
They are the second best bank group in terms of ROE in the sample. CCBs have 
experienced a dramatic decline in both ROA and ROE during the first half of sample 
period. The main reason is considered to be a sample bias. As shown in Table 4.1, 
only a few CCBs are included in the sample for the first five years. They have been 
established and have operated in well developed economic régions of China, such as 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin. Shenzhen and Xiamen. Moreover, their management is 
generally superior to that of other CCBs. Evidently, the average ROA and ROE have 
dropped sharply when more CCBs are included during the second half of the sample 
period. 
SOCBs have performed poorly throughout the whole sample period despite of an 
improvement in ROA and ROE after 2002. The overall performance of SOPBs is 
very similar to SOCBs, causing a particular concern. In principie, SOPBs are 
supposed to conduct policy lending activities to economically less profitable but 
socially bénéficiai industries and prqjects in support of the overall economic 
development. They do not opérate on a profit-oriented commercial basis and therefore 
they are expected to underperform SOCBs who opérate on commercial basis and have 
been freed from policy lending activities since 1994. This similarity in the 
performance among SOCBs and SOPBs has two implications. First, SOPBs have 
been concerned about profitability in extending policy loans which to some extent is 
in contradiction with their policy lending role. Figure 4.1 shows SOPBs' ROE has 
been increasing over the sample period. Second, SOCBs have been less concerned 
about profitability in their opérations than they should be as commercial banks. It 
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might be évident that SOCBs still have been playing a rôle in policy lending activity, 
consistent with the discussion of SOPBs in Chapter 2. 
On average. JSCBs have higher ROA and ROE than other domestic banks and they 
even compete with international banks in terms of ROE for the most of sample period. 
Majority of JSCBs were established during the late 1980s and early 1990s as profit-
oriented commercial banks. They are generally believed to have better management 
and some advantages over SOCBs, such as a more flexible rémunération System, 
more profit-orientation, and less govermnent intervention. However, Figure 4.1 also 
reveals that JSCBs' ROA has been declining during the same period when other 
domestic banks' ROA have been stable or slightly improved. This trend opens a 
question as to whether their better performance has been the results of superior 
management and modem banking practices or simply the results of taking the 
advantages of new establishment with no historical burden as the SOCBs. In fact, key 
management officiais of JSCBs are mainly transferred from SOCBs, resulting in more 
or less similar management philosophy, style, and operational skills. There is a 
danger that JSCBs could be a copy of SOCBs except for fewer NPLs burdens. For 
JSCB to be internationally viable in the long-term JSCBs' bankers should ensure their 
superiority in management and modem banking practices. 
Given a high priority in banking reform and a dominant rôle in the Chinese banking 
System, it is worthwhile to have a close look at their performance in comparison with 
the performance of the selected international banks. In fact, the four SOCBs are at 
pivot of the Chinese banking System and at the forefront of bank reform. They are 
among the 40 largest banks in the world in terms of total assets, whereas their 
performance is rnuch lagged behind the world's largest banks despite a significant 
improvement in récent years. Figure 4.2 shows the ROA and ROE for each of the 
SOCBs and average the ROA and ROE of the international banks. The performance 
of three restructured SOCBs (CCBC, BOC and 1CBC) significantly caught up with 
that of the international banks over the past three years. Their ROA and ROE 
increased slowiy before 2003 but rose sharply after 2003, suggesting a significant 
impact of drastic SOCBs reform starting from 2003. CCBC made the most impressive 
improvement, outperforming the international banks after 2004. Its ROA and ROE 
increased about six times, reaching 25.4%. BOC and ICBC expericnced a similar 
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catching up process, achieving a significant increase in ROA and ROE from 2003. By 
2007, except for A B C . the SOCBs vvere as profitable as the international banking 
giants. 
Figure 4.2 ROA and ROE of SOCBs and international banks 
(a) R O A 
A B C H B O C H C C B C • I C B C B) Inter 
( b ) R O E 
A B C S B O C S C C B C • I C B C S In te r 
Source: BankScope 
Notes: R O A = returns on assets, ROE = returns on equitv. SOCB = statc-owned commercial bank, A B C = 
Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China, C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation. ICBC 
= Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. Inter = Internationa) Banks. 
The ratio of interest margin (interest reeeived less interest paid) to gross income 
measures the relative share of net interest earnings in gross ïncomes, which indicates 
the sources of bank profit. Figure 4.3 shows the average of this ratio for différent 
types of banks in China and international banks. Chinese banks have been 
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overwhelmingly and persistently dépendant on interest incomes that accounts for 
about 90% of their gross incomes. In a sharp contrast, interest incomes in 
international banks only account for about 40% of their gross income. Among 
différent types of bank. JSCBs have the highest dependency on interest incomes at 
about 94%, surpassing SOCBs. It is evident that JSCBs have concentrated on 
traditional lending activities with less involvement in more profitable modem banking 
activities to generate fees and commission incomes. The results suggest that JSCBs 
have developed in a similar fashion with SOCBs that they both have excessively 
dépendent on traditional lending activities. There bas been a lack in moving towards 
the advanced and diversified banking practices, suggesting a fundamental weakness 
of the Chinese banking sector. 
Figure 4.3 Interest margin to gross income of différent type of banks 
[ —•—i" r"vr /—i 1 1 —r i" i 1 
4995—1-996—1991—1-&—1-999—2000—2001 2002- -2003—2004—2005-
CCBs FBs - à - J S C B s - * - SOCBs - ^ - S O P B s -*-lnter 
Source: Authors' calculât ion bascd on data from BankScope. 
Noies: C C B = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank. JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B 
statc-owned commercial bank. SOPB = state-ovvned policy bank, Intcr = international bank. 
Figure 4.4 shows the ratio of interest incomes to gross income for individual SOCBs 
and the selected international banks group. Again, the ratios were as high as at 90%. 
It appears that Chinese banks were unaware of the benefits of diversifying income 
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sources away from interest incomes after almost three décades of reform. It is 
considered as a weakness of the banking system because higher dependence on 
interests makes banks' profitability more sensitive to assets quality. It is an area of 
great potential for future development and needs to be addressed. 
Figure 4.4 Interest margin to gross income of SOCBs and international banks 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
• A B C S BOC S CCBC • ICBC S Inter 
Source: Authors' calcuiation. 
Notes: S O C B = state-owned commercial bank: A B C = Agricultura! Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China, 
C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation. ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Inter = 
International Bank. 
Cost-to-income ratio is defined as the ratio of operating non-interest expenses to gross 
income, measuring the proportion of gross operating income absorbed by overhead 
expenses. It is a simple financial proxy for cost efficiency, widely used by banking 
System analysts. A lower value indicates greater efficiency. As shown in Figure 4.5, 
operating expenses consume a substantial portion of net operating income. The cost 
to income ratio declined over time for ail types of banks, suggesting that ail the banks 
were concentrated on cost savings to improve performance. Chinese banks performed 
much better in cost control than their international counterparts. In other words, they 
were more cost efficient. This is considered as the strength of the Chinese banking 
System. 
98 
Figure 4.5 Cost to income of différent type of banks 
80 
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: C C B = city commercial batik, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = 
state-owned commercial bank, SOPB = stale-owncd policy bank, Inter = international bank. 
Looking at the cost to income ratio of individual SOCBs shown in Figure 4.6, SOCBs, 
except A B C , achieved higher cost efficiency than the international banks. SOCBs 
made considérable efforts to reduce operating expenses by closing down unprofitable 
branches and cutting jobs. As a resuit, cost to income ratio was reduced by about 20% 
over the sample period. 
Figure 4.6 Cost to income of SOCBs and international banks 
100 -
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: SOCB = state-owned commercial bank, A B C = Agricullural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China, C C B C 
= China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Inter = International 
Bank. 
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When taking into account of increased loan loss provisions (LLP) for most Chinese 
banks during the period, cost savings were morę significant sińce LLP constituted 
part of total expenses and consuined gross income. LLP are net new aliowances 
against bad or impaired loans during an accounting period. On average, the ratio of 
L L P to gross income of domestic bank increased to 17% by 2005 from nearly zero in 
1995 as a result of tightened regulations. 
4.2.2 Capital adeąuacy 
Banking is a highly leveraged industry that eąuity capital only accounts for 8% of 
total assets with the rest 92% being financed by depositors and other creditors. Such a 
smali portion of eąuity capital plays a fundamental role in the banking business and it 
is vital to the surviva! and growth o f banks in the long run. Bank capital functions as a 
source of funds, a cushion to absorb unexpected operating losses, and the finał 
safeguard of bank solvency. When losses exceed bank capital in the extreme, banks 
will be insolvent and face closure. It is important for banks to have adeąuate capital. 
Capital adeąuacy ratio (CAR) measures the capacity of the financial sector to absorb 
losses and indicate bank solvency. C A R is regulated in most countries for the 
purposes of maintaining a sound banking system and protecting depositors. 
IMF has introduced four capital adeąuacy indicators in the macro-prudential analysis 
framework, including regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, regulatory Tier 1 
capital (core capital) to risk-weighted assets, non-performing loans (net of specific 
provisions) to capital ratio, and eąuity to total assets ratio (E/A ratio). Tier 1 capital is 
common in all countries and it is the most important capital because of the greatest 
ability to absorb losses. It is related to bank profitability and competitiveness and has 
become an informative basis for interest parties to judge a bank :s capital adeąuacy. 
The Basel Capital Accord sets minimum capital reąuirements for banks as 8%) for 
regulatory capital and 4% for core capital. Generally, the higher the ratio, the safer is 
the bank, although over capitalization might imply economic inefficiency, waste, and 
opportunity cost for both shareholders and society. 
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In China, Regulation Governing Capital Adeąuacy of Commercial Banks has come 
into effect sińce 1 March 2004. Commercial banks were given a transition period up 
to 1 January 2007 to meet the minimum capital adeąuacy reąuirements by taking on a 
feasible phase-in plan. The disclosure of CAR is not an official reąuirement for banks 
before 2004. Although authorities have internally monitored banks' capital adeąuacy 
in accordance with the Basel Capital Accord sińce 1998, data on C A R are publicly 
unavailable for every bank. Therefore, the analysis is based on odd information 
gathered from various sources, including major annual reports, press releases, China 
Banking Regulatory Commission announcements, and Almanac of China 's Finance 
and Banking (1986-2005). Table 4.2 reports the C A R for the major banks in China 
and the average CAR of international banks. 
Table 4.2 Capital adeąuacy ratio of Chinese banks 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Chinese banks: 
A B C 1.44 
BOC 8.30 8.15 7.69 10.04 10.42 
CCBC 6.88 6.91 6.51 11.29 13.57 
ICBC 5.54 5.52 9.89 
JSCBs 3.36 6.59 8.10 
International banks 12.15 12.05 12.17 11.60 11.83 
Sources: the Banker. Almanac of China's Finance and Banking. 
Notes: A B C = Agricultural Bank of China. B O C = Bank of China. C C B C = China Construction Bank 
Corporation, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank. 
Low capitalization has been one of the major plights haunting the Chinese banking 
system. The capital adeąuacy for most Chinese banks has been much less than 
international standards set by the Basel Capital Accord. In order to inerease banks' 
capital adeąuacy, the government has made every possible effort sińce 1998, 
including two rounds of capitalization and two rounds of NPLs off-loading. After a 
capital injection of R M B 270 billion in 1998, the CARs of SOCBs reached 8%. 
Nevertheless, SOCBs' C A R dropped below 8% except for BOC, although Tier l 
capital ratios of SOCBs were still above the international standard of 4% in 2002. 
Under the challenges from WTO accession, the government initiated the second 
round of capitalization and NPLs offloading for selected SOCBs to inerease their 
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capital base and assets ąuality. As shown in Table 4.2, the C A R was well above the 
international reąuirement of 8% by the end of 2005, although still lower than the 
average international banks' CAR by about 3 to 4 percentage points. 
In the absence of complete data on regulatory CARs, this analysis has to be 
compromised by concentrating on the E/A ratio that reflects the proportion of total 
assets fmanced by eąuity capital. The total assets are not risk weighted and eąuity 
only includes capital and reserves, taken from bank balance sheets directly. While 
eąuity to total assets ratio is less risk-sensitive than regulatory CARs, the changes in 
E/A ratio reveal shifts in bank balance sheet structure and shifts in bank risk taking. 
Figurę 4.7 plots the E/A ratio for the major peer groups of Chinese banks and selected 
international banks. 
The capital base of Chinese banks has declined over the sample period measured by 
the proportion of their total assets. Eąuity accounts for 5% or less of total assets, 
whilst that of selected international banks is above 6%, suggesting a slightly more 
vulnerable banking system in China. The E/A ratio of JSCBs dropped substantially 
during the first four years from the most capital adeąuate banks to the least ones. One 
reason is the rapid expansion of loans from 48% of total assets in 1995 to 60% in 
2005, much faster than the eąuity growth. The E/A ratio of CCBs and SOPBs have 
moved in a similar pattern as that of JSCBs, declining first then becoming relatively 
stable. The movement of SOCBs' E/A ratio exhibits different patterns from other 
banks because of the significant effect of government subsidiaries. The E/A ratio of 
SOCBs was the lowest at 3% in the first two years and dramatically doubled as a 
direct conseąuence of the first round SOCBs bailout in 1998. Nevertheless, it then 
declined slowly in the next two years and then sharply until 2004. Again, due to the 
second round of SOCBs bailout, their E/A ratio slightly increased in 2005. 
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Figure 4.7 Equity to total assets ratio of différent type of banks 
10.00 - -
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: C C B = city commercial bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = state-owned commercial 
bank, SOPB = stalc-owned policy bank: Inter= international bank. 
Over the sample period, the overall E/A ratio of Chinese banking system has been 
declining, which may be explained as follows, First, rapid credit expansion has been 
driven by a rising demand for financing the fast growing economy. From 1996 to 
2005, the total loans made by SOCBs and JSCBs increased by 157%. Second, 
domestic banks have been unable to raise extemal capital to keep up with the pace of 
credit expansion. The capital market in China remains underdeveloped and the market 
relatively is thin. Only six JSCBs have raised funds from the capital market through 
stock exchange listing by 2005. Until 2006 the government started to restructure 
SOCBs and let three SOCBs be listed in the stock markets. Third, banks have been 
unable to increase capital internally because of low profitability. Although JSCBs are 
profitable, they have extended out loans much faster than the increases in equity. 
SOCBs' low capitalization was the resuit of low profitability and rapid expansion of 
loans with low quality. The resuit suggests that the surge of foreign direct investment 
in the banking system and the IPOs of domestic banks were insufficient to 
significantly improve the capital base of the banking system at least by 2005. 
When looking at SOCBs individually in Figure 4.8, the impact of government 
subsidies become apparent. The E/A ratio improved significantly in 1998 after the 
first round of SOCBs bailout, while the ratio kept falling gradually for ail SOCBs 
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except for BOC until 2002. In late 2003, the government recapitalised three SOCBs 
as part of more radical SOCBs reforms. As a result SOCBs' E/A ratio improved 
significantly reaching a level of the international benchmark except for A B C . 
Figure 4.8 Equity to total asset ratio of SOCBs and international banks 
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: S O C B = state-owned commercial bank. A B C = Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of 
China, C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Inter = International Bank. 
4.2.3 Asset quality and the non-performing loans 
The quality of banks' loan portfolio is of fundamental importance to profitability, 
which, in turn, is the premise of banks' long term viability. Asset quality is 
particularly essential for a banking system where bank incomes are mainly supported 
by interest incomes as it is in China. Although a few financial ratios can be used to 
reflect assets quality, this study concentrates on the NPL ratio (the ratio of NPLs to 
Gross Loans) and loan loss reserves (LLR) to gross loans ratio. 
NPL ratio is a backward-looking measure of assets quality based on historic 
information of bank loan portfolio. A higher ratio indicates lower asset quality. NPL 
is an important problem in the Chinese banking system as a vast amount of NPLs was 
accumulated in the SOCBs over the last two decades. Detailed NPL information has 
been unavailable until the People's Bank of China urged banks to disclose their NPL 
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ratios and balance sheets in accordance with the newly adopted internationally-
accepted five-category loan classification system in 2000. Since 2002, all banks were 
officially required to disclose NPL figures in their annual reports. In 1998, the 
government first disclosed that the NPL ratio of SOCBs was less than 30%. However, 
our estimate was about 42% in 1999 as shown in Table 4.3, accounting for 40% of 
China's GDP for the year. The estimates in Table 4.3 are consistent with those by 
some international agencies, such as Standard & Poor's and Moody's, that the NPL 
ratio of Chinese banks was 35-50%. 
In essence, NPLs of Chinese banks are different from those of banks in other 
countries. Rather than losses from managerial and operational failure, much of NPLs 
of Chinese SOCBs was a number of factors in the process of economic transition in 
the country. Such factors include government intervention to support loss-making 
SOEs, excessive credit expansion to finance the overheated economy during the 
economic bubble in the early 1990s, the lack of commercial banking experiences in a 
market-oriented environment, a weak supervisory and regulatory system, and the 
under-developed legal and accounting framework. These NPLs are the costs of the 
transition from a planned economy to a market one for maintaining social stability 
and sustaining high economic growth. 
Before further analysis, it is worth looking at how to identify NPLs in China. A 
Chinese-style four-category loan classification system had been used until it was 
officially replaced by an internationally-accepted five-category loan classification 
system. Under the four-category loan classification system, loans are categorized as 
Pass, Past-due, Idle and Bad, of which the last three categories are identified as NPLs. 
Under the five-category loan classification system, bank loans are classified in 
accordance with their inherent risks as Pass, Special-mention, Substandard, Doubtful 
and Loss, of which the last three categories are identified as NPLs. The four-category 
loan classification system tends to underestimate NPLs relative to the five-category 
loan classification system since the former provides leeway to retain NPLs unexposed. 
According to PBC's internal studies, the five-category system increases NPL ratio by 
about 14% compared with the four-category loan classification system. Based on an 
experiment in Guangdong, the five-category loan classification system has been 
applied to all commercial banks since 2002. 
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SOCBs vvere the main producers of massive NPLs in the Chinese banking System. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the statistics of SOCBs for the period 1999-2005, based on our 
estimation and officiaiLy released information. In 1999. the total amount of NPLs in 
SOCBs reached RMB3.3 trïllion and the NPL ratio was 43% under the four-category 
loan classification System, accounting for 40%» of the country's GDP in that year. 
This figure would be higher if NPLs had been identified under the five-category loan 
classification system. After the first round of NPL divestment by R M B 1.4 trillion in 
1999, the total amount of NPLs rebounded to RMB 2.3 trillion and the NPL ratio was 
31% in 2001 under the newly adopted five-category loan classification System. After 
2001, NPLs declined steadily. By 2005, the NPL ratio and total NPLs were down to 
10.49%) and RMB 1 trillion respectively, reflecting a significant achievement of 
government efforts to revitalise the SOCBs. The share of NPLs in SOCBs to GDP fell 
dramatically from 42% in 1999 to 6% in 2005, because of increasing GDP and 
decreasing NPLs. 
Table 4.3 NPLs of SOCBs 
Four-category Five-category 
Share of Share of 
Ratio Balance GDP Ratio Balance GDP 
% RMB billion % % R M B billion % 
1999 42.83 3,345 40.76 
2000 29.18 1,952 21.82 
2001 25.37 1,877 19.29 31.02 2,286 23.49 
2002 26.10 2,208 20.99 
2003 19.74 1,964 16.75 
2004 15.57 1,575 11.54 
2005 10.49 1,073 5.88 
Sources: C B R C . Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, China Statistical Ycar book and authors calculation 
and estimation. 
Note: NPL = non-perforniing loan. SOCB = state-owncd commercial bank. 
Due to the incompleteness of data, Table 4.4 shows the NPL ratios of major Chinese 
commercial banks for the period 2001-2005. Apart from A B C , all domestic banks 
have dramatically reduced their NPLs in both year-end balance and the ratio to total 
loans. The NPL ratio of three restructured SOCBs and CCBs have declined 
significantly from more than 20% in 2001 to 5% and 8% in 2005, respectively. JSBCs 
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had the lowest NPL ratio among ail domestic banks. Their average N P L ratio 
declined from 13% in 2001 to 4% in 2005, indicating better asset quality control and 
risk management practice over SOCBs and CCBs, Despite substantial improvement, 
the NPL ratio of the Chinese commercial banks was still well above the average NPL 
ratio of about 2% achíeved by the selected international banks. It implies that 
continuous efforts are required by the Chinese banks to fundamentally résolve their 
NPL problem. 
Table 4.4 NPL ratios of Chinese banks (%) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
A B C 30.1 26.2 
BOC 27.5 22.5 16.3 5.1 4.9 
CCBC 19.4 15.2 9.1 3.9 3.8 
ICBC 29.8 25.4 21.2 19.0 4.7 
JSCBs 12.9 9.5 7.6 4.9 4.2 
CCBs 24.0 17.7 14.9 11.7 7.7 
Sources: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (2000-2005), The Banker. 
Notes: A B C = Agncultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China, C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, 
ICBC = [ndustrial and Commercial Bank of China, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, C C B = city commercial 
bank. 
The remarkable decline in the NPL ratio and year-end NPLs was largely due to the 
massive disposal of bad assets. The government first off-loaded NPLs by R M B 1.4 
trillion to fonr state asset management companies at book valué in 1999, which was 
followed by the second round of NPLs divestment in 2003 and 2005 totalling R M B 
1.18 trillion. These divestments reduced absolute valué of NPLs in SOCBs, 
significantly improving their asset quality. Moreover, the decline in NPLs was also 
attributable to the favourable economic environment and the rapid expansión of the 
credit market. Total loans extended by SOCBs increased one-third from RMB 6.4 
trillion in 1999 to RMB 10 trillion in 2005. The expansión helped reduce the NPLs 
ratio at least in short run irrespective of the quality of new loans. Furthermore, the 
significant improvement in NPL condition was also the result of the ongoing bank 
reform aiming to enhance internal control, risk management, decisión making 
mechanism of credit expansión, disclosure requirements, and quality control for new 
loans. 
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However, when looking at the overall NPL situation in China, a différent story 
emerges as summarized in Table 4.5. It shows that although the NPL ratio and the 
total amount of NPLs decreased substantially, the problem was not resolved for the 
economy as a whole. Two rounds of NPL divestments transferred a total amount of 
RMB2.58 trillion NPLs from SOCBs and R M B 64 million from Bank of 
Communication to asset management companies. 
Table 4.5 Analysis of NPLs in Chinese banks (RBM billion) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
NPLs condition in AMCs 
NPLs received inl999 1412 1412 1412 1412 1412 1412 
Debt equity swaps 319 319 319 319 319 
Accumulated Disposai 125 315 509 675 840 
(Cash Recovered) 26 67 99 137 177 
OutstandingNPLs from 1999 1412 968 778 583 418 253 
New removal from Banks 542 705 
NPLs balance in AMCs 1412 968 778 583 960 958 
NPLs in banks 1952 2286 2208 2441 1718 1313 
Total NPLs 3364 3255 2986 3024 2677 2271 
Share of total NPLs to 
GDP % 37.60 33.44 28.39 25.79 19.61 12.46 
Sourccs: C B R C , Almanac of China's Finance and Banking. China Statistical Yearbook, and author's estimates 
Notes: (1) NPLs for 2000 are under four-category loan classií ication system and the rest are all under the newly 
adopted five-category loan classification system. (2) NPL = Non-pcrformmg loan, A M C = Assets management 
company. 
The last two rows in Table 4,5 show the total amount of NPLs that include NPLs in 
both asset management companies and banks and the share of NPLs to GDP for each 
corresponding year. The absolute total amount of NPLs in the country had declined 
by one-third from a total of RMB 3,364 billion in 2000 to RMB 2,271 billion in 2005. 
As GDP increased from R M B 8.2 trillion in 1999 to RMB18.2 trillion in 2005, the 
NPL/GDP ratio declined to 12% in 2005. 
Taking a closer look at the asset management companies' opération in resolving these 
transferred NPLs. the problem became more apparent. With respect to R M B 1412 
billion NPLs received in 1999, the asset management companies arranged debt-for-
equity swap by about RMB 400 billion, of which R M B 319 billion were ultimately 
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approved by the State Council in 2003. The conversión could end up with worthless 
rights if there were no fundamental improvement in the performance of these debtors 
(mainly loss-making SOEs). Thus, the debt-for-equity resolution is not the end of the 
game since the ultimate result is uncertain. For the rest NPLs of RMB 1.100 billion. 
only about 20% were recovered as cash. The cash recovery ratio for the remaining 
NPLs would be lower than 20%> since NPLs with relatively better quality had been 
disposed of already. 
Asset management companies had financed those purchased NPLs by the central 
bank lending and the issue of special bonds guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. 
Asset management companies themselves had no sources to repay principal, which 
would possibly become bad debts again but changed hands from SOCBs to asset 
management companies. Moreover, the costs on these central bank lending and 
special bonds were substantial. By assuming the average cosí of 2.25%o (recent one-
year prevailing deposit rate), the total costs for 6 years would be about R M B 191 
billion by 2005. The accumulated recovered cash from the disposal of NPLs was 
RMB 177 billion, which was insufficient to cover the costs of funds to finance 
purchased NPLs. In addition, there were also initial capital investments of R M B .40 
billion to asset management companies when they were established in 1999. 
The real effect of the NPLs transfer to asset management companies was to beautify 
bank balance sheets in order to attract foreign strategic investors and to reduce the 
possibility of banking crisis. Our analysis implies that the transfer of R M B 1.4 trillion 
NPLs to asset management companies would possibly end up with the same amount 
of íosses for the economy as a whole, when taking into account the potential losses 
arising from the debt-for-equity swap. Thus we conclude that the NPL condition of 
the Chínese financial sector as a whole has not been improved and the NPLs problem 
remains unresolved. This fosters potential threat to the country's economy as the state 
probably would pay for the total losses. 
The second indicator of bank assets quality is the ratio of L L R to gross loans that 
measures how much banks provide for unanticipated losses from loan defaults. L L R 
is used as a cushion against possible future loan defaults before using other types of 
equity capital. Adequate L L R is a primary indicator of bank financia! strength. This 
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provisioning ratio provides information on bank assets quality by focusing on the 
ability of the banking system to prépare for possible losses arising from loans. Higher 
provisioning ratio indicates that a bank provides more for losses on loans and 
therefore the banks become more immune from unexpected loan defaults. Changes in 
assets quality can be captured from the changes in provisions. Provisions normally 
decrease when asset quality is improved with better économie conditions (Morttinen, 
2005). Increased provisions reflect deteriorating assets quality, vvhich in turn corrodes 
bank performance. 
Figure 4.9 shows the average ratio of L L R to gross loans for banks in China and 
selected international banks. The ratio of Chinese banks has increased steadily, 
suggesting the improved financial strength of the banking system. During the first 
four years, only less than 1% of gross loans were secured by L L R for ail banks 
(including foreign banks) in China. Since 1998, in line with more prudential 
regulatory and supervisory requirements, JSCBs and foreign banks surpassed the 
average L L R to gross loan ratio of international banks in the rest of the sample period, 
suggesting the relative stronger ability in absorbing unexpected loan losses. SOCBs 
improved their performance slowly at the beginning of the sample period. From 2003, 
their L L P position was significantly improved thanks to the joint-stock reforms. 
CCBs also exhibited a healthy upward trend in L L R to gross loans ratio. By 2005, ail 
major commercial banks in Chinese had a higher L L R to gross loans ratio than the 
selected international banks. 
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Figure 4.9 LLR to gross Ioans ratio of différent type of banks 
6.0 
0.0 J i 1 ] — i ; • i 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
CCBs —•—FBs - à - J S C B s -^K -SOCBs - ^ i - S O P B s -o - In t e r 
Source: BankScopc. 
Noies: LLR = loan loss reserve, C C B = ciiy commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock 
commercial bank. SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. SOPB = statc-owned policy bank, Inter = 
international bank. 
Figure 4.10 depicts the loan loss reserve position for the SOCBs in comparison with 
the average of selected international banks. Bank of China had a higher ratio of L L R 
to gross loans than other domestic banks and international banks throughout the 
sample period. China Construction Bank Corporation was the second best bank 
whose ratio of L L R to gross loans increased from 1999 and surpassed the 
international banks after 2003. The LLR to gross loan ratio of ICBC was the lowest 
among the SOCBs until 2004, but surpassed that of A B C and the international banks 
in 2005. Although not signiflcant. L L R to gross loan ratio of A B C has improved 
steadily over the sample period. Thus, considering the ratio of L L R to gross loans 
along, the Chinese banks appear sound by benchmarking to the international average 
level. 
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Figure 4.10 LLR to gross loans ratio of SOCBs and international banks 
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: S O C B = statc-owncd commercial bank, A B C = Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of 
China, C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, lnter= International Bank. 
N P L ratio and L L R to gross loan ratio measure asset quality from différent aspects. In 
Order to draw a more complète pictnre of bank assets quality when evaluating the 
bank financial strengths, two indicators should be interpreted jointly. N P L is the most 
likely source of charge-off loans. vvhile NPL provisioning coverage ratio implies the 
adequacy of a bank's L L R to cover possible future loan losses. In particular, NPL 
coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of L L R to NPLs, which is shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Bank NPL Coverage Ratio in China 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
A B C 4.19 4.85 
BOC 16.3 22.1 67.2 68.2 75.9 
CCBC 7.73 10.1 29.9 62.1 78.4 
ICBC 1.01 1.69 2.88 2.95 56.2 
JSCBs 25.8 35.7 36.5 57.5 58.9 
CCBs 3.2 7.51 9.52 16.5 29.2 
Source: Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, The Bankcr, and authors7 calculation. 
Notes: NPL coverage ratio = loan loss reserve to N P L ratio, N P L = non-pcrforming loan. A B C = 
Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank ofChina. C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = 
Induslrial and Commercial Bank of China. JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, C C B = cily commercial 
bank. 
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N P L coverage ratio increased rapidly for all Chinese banks except for A B C over the 
past five years as a result of a decreased NPL ratio and an increased L L R to gross 
loan ratio. By 2005, most domestic banks provided loan loss reserve covering more 
than half of the outstanding NPLs except for CCBs which covered only one-third of 
NPLs. However, the NPL coverage ratio of seven benchmarking international banks 
was much higher than that of Chinese banks, ranging from 150% to 300%. Although 
international banks had lower L L R to gross loan ratio, they had much lower NPL 
ratios than the Chinese banks. The majority of Chinese domestic banks were under-
provisioned against their higher level of NPLs, whereas international banks provided 
sufficient L L R by as much as three times of their NPLs. 
On average, JSCBs were the fmanciaily safest domestic banks in providing provisions 
for outstanding NPLs, implying their better asset ąuality control and more prudential 
operational practices. Bank of China was the best amongst the SOCBs with the 
highest average coverage ratio of 50%, while ICBC and C C B C caught up in loan loss 
provision after the latest reform. Meanwhile, the NPL coverage ratio of CCBs also 
improved by 10 times by 2005, thanks to the overall tightening regulatory and 
supervisory framework and more prudential practice in the Chinese banking system. 
4.2.4 Liąuidity 
Liquidity represents the extent to which bank funds are available to meet the most 
important cash demand for deposit withdrawals, loans, and profitable investment 
opportunities. The banking system is a highly geared industry, and it is important for 
banks to maintain a prudent level of Hquid assets. Serious problems in banking 
liquidity could cause financial losses. bankruptcy of an individual bank, and bank run. 
It could even trigger a financial crisis for a country or a larger region in the extreme. 
Therefore, at the industrial level, banking liąuidity has been closely momtored by 
authorities. 
There exists a trade off between asset liquidity and profitability because highly liquid 
assets are normally associated with lower profitability. It is necessary to maintain 
certain level of liquid assets to meet cash demand in daily operations, while excessive 
liquid assets have adverse impact on bank profitability. Lower level of liquid assets to 
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total assets may result in the risk of being unable to meet cash demand that could be 
either deposit withdrawals or more profitable investment opportunities. Financial 
losses might occur when banks have to liquídate assets or raise more expensive funds 
to meet cash demand in case of depositors! withdrawals to avoid adverse publicity 
and reputation. Therefore, at the individual bank level, liquidity management is also 
important for smoothing its daily operations. 
It is difficult to measure and assess liquidity due to the involvement of subjective 
judgement when identífying liquid assets. There is no exact benchmark specifying the 
extent to which assets hold as liquid assets is considered as adequate. IMF suggests 
two indicators for measuring and assessing bank liquidity— the ratio of liquid assets 
to total assets (liquid asset ratio) and the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities. 
Liquid assets are those that can be readily converted into cash without significant loss 
under normal business condition. 
Liquid asset ratio indicares the proportion of liquid assets held by banks for meeting 
expected and/or unexpected demand for cash. The higher the ratio, the lower the 
liquidity risk a bank faces. Figure 4.11 plots the liquid assets ratios for major Chínese 
bank groups and the average ratio for selected international banks, The share of liquid 
assets in bank total assets declined over the sample period for all domestic banks, in 
contrast to the relativcly stable level of international banks. Domestic banks hold less 
liquid assets than those selected international banks and the gap widened during the 
second half of the sample period. On average, domestic banks held about 20% of their 
total assets in the form of liquid assets, of which JSCBs had higher liquidity than 
SOCB and CCBs. As to foreign banks, about half of total assets were liquid assets 
until 2002 but their liquid assets level dropped to the same level as domestic banks by 
2005. 
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Figure 4.11 Liquid assets to total assets ratio of différent type of banks 
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: C C B = city commercial bank, FB = tbreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B 
state-owned commercial bank. Inter = international bank. 
The ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities captures the liquidity mismatch of 
assets and liabilities. It reflects a bank's ability to meet short-term liabilities without 
liquidity problems. The trends of the liquid asset to short-term liabilities ratios as 
shown in Figure 4.12 were very similar to the trends of liquid assets ratios as shown 
in Figure 4.11. The ratios of domestic banks were lower than the average ratios of the 
international banks. The level of liquid assets as a proportion of short-term liabilities 
declined. At the end of 2005, the average liquid assets to short-term liabilities ratio of 
the Chinese banks was 14%, lower than the average level of the international banks 
by about 10%. Again, JSCBs had a higher ratio than other domestic banks. 
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Figure 4.12 I, i quid assets to shorí-term Iiabilities ratio bank types 
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Source: BankScope. 
Notes: C C B = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = 
state-owned commercial bank, Inter = international bank. 
In short, two liquidity indicators consistently suggest declining liquidity and 
increasing liquidity risks for the Chínese banks. However, it is unclear whether this 
trend was an unfavourable sign or not. On the one hand, it could be a negative 
indication that banks became more vulnerable because of increased liquidity risk. The 
decline in the proportion of liquid assets in total assets and in short-term Iiabilities 
reflected a weakening position in liquidity, which was an unfavourable signal for a 
sound banking system. On the other hand, it could be a positive indication that banks 
became more experienced in liquidity management by taking account of the real 
market condition in China. Reduction in liquid assets could improve bank 
profitability by lending to profitable projects. China has its own speciality that 
domestic depositors have rather higher level of trust on state-owned banks. Bank run 
is highly unlikely even the SOCBs are technically insolvent. Thus, it is possible for 
Chínese banks to opérate at a lower liquidity level without facing liquidity problems. 
Moreover, liquidity management techniques also help banks better balance the trade-
off between liquidity and profitability. 
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4.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter has assessed the performance and current financial condition of the 
Chinese banking system by analyzing financial ratios under a macro-prudential 
analysis framework. To snapshoot the banking system from different dimensions, a 
variety of financial ratios are grouped into four main categories—profitability, 
capitalization, assets ąuality, and liąuidity. To identify the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different types of Chinese banks, the analysis is conducted for 
different groups of domestic banks in comparison with seven selected international 
banks. 
Prior to 2003, bank reform in China had been a gradual process of preparation and 
adjustment by touching the stones to cross the river. The reform objective was to 
transforni the banking system to a market oriented one through commercializing 
SOCBs. By 2002, the main achievements were the establishment of a multi-layered 
banking system with a strengthened legał, regulatory and supervisory framework. Not 
in line with the considerable reform efforts made by the government, very little 
improvement in financial term was made from four dimensions reviewed during this 
period. A number of factors hindered the pace of reform including the persistence of 
the government intervention, the lack of managerial and operational experiences, and 
weak corporate governance in banks. In essence, the Chinese authorities had only 
tackled the superficial problems but not the deep-rooted causes of real problems in 
the banking system., 
After 2003, the govemment has speeded up the banking reform process by radically 
restructuring the SOCBs. Significant improvements have been subsequently observed 
in terms of profitability, capital adeąuacy and assets ąuality. SOCBs performance has 
improved remarkably following financial restructuring and joint-stock reorganization. 
C C B C has even become one of the most profitable banks in the world in terms of 
ROE. The issue of the Iow capitalization has also been well addressed to strengthen 
the capital adeąuacy and solvency of the Chinese banking system. By 2005, a total of 
53 Chinese banks were reported to have a capital adeąuacy ratio of more than 8%, 
minimum reąuirement of international standards. The most impressive progress was 
made in the resolution of NPLs problem with significant decreases in both N P L ratio 
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and the absolute amount of NPLs. Assets quality of SOCBs improved significantly as 
a result. 
As to different bank groups, JSCBs have outperformed other bank groups throughout 
the sample period, with higher profitability, better capitalization, better assets quality, 
and liquidity. CCBs have also made considerable progress in every dimensión, in line 
with the pace of bank reform. The preferential reform measures implemented by the 
government have effectively made a turnaround for SOCBs of which most have 
became profítable enterprises with a sound and healthy capital structure and a good 
corporate governance mechanism (although not fully functioning) by 2005. 
One particular concern of this study is the sustainability of these achievements. 
Recent improvements are largely attributable to the two rounds of NPLs divestments 
and capitalization initiated by the government. The sustainable soundness of the 
banking system relies on banks' better performance upon which banks could be 
viable in an internationally competitive financial market. The government has done 
what it can to help these banks to raise capital adequacy," divest the historical NPLs, 
and be listed on the stock markets, leaving the rest to the banks. To become an 
internationally viable and financially sound commercial bank, it is vital to have 
advanced management skills, functioning corporate governance, better risk 
management and control, after the one-off government bailout. 
Compared with the selected international banks, the Chínese banking system is still at 
a vulnerable condition despite of recent improvements. Most Chínese commercial 
banks are still less profítable and their income is highly dependent on lending 
activities. The Chínese authorities have encouraged domestic banks to attract capital 
from both domestic and international capital markets by being listed on the stock 
exchanges but the banking system as a whole does not have enough capitalization. 
There is a significant capital gap for banks, such as A B C , CCBs, and RCCs and 
UCCs, to meet the capital adequacy requirement. It is uncertain whether the domestic 
capital markets and foreign investors have the capacity and the willingness to provide 
capital for all these banks. 
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Assets quality of Chínese banks is sííll poor compared with the international banks 
although it has been remarkable improved recently. At the end of 2006, CBRC 
announced that the NPL ratio was down to 7%, which was still far higher than the 
international level of 1 -2%. ín terms of NPL coverage ratio, only a few banks reached 
the lower bound of international level recently. If taking into account of NPLs in the 
A M C s , the situation is even worse. The transfer of NPLs to A M C s has cleaned up the 
SOCBs' balance sheets, which only effectively postpone but not relieve the threats of 
the NPLs problems for the economy as whole. Given the inability of asset 
management companies to repay borrowings and bond issues for purchasing NPLs, 
the govemment should pay sufficient attention and make an effective stepped plan to 
tackle this potential threat in the future financial reform to avoid unexpected adverse 
shocks to the economy. 
The financial ratio analysis cannot form a conclusión as to whether bank reform has 
been successful and whether SOCBs could be internationally commercially viable in 
the long run. Since major reform measures have been undertaken from the late 2003, 
the time period is too short to give such a conclusión. What conclusión could be made 
is that the banking reform and SOCBs are on the way to success in a right direction. It 
calis for continuous efforts on bank reform. Further development should depend more 
on banks' own ability to enhance capital adequacy and control asset quality, which 
comes from efficient operations. Therefore future reforms need to be directed to 
improve bank efficiency which is the only promise for long run viability of the 
Chinese banks. 
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Chapter 5 Economic rationale of bank reform in China 
5.0 Preamble 
The Chinese government has launched a gradual approach to reform the banking 
system for almost three decades, As a result, the Chinese banking system has become 
an increasingly competitive market. It is imperative to distinguish well-performing 
banks from poor ones through comparative benchmarking analyses. Commonly 
employed performance measure of ROA and ROE are generally regarded as lacking 
comparability and reliability, especially in the transition and developing countries. 
For this reason, a more sophisticated performance measure—frontier efficiency has 
been widely used to evaluate performance. 
The main objective of bank reform is to improve bank performance in order to better 
support economic development. Concrete reform measures have been initiated and 
implemented taking into account the condition and specialty of the Chinese banking 
system with reference to the experiences of the banking reform in other transition 
.economies and developing countries. Among these reform measures, the ownership 
reform and hardening budgetary constraints are two major strategies. 
Employing a one-step SFA, this chapter answers the first set of research questions of 
this study. It attempts to rationalize the economic foundations of banking reform 
strategies in China by testing whether bank reform has been grounded on the agency 
theory and/or the budgetary constraints theory. Two main purposes of this chapter are: 
(1) to rationalize the economic foundations of bank reform; and (2) to examine the 
impact of WTO accession on the performance of Chinese major commercial banks. 
Performance is measured by technical efficiency, estimated by the single-output 
Cobb-Douglas production models. The following two chapters examine bank 
performance and the effects of the bank reform on performance in terms of technical 
efficiency (Chapter 6), cost efficiency and profit efficiency (Chapter 7). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 briefly reviews the 
efficiency literature on the relationship between performance and the agency theory 
and budgetary constraints theory. Section 5.2 outlines methodology of the one-step 
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SFA and specifies empirical models. Section 5.3 discusses empirical results and 
findings. Section 5.4 draws conclusions. 
5.1 Literature review 
The relationship between performance and ownership and corporate governance has 
been well documented in bank efficiency literature under the principal-agent theory 
and the soft-budget constraint theory. The agency theory has been developed in the 
1970s. When there is a separation between owners and management, owners 
(principal) delegate the responsibility and related authorities of daily management and 
even strategic management to senior managers (the agent). There is a danger that the 
agent may not act on the best interests of the owners (shareholders), for example, they 
may not work as efficiently as they could. They may also pursue their own interest at 
the expense of that of shareholders. Thus the principal has to exercise due care on the 
running of business and monitor the management. They need to assess the 
management performance exceptionally and periodically through mechanisms such as 
external auditing and board of directors. The principal also need to ensure these 
governance mechanisms in place and well functioning. 
However, the corroboration of agents' behaviours and the evaluation of actual 
performance could be difficult or costly. This is because the information asymmetry 
problem that the agents involve daily operations and possess more information than 
the principal. The central dilemma of the principal-agent theory is how to ensure the 
agent (the manager or employee) to act in the best interests of the principal (the 
shareholder or employer), given the agent has more information on the business over 
the principal and different, maybe conflicting, interests from the principal. The cause 
of principal-agent problems is the separation between ownership and control. Firms 
with different ownership types have different corporate governance mechanisms to 
solve the agent-principal problems, resulting in variations in performance (Williams 
and Nguyen, 2005). In particular, the agency problem is considered as a source of 
inefficiencies (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). 
The budgetary constraints theory was first introduced by Kornai in 1979. A soft 
budget constraint indicates that firms could obtain capital infusion from government 
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or similar sources to surmount the financial distress without facing bankruptcy. The 
strongest argument for the existence of a soft budget constraint is that the costs of 
bailout would be cheaper than the costs of firm failure when taking account of social 
or/and political costs. In contrast, a hard budget constraint implies that a firm has no 
access to government financial subsidies. The determination of a firm's continuation 
or bankruptcy should be purely based on market disciplines and considerations on 
performance, re-allocating capital to more productive firms in the best interests of 
shareholders as well as the economy as a whole. Literature has generally suggested 
that the adverse effects of a soft budget constraint outweigh its benefits and a soft 
budget constraint appears to be one source of inefficiency of a firm. Therefore, the 
theory suggests that the state should abandon the role of being the last resort for state-
owned banks. 
Typically, state-owned banks are faced with a soft-budget constraint largely 
capitalized by state funds. In transition economies, governments are under various 
pressures during the transformation of the economy from centrally planned to a 
market oriented one. Government bailout appears necessary to the financial sector for 
maintaining employment and social stability. The expected bailouts inevitably lead to 
a moral hazard problem. For example, in China, state-owned banks had been entirely 
capitalized using state funds until the recent joint-stock reform in 2003. In the past, 
whenever the state banks ran into difficulty as they always did, the state had to help 
them out of the trouble. State-bank managers had a good understanding that the state 
would be the ultimate resort of help and would bail them out i f things went wrong. 
They were not concerned with profitability and might act thoughtlessly when making 
economic decisions, resulting in losses and inefficiency. They lent relentlessly to 
whatever clients they considered to be trustworthy, resulting in mounting NPLs that 
could never be recovered. 
There are a number of reasons suggesting that state-owned banks are less efficient 
than other types of banks, which have been well explored by some political and 
economics theories. The first argument is that state-ownership is less efficient by 
design based on political theories. The state ownership in banks facilitates 
governments to provide funds to financially inefficient but politically desirable 
projects (La Porta et al., 2002). It is common practice that state-owned banks act as 
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government agents to fulfil national development plans with much less concerns on 
profitability and efficiency. Under the control of state ownership, state banks finance 
SOEs to pursue non-economic goals of maintaining social stability and patronage 
employment as well as economic growth goals by supporting infrastructure 
investments and exports. These goals are in confliction with the commercial goal of 
profit maximization and the latter commonly gives way to other goals. resulting in 
poor performance. Moreover, government acts as both the owner and the regulator 
vvho might also have somewhat conflicting interests (Megginson. 2005). 
The second argument for low efficiency in state banks is a severe free-rider problem 
among owners (Huíbers, 2005). In theory, all citizens are the co-owners of state-
owned banks. The government is their representativo to appoint managers to run state 
banks on the best interest of the owners. In reality, these owners have no ability to 
effectively influence the management and therefore have no incentive to monitor the 
operations of these banks. They have lo be free-riders, leaving the government the 
only agent to effectively influence the management of the state-owned banks. 
However, government essentially uses state banks as a mechanism to help accomplish 
their múltiple, often conflicting, goals. As discussed in the last paragraph, this would 
lead to inefficieney. 
The third argument for low efficiency of state banks is the ageney problem associated 
with state-ownership. The incentives for state bank managers to efficiently allocate 
resources might differ to those under other ownership arrangements (Laeven, 1999). 
On the one hand, state bank managers have no incentive and pressure to improve 
efficiency and therefore are less diligent in maximizing revenues and minimizing 
costs. They are more likely to pursue "a quiet life" or their own interests at the 
expense of owner interests. On the other hand, there exists a collective action problem 
in state-owned banks, resulting in the lack of means for punishing managers when 
they act in the best interest of sub-part's performance (Megginson, 2005). In fact, 
managers of state banks are rarely punished individually for poor performance, 
whereas the managers will be replaced by shareholders or a hostile takeover for poor 
performance in a private bank. In the absence of proper capability to monitor the 
activity of management and appropriate methods of disciplining managers in state-
owned banks, ageney problems become serious. 
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The final argument for low efficiency of state banks is soft budget constraint faced by 
state-owned banks. State-owned banks are normally large banks in size and play a 
crucial role in the economy. The fear of too-big-to-fail or too-important-to-fail 
permits the survival of inefficient state banks. The government is unlikely to make or 
let poorly performing state-owned banks become bankrupt by subsidizing insolvent 
state-owned banks in pursuit of its multiple objectives. Managers of poorly 
performing state-owned banks develop a dependency on the government for funding 
when their banks go into financial difficulties. In contrast, managers of private banks 
do not have such a dependency and their clear understanding is that banks facing 
finance distress may be bankrupt. Therefore, managers of state banks are under weak 
capital markets discipline and less threat of financial distress than those of private 
banks. 
Empirical research finds a negative association between bank efficiency and state 
ownership with a few exceptions. La Porta et al. (2002) find that financial 
performance of publicly owned banks is inferior to that of private banks using a 
dataset of large banks in 92 countries. Hao et al. (2001) report a negative association 
between bank cost efficiency and the share of government ownership in Korean banks. 
In transition economies, state-owned banks are found to be significantly less efficient 
than their private counterparties (Bonin et ai, 2005b; Matousek and Taci, 2002; and 
Fries and Taci, 2005). Nevertheless, Spong et al. (1995) argue that no single 
organizational structure appears to be a guarantee of efficiency. Little evidence from 
Altunbas et al. (2001) suggests superior efficiency of privately owned banks, while 
Isik and Hassan (2003a) and Shanmugam and Das (2004) find state banks outperform 
other types of banks in Turkey and India, respectively. 
In short, the agent-principal problem and the soft budgetary constraint problem 
simultaneously become prominent in state-owned banks. The role of SOCBs and the 
role of government are ambiguously defined as they have multiple (and often 
conflicting) objectives to achieve. It is hard for the agent (managers) to clarify what 
the principal (government) exactly expects from them. The solution is to provide 
appropriate incentives so that agents are more likely to act in the best interest of the 
principal by better solving the agent-principal problem. Ownership reform therefore 
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is the most common strategy in banking reform by turning the state-owned banks into 
joint-stock enterprises. Multi-ownership in state banks will enhance the corporate 
governance and the exit of state-ownership will harden budgetary constraints. 
In China, the goveniment has assumed the responsibility for removing much of the 
NPLs from SOCBs to generale a fresh capital structure similar to that of a true 
commercial bank so that they can compete with the incoming foreign entrants on a 
level playing field. The most récent one-off bailout implies the abolishment of the 
soft budget constraint that the state will never have to bail them out in the future. 
These restructured SOCBs have successfully attracted foreign stratégie investors as 
well as sufficient capital from the stock markets. In the future, thèse banks will have 
to be entirely responsible for their own profits and losses without political or 
administrative interférence. Their competitiveness will dépend on the ability to earn 
profits and pay dividends to shareholders. By turning SOCBs into joint-stock 
companies, the incentive structure has changed and the state banks now face a 
hardened budget constraint. Banks have to rely more and more on raising capital from 
various shareholders, rendering them to be responsible for shareholders' interests 
rather than state (or local) government interests. 
In order to empirically rationalize the theoretical motivations of bank reform in China, 
two specific hypothèses are tested with regard to the agency theory or/and budgetary 
constraints theory. First, it hypothesizes that joint-stock banks are expected to 
outperform state banks, ascertaining the economic rationale of the joint-stock 
ownership reform to be the agency theory. Second, it hypothesizes that banks subject 
to a harder budget constraint are more efficient than banks subject to a softer budget. 
These two hypothèses will be tested using a stochastic frontier approach which 
provides Statistical inference with certain reliability and accuracy. 
5.2 Methodology 
5.2.1 SFA and a one-step estimation procédure 
Parametric method and nonparametric method are two main frontier méthodologies to 
détermine the relative efficiency by identifying best practice institutions. There is no 
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consensus on which method is superior over another since each of them possesses 
certain advantages and disadvantages. Non-parametric method does not specify a 
functional form for the frontier and thus it is free from the possibility of mis-
specification of functional form for the underlying production relationship. Using a 
linear programming technique, the best-practice frontier is formed as the piecewise 
linear combinations. However, a principal shortfall of non-parametric is that the 
linear programming solution does produce any error term. Any deviation from the 
frontier is considered as inefficiency and no random shocks are allowed. In addition, 
a non-parametric approach cannot be used for hypothesis testing. 
The parametric method has been criticized for using a predetermined frontier 
functional form which may be mis-specified and for the pre-assumed distributional 
assumptions with respect to the random error terms and inefficiencies. However, a 
parametric method has its virtues. First of all, a major advantage is the allowance for 
the random errors. Deviations of actual performance from best practice are 
represented by composite errors that are theoretically decomposed into inefficiencies 
and random shocks. It is argued that the separation of random errors and 
inefficiencies leads to more accurate estimated technical efficiency. Secondly, despite 
distributional assumption on inefficiencies induces the suspicion of the estimated 
efficiency level, SFA always rank the firm efficiency in the same order as the orders 
of their cost function residuals. Thirdly, parametric methods appear to be more 
consistent with the competitive conditions in banking market and more consistent 
with non-frontier measures of bank performance such as return on assets Bauer et al 
(1998). 
This study employs a parametric method—SFA, Fries and Taci (2005) provide 
particular argument for the adoption of SFA in bank efficiency study in transition 
economies because problems of measurement errors and uncertain economic 
environments are more likely to prevail. SFA is one of the popular and widely applied 
methods of investigating efficiency in the literature. For instance, SFA has been used 
to study bank efficiency in the US by Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Bauer at el. (1993), 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996), DeYoung and Hasan (1998). and Clark and Siems 
(2002). Hasan and Marton (2003) use a translog functional form to investigate bank 
efficiency in Hungary while Shanmugam and Das (2004) have studied bank 
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efficiency in India. Very recently. a few studies employ SFA to investigate bank 
efficiency in China, including Fu and Heffernan (2007), Yao et ai (2007), and Berger 
et ai (2007). 
SFA is developed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) independently. SFA spécifies a functional form for the cost, profit or 
production function, which allows inefficiencies to be included in the error term. The 
composite error term consists of random error (v.) and inefficiency (w,), which are 
separated by two distributional assumptions. The first assumption is that the 
inefficiencies ( M, ) are independent and identically distributed as exponentiai or 
asymmetric half-normal distribution, based on the logic that inefficiencies only 
increase costs above frontier levels. The second assumption is that random errors (v(.) 
are independent and identically distributed with mean zéro and constant variance 
(crv2), based on the fact that random fluctuations can either increase or reduce costs. 
The estimated inefficiencies of any firm is taken as the conditional mean or mode of 
the distribution of the efficiency term, u, given the observations of the composed 
error term, e (Bauer at el.,1993). Later studies argue that alternative distributions for 
inefficiencies, such as truncated-normal distribution, may be more appropriate than 
the half-normal and exponentiai distributions. 
Efficiency studies have commonly adopted a two-step estimation procédure. The first 
step is to specify a stochastic production function and estimate the technical 
inefficiencies for individual firms, assuming thèse inefficiencies are distributed 
identically. The second step is to regress the predicted inefficiencies against a set of 
firms' specific characteristics and environmental variables (z, ), such as managerial 
expérience, ownership, location, and the like. The purpose of the second step is to 
identify possible déterminants of the différences in predicted inefficiency across firms. 
However, this two-step procédure has serious econometric problems, due to its 
contradictory assumptions on the independence of the inefficiencies in the two 
estimation stages (Battese and Coelli 1995; ICumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Using the 
two-step procédure, the éléments ofz(must be assumed to be uncorrelated with the 
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elements of input vector (x,) in order to assure that Máximum Likelihood (ML) 
estímales of the first stage stochastic frontier model are unbiased. Moreover, the 
predicted inefficiencies are assumed to be identically and independently distributed in 
the first stage, but they assumed to ha ve a functional relationship withz,in the second 
stage. This contradiction between two steps makes the two-step procedure so-called 
'schizophrenic approaclv. 
The awareness of this problem has stimulated the development of a one-step 
procedure, in which the potential relationship between z-variables and technical 
efficiency is imposed in a single procedure to estímate the production technology and 
the possible determinants of ineffíciency simultaneously. A number of studies, such 
as Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), Huang and Liu 
(1994), and Batiese and Coelli (1995) have contributed to this development by 
proposing slightly variant models to overeóme problems arising from the two-step 
procedure. Wang and Schmidt (2002) provide further theoretical insights into reasons 
why the two-step procedure is biased and provide extensive Monte Cario evidence 
showing the severity of the bias. They ñnd biased estimates at both steps and the 
magnitude of the bias is substantial. They strongly recommend one-step models are as 
long as the research interest is in the effeets of firm characteristics on efficiency 
levéis. 
Among these developments, this study adopts a one-step approach suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1995), thereafter BC95 model. It assumes that non-negative 
technical ineffíciency is a function of firm-specific variables and time. The 
distributional assumption is that the ineffíciency effeets are independently distributed 
as truncations of normal distributions with constant variance, but with means that are 
a linear function of observable variables. The BC95 model shown in Equation (5.1) 
allows the estimation of both technical change in the stochastic frontier and time-
varying technical inefficiencies. 
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where yu dénotes the production at the /-th time period (t=T,2,...,T) for the /'-th 
firm (i=l,l,...,N) ; ,Y„is a lx^vector of inputs and other explanatory variables 
associated with the /-th firm at the /-th time period; /? is a k x l vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated; vu is a random variable assumed to be iid 
with mean zéro and a constant variance. N(0,al ), independently distributed of 
the uH ; w„ is a non-negative random variable, associated with technical 
inefficiency of production, which are assumed to be independently distributed 
as truncations at zéro of the normal distribution with mean, zitS and variance 
Equation (5.1) spécifies a stochastic frontier production function based on the original 
production values. The technical inefficiency effects (w ) t) are specified as a function 
of a set of explanatory variables (z lV ) and an unknown vector of coefficients (S). 
Some input variables in the stochastic frontier may be included in the inefficiency 
model as explanatory variables, provided the inefficiency effects are stochastic. 
The technical inefficiency effects (wj( ) model is shown in Equation (5.2) 
ua=ô0 + â,t + &lt+£i, (5.2) 
where zi{ is a 1 x m vector of explanatory variables associated with technical 
inefficiency of production overtime;£ is an m x 1 vector of unknown coefficients 
to be estimated; eit is a random variable defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zéro mean and variance a2. N(0, a] ). 
Finally, the technical efficiency of the production for the /-th firm at the t-th time is 
defined by Equation (5.3). 
TE, = exp(-iiB) = exp(-z„cï-e t l) ( 5 3 ) 
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The BC95 model is flexible by allowing the estimation of both technical change in 
the stochastic frontier and time-varying technical inefficiencies in the technical 
inefficiency effects. The time trend variable t included in Equation (5.1) accounts for 
Hicksian neutral technical progress at a constant rate, while in Equation (5.2) 
capturing temporal changes in inefficiency at a constant rate against the shifting 
frontier with respect to time. Therefore, productivity changes are decomposed into the 
shift in the frontier and the movement towards or away from the theoretically 
predicted production frontier. Greater efficiency can be gained through either 
technological innovations or improvement of efficiency in general caused by 
learning-by-doing effects or dissemination of the best-practice. 
The BC95 model is a generalized model by encompassing other efficiency estimation 
models as special cases. By setting all elements of the 8 -vector to be zero that the 
technical inefficiency effects are unrelated to the z-variables, the case represents the 
original specification of Argner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) with the half-normal 
distributional assumption. If the first z-variable has value of 1 and the coefficients of 
all other z-variables are 0, then the model becomes the case in Stevenson (1980) and 
Battese and Coelli (1988, 1992). Moreover, the BC95 model can be applied to 
different production technology representations, such as distance function, cost 
function, profit function, and production function, using different functional forms, 
such as Cobb-Douglas, translog, and Fourier flexible form. 
More importantly, the model is applicable in practice to estimate efficiency because 
the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency 
effects can be estimated simultaneously using the method of maximum likelihood. 
Tim Coelli (1996) has developed a computer program—Frontier 4.1c that contains 
the Battese and Coelli (1995) specification, making the estimation easer. With these 
virtues, the BC95 model has been applied more frequently in recent efficiency study, 
like Williams and Nguyen (2005), Kraft etal (2006), and Fries and Taci (2005). 
5.2.2 Defining outputs and inputs variables 
Choosing proper proxies for bank inputs and outputs is one of the important issues in 
bank efficiency study. There is no agreement on this controversial issue regarding the 
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most appropriate indicators of inputs and Outputs. The sélection of approach to 
measureing inputs and Outputs dépends on both the objective of the study and the 
availability of data. This study adopts the most commonly employed intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). as its main concern is the bank efficiency at 
industrial level and the impacts of reform on bank efficiency. The intermediation 
approach treats banks as using labour, physical capital and fund to produce earning 
assets. Service flows are treated as output measured by the dollar value of the various 
types of earning assets. Deposits are considered as inputs in the production of earning 
asset output, along with capital, materials, and labour inputs. This approach takes 
interest expenses into account, vvhich is useful not only for examining bank efficiency 
but also for frontier analysis. 
The intermediation approach appears more appropriate for studying the economic 
differentiation of banks by controlling the overall costs of banks, in contrast to the 
production approach which is more appropriate for studying the cost efficiency of 
banks by addressing the operational costs (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). The production 
approach is more suitable to assess efficiency at branch level. The role of a particular 
branch focuses on processing transaction and document since branch managers 
generally could not impose much influence on the funding and investment décision 
making process (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
In the banking industry, it is crucial to take into account the multiple-output nature of 
production when defining Outputs. This study defines Outputs as the book value of the 
profit before tax, and the book value of loans using data from bank annual fmancial 
reports. Both profit and loans are frequently employed as proxies for Outputs in bank 
efficiency literaturę. Technical efficiency of individual banks is estirnated by defining 
bank output as pre-tax profit and loans respectively in tvvo différent spécifications— 
profit model and loan model. The value of loans includes short-term, medium and 
long-term, and other loans, having deducted LLRs. 
Bank inputs are defined as fixed assets, deposits, equity and labour in both profit 
model and loan model. Fixed assets (physical capital) reflect the bank ability to 
provide service to its customers, which is expected to have a positive effect on output. 
The value of fixed assets has been net of dépréciation. Deposit is a sensitive variable 
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and its treatment distinguishes between the production approach and the 
intermediation approach. The value of deposit includes short-term customer deposits 
and long term deposits. The more the deposit attracted, the more the profits could be 
earned by extending loans or investments. A positive effect of deposit on 
performance is expected. Equity is a proxy for capital input along with physical 
capital input of fixed assets. It includes share or/and own capital, as well as retained 
profits. Labour cost is included, which generally accounts for a large proportion of 
operational expenses. Following common practices in the literature, when direct 
labour costs are unavailable overhead is used as an approximation of labour capital 
input. 
5.2,3 Empirical model specification 
This chapter specifically applies the one-step SFA production frontier model 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Traditional Cobb-Douglas functional form is 
employed as the presentation of the production technology to estimate bank technical 
efficiency. It has been criticized because of its inability to accommodate multiple-
outputs. However, it has the virtue of self-duality, simplicity, and the economic 
interpretability of the coefficients on output, input and control variables. The 
estimated coefficients for the frontier model using a translog or Fourier flexible 
functional form commonly provide no economic meanings because of the collinearity 
problem in the presence of second order and interaction variables, and trigonometric 
terms. The main purpose of this chapter is to verify the economic rationale of the 
reforming strategies and the impact of WTO accession on bank performance. The 
precision of efficiency estimates will be addressed in the next two chapters by using 
more comprehensive models. Information from a Cobb-Douglas production 
functional form is considered to be sufficient for the research purpose of this chapter. 
Apart from input and output variables defined in the last section, a dummy variable is 
included in the frontier estimation for testing the effect of WTO accession on bank 
efficiency. It is assumed that WTO accession influences bank efficiency via its 
influence on the structure of the production technology in Chinese banking, rather 
than a direct effect on the productive efficiency. The dummy has a value of 0 until 
WTO accession in 2001 and 1 since 2002. This variable is expected to have a 
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positive sign, that bank performance is expected to be improved under the incoming 
threats as well as the opportunity for Chinese banks. 
In the technical inefficiency effect model, two variables are particular included to 
statistically ascertain the economic rationale of ongoing bank reform in China. An 
ownership dummy and a capitalization ratio are employed for testing two hypotheses 
with respect to the agency theory and the budgetary constraint theory, respectively. 
The ownership variable takes the value of 1 for joint-stock commercial banks and 0 
for state-owned commercial banks. A negative sign is expected, since joint-stock 
banks are generally believed to have better governance structure to cope with the 
agent-principle problem and therefore have tower inefficiency level than state banks. 
In other words, joint-stock banks are expected to be more efficient than state banks. 
A capital risk indicator, E/A ratio, reflects the extent to which banks are subject to a 
hard budget. Banks with a high E/A ratio are better capitalized and face less risk-
taking, and hence subject to a softer budget constraint. In deriving an equity to total 
assets ratio, equity is defined as in Chapter 4. Total assets include loans, fixed assets 
and other assets, which equals total liabilities plus equity where total liabilities 
include deposits, borrowing from other institutions, and other funds. As total assets 
include loans, a bank is subject to higher risk with a lower E/A ratio, since for a given 
amount of equity, the bank is exposed to more liabilities. If a bank is a joint-stock 
company, part of its equity will be share capital. A lower E/A ratio may theoretically 
mean that the bank is less capitalized and subject to a harder budget constraint. The 
bank takes more risk in order to increase loans to its clients. 
If a bank is capitalized and supported by the state, equity consists of state capital. 
When the government is involved in changing the E/A ratio, different banks will be 
subject to different budget constraints and the E/A ratios need to be interpreted with 
caution. Governments have resources and incentives to bail out failing banks 
especially in post-socialism nations, giving rise to a soft budget constraint for state 
banks. Usually, the state will support the state-owned banks with capital injection and 
increase E/A ratio, ceteris paribus. When a bank expects to obtain economic 
assistance in financial difficulties, it is said to face a soft budget constraint. A soft 
budget constraint causes a moral hazard problem, resulting in low efficiency by 
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inefficient opérations and careless expansions of crédits and investments. As a resuit, 
the E/A ratio is expected to have a positive sign. that is, by facing a soft budget 
constraint, well capitalized state banks have a higher E/A ratio but lower efficiency, 
and vice versa. 
The empirical spécification of the profit model is shown in Equations (5.4) and (5.5), 
where a time trend is included in both the frontier model and the technical 
inefficiency effects model. 
ln(profttll ) = pQ + pxt + p2 \\\(Fixedassetu ) + pl \n(Depositu ) 
+ PA \n{Equilyu ) + P5 \n(Overhead) + PbWTO + vu - uit (5.4) 
Pu | = <5o + S}t + S2Ownership + ô2E/A + £il (5.5) 
where subscripts / and t respectively dénote banks and time; In dénotes natural 
logarithm; vu uu £it are the same as defined in Equations (5.1) and (5.2); ps are 
parameters to be estimated. 
The empirical spécification of a loan model is identical to this profit model with the 
same structure and explanatory variables, except for the dépendent variable being 
replaced by total loans. 
5.2.4 Data 
The data sources and the reliability have been discussed in Chapter 4. The sample 
used in this chapter inciudes only joint-stock commercial banks and state-owned 
commercial banks over the period 1995-2005. which is différent from that in the next 
two chapters due to différences in research purposes. Apart from four state-owned 
banks and 11 joint-stock banks, even small commercial banks are included, namely 
Kincheng Banking Corporation, Kwangtung Provincial Bank (The), National 
Commercial Bank Ltd., Sin Hua Bank Limited, Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Ltd., 
China & South Sea Bank Ltd., and (The) China State Bank Ltd. They are classified as 
state-owned banks since they are ultimately owned by one of the state banks or state 
council. The exclusion of city commercial banks and the inclusion of seven state-
owned banks! subsidiaries are for distinguishing the effects of soft budget constraints 
faced by state banks. Of the totai 22 banks, two have data for 1996-2004, one for 
1996-2005, seven for 1995-2000, and the rest for 1995-2005. This forms an 
unbalanced panel data set with 204 observations sufficient to construct a stochastic 
frontier. The summary statistics of variables are reported in Table 5.1 and data have 
been deflated to 1995 priée level using the CPI to control for the effect of inflation. 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics of variables 
Profit Loans Fixed Deposits Equity Overheads E/A Total 
Assets ratio Assets 
SOCBs 9.26 856.67 26.85 1335.99 67.32 16.14 7.33 1504 
JSCBs 1.86 112.07 2.68 165.36 7.47 2.22 4.65 200 
Sources: Bankscope 
Notes: (1) S O C B = state-owned commercial bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank. E/A ratio = equily to 
total assets ratio; (2) Data shown by ownership in R M B billion except for E / A ratio. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 The profit model 
Using a modification of the computer program, Frontier 4.1C (Coelli, 1996), 
Maximum-likelihood estimâtes of parameters from the profit model are obtained and 
reported in Table 5.2 with their /-statistics. In Table 5.2, panel A shows the estimâtes 
of the production frontier function, panel B shows those of the technical inefficiency 
model, panel C and D contain the information on the overall explanatory power and 
fitness of the model to the data. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients for the stochastic frontier are as expected. AU 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1-10% critical level. The négative 
coefficient on time trend indicates that output decreases by 7% per year. In other 
words, the best-practice frontier has been downward moving over the 11-year period. 
The estimated coefficients on fixed-asset, deposit, equity, and labour are their 
elasticities with respect to bank outputs because the estimated production model is in 
a log-linear form. The elasticity of fixed-asset is relatively small at 0.08 but 
significant. Deposit and equity have a positive impact on output with roughly equal 
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importance for the production. Their respective elasticities are 0.46 and 0.42, 
indicating that a 1% increase in deposit or equity would resuit in about 0.4% increase 
in profit before tax, holding ail others constant. Labour has an expected négative 
impact on outputs at 1% statistically significant level. A 1% rise labor input would 
lead to a 0.2% drop in profit. The coefficient on WTO dummy is positive and highly 
significant. highlighting the influence of WTO accession on the Chinese banking 
System. Facing more compétition pressure from incoming foreign banks, the banking 
System as a whole has actively responded by upgrading production technology so that 
bank performance has been improved. 
Table 5.2 Results of the production fronticr and inefficiency effect function 
Dépendent variable: ln (profit before tax) 
Variables M L estimâtes T-Value 
A. Production Frontier 
Timc(fl) -0.07*** -4.41 
Fixed-asset (fl2) 0.08* 1.73 
Deposit ( p, ) 0.46*** 4.48 
Equity ( A ) 0.42*** 7.85 
Labor (/? s) -0.21** -2.40 
WTO entry(/?6) 0.66*** 4.85 
B. Inefficiency Effect Model 
Time (<?, ) 0.14** 2.65 
Ownership( S2 ) -1.76** -2.66 
Equity/Asset Ratio( 5% ) 0.20* 1.40 
C. Variance parameters 
Sigma-squared 4.98** 2.9 
Gamma 0 9 9 * * * 236 
D. Diagnosis and other information 
LR test 148 
Ln (likelihood) -123 
Number of observations 204 
Number of years 11 
Number of cross-sections 22 
Average technical efficiency 0.69 
Notes: (l) AU the variables are in natural logarithms; (2) Négative sign in the inefficiency funclion 
indicates that the variable has a positive effect on production efficiency and vice versa; (3) *, **, *** 
indicatc significancc level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Estimated variance parameters and LR test suggest that the one-step SFA model has 
been well estimated. The variance ratio—gamma ( y = a] /(<rj + a*) ) is 0.99, 
indicating that half of the error terms is attributable to the inefficiency dement un and 
it is stochastic. The présence of the one-sided error component is also justified by the 
highly significant LR test shown in Table 5.2 panel D. These statistics demonstrate 
the significance of inefficiency effects and the inadequacy of a classical régression 
model of the production function to represent the data of Chinese banks. 
The average technical efficiency over the sample period is estimated to be 69%, 
indicating that the Chinese banking industry produces 31% less than they would at a 
maximum possible level. The average estimated technical efficiencies for 22 
individual banks are plotted in Figure 5.1. The most efficient bank is a shareholding 
bank—China Merchants Bank with average technical efficiency of 82%, whilst the 
most inefficient bank is a state-owned bank—ABC with a technical efficiency of 
43 %. Wide efficiency gaps across banks indicate that there is substantial potential for 
improving efficiency in the Chinese banking industry. Most banks are distributed 
closer to the best-practice banks with a few outliers that drive down technical 
efficiency from the best of 82 % to the average level of 69%. 
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Note: The numbers of I to 22 on the X-axis represent individual banks. corresponding wilh Bank of 
Communications, China Everbright Bank. China Evergrowing Bank. China Merchants Bank, Minsheng Bank, 
CITIC Bank. Guangdong Development Bank, Hua Xia Bank. Industriel Bank, Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, Agricultural Bank of China. Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank Corporation, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Kincheng Banking Corporation, 
Kwangtung Provincial Bank (The), National Commercial Bank Ltd. Sin Hua Bank Limited, Yien Yieh 
Commercial Bank Ltd. China & South Sea Bank Ltd. (The), China State Bank Ltd. 
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As the bedrock of the Chinese banking system, the big four SOCBs are at the 
forefront of the ongoing banking reform. Figure 5.2 plots average estimated technical 
efficiencies of individual SOCBs. From the figure, tvvo systemic downside shocks are 
observed in 1998 and 2002. The first shock happened in 1998 when the Asian 
Financial Crisis hit China hard. The downside shock was stabilized quickly by the 
first round of government bailout during 1998-1999. However. this round of 
government bailout addressed only the superficial problems of low capitalization and 
mounting NPLs but not the fundamental causes of thèse problems. Without a 
fundamental reform, bank performance worsened during 2000-2001. 
Figure 5.2 Average technical efficiency of SOCBs (profit model) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
— A B C — • — B O C — * — C C B C — * — I C B C 
Notes: S O C B = state-owned commercial bank, A B C = Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China. 
C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 
The second shock occurred in 2002 due to the Chinese WTO entry in 2001. In the 
estimation, a dummy is included in the frontier model to account for the WTO impact. 
The coefficient is positive and highly significant, suggesting a rapid technological 
upgrading and therefore an upward moving frontier. When upward movement of the 
best practice frontier is faster than performance improvement of individual banks. the 
measured relative bank efficiency becomes low. The adverse trend has been corrected 
shortly by the second round of government bailout and the subséquent radical SOCBs 
reform started in 2003. Three reformed SOCBs reached the highest levé! of technical 
efficiency at 91% for the sample period in 2005. 
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The Technical efficiency of SOCBs has moved in a similar pattern over the sample 
period. A i l SOCBs have achieved efficiency gains for two years from 1995 to 1997 
except for CCB. After the systemic shock in 1998, CCB first enjoyed a significant 
efficiency gain in 1999 but followed by a sharp décline in 2000 and 2001. The 
efficiency levé! of 1CBC remained unchanged and that of A B C and BOC increased. 
Following the second systematic shock in 2002, BOC and CCB picked up efficiency 
growth in 2003 and sustained a steady increase thereafter, while ICBC experienced a 
further efficiency loss in 2003 and increased dramatically in 2005, consistent with the 
récent radical SOCBs reform. A B C is the least efficient bank with more drastic 
fluctuations in performance. Although it is yet to be reformed, A B C has improved its 
performance in the last two years of the sample period. 
Results from the technical inefficiency effect model are of particular interest. 
Ownership characteristic of banks is measured by a dummy variable taking a value of 
0 for SOCBs and a value of 1 for JSCBs. As reported in Table 5.2 panel B, ownership 
has a significant impact on technical inefficiency with an estimated coefficient of 
-1.76. The negative sign indicates that JSCBs are more efficient than SOCBs, 
demonstrating that ownership structure is an important variable in explaining the 
variations of bank inefficiency. The average technical efficiency of SOCBs and 
JSCBs is depicted in Figure 5.3, showing the impact of ownership characteristic on 
bank efficiency. JSCBs are found to have outperformed state-owned banks unttl 2002. 
SOCBs surpassed JSCBs since 2003 when the government started the ownership 
reform of SOCBs by joint-stock restructuring. 
The results provide strong évidence supporting our first hypothesis so that the 
Chinese banking reform can be partially rationalized on the économies ground of the 
agency theory. Shareholding ownership structure is found to better solve the agent-
principal problem since joint-stock banks significantly outperform state-owned banks 
and the performance of former SOCBs has been improved after joint-stock 
restructuring. The results also show the expected positive effects of reforms on bank 
performance. Because of rapid improvement in performance in SOCBs during the last 
three years, the average efficiency of JSCBs is 69%, just slightly higher than that of 
SOCBs by two percentage points 
139 
Figure 5.3 Technical efficiency of JSCBs and SOCBs (profit model) 
0.2 - -
0.0 - I — — : , — - . : ; , ! 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
—*— JSCBs - « — S O C B s 
Notes: JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = statc-owned commercial bank. 
JSCBs and SOCBs exhibit similar technical efficiency movements as shown in Figure 
5.3. The average efficiency slightly increased from 1995 and reached a peak in 1997. 
After the Asian Financial Crisis, the efficiency level declined for two years and was 
stabilized by 2001. The décline reflects both the external as well as internai shocks. 
External shocks were largely triggered by the Asian Financial Crisis, but the internai 
shocks reflected the govemment efforts to improve bank efficiency during the post-
crisis period. Our results suggest that the tightening policy in the aftermath of the 
Asian Financial Crisis had paid a high dividend. In 2002, ail banks suffered 
significant efficiency losses caused by the WTO entry in 2001. However, thèse 
efficiency losses are considered to be caused by the upward moving best-practice 
frontier. Thereafter, the average technical efficiency of both State and non-state banks 
increased rapidly over the last three years of the data period because of the deepened 
and widened banking reform. 
The E/A ratio is employed to test the second hypothesis that banks subject to a harder 
budget constraint are more efficient than those subject to a softer budget. The E/A 
ratio is found to have a negative relationship with efficiency, that is, well-capitalized 
banks are less efficient, providing strong évidence supporting the hypothesis. 
Regression results suggest that banks vvhich are subject to a hard budget, and hence 
less capitalized, tend to take more risk and become more efficient than those which 
are subject to a softer budget constraint and hence more capitalized. If banks are 
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subject to a soft budget constraint, such as the state-owned banks, their capital assets 
are mainly raised from state funds and they tend to be well capitalized. However, a 
soft budget constraint causes moral hazard problems and leads to inefficiency. But i f 
banks are subject to a hard budget, they have to raise capital from shareholders. Thèse 
banks will tend to be less capitalized, and hence have to take more risk to make 
profits. Our results ascertain that the Chinese banking reform bas been partially 
grounded on the budgetary constraint theory. The government has taken concrète 
measures to harden the budgetary constraints for SOCBs by diversifying their capital 
structure, listing them on the stock market. and implicitly indicating no more bailout 
in the future. 
5.3.2 The loan model 
A slightly différent picture émerges from the loan model as shown in Table 5.3. The 
variance ratio—gamma {y ~ a] + <rv2)) is 0.11, indicating only a small part of 
the error terms attributable to the inefficiency élément of uu. However, LR test has 
justified the présence of the one-sided error component. In gênerai, the estimated 
parameters of the production frontier and the coefficients on output and input 
variables suggest that the loan model-has also been well estimated. 
The signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with those of the profit model 
except for coefficients on time trend variable and labour. The coefficient on the time 
trend variable is 0.01, implying an upward moving production frontier. The output 
level tends to increase by 1% per year over the data period although not significant. 
The elasticity of fixed-asset is 0.02, which is even smaller and less significant than in 
the profit model. Deposits are found to have much stronger impact on efficiency than 
in the profit model, consistent with the fact that deposits have more direct influence 
on loans than on profits. The elasticity of deposit is as high as at 0.8, that is, a 1% 
increase in deposit would resuit in a 0.8% increase in loans, céleris paribus. The 
significant importance of deposits also helps explain the positive sign on labour. In 
China, deposits are mainly collected from a labour intensive branch network. 
Extensive coverage of the branch network is important for attracting more deposits 
but requiring more manpower. The increase in labour cost by 1% would lead to a 
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0.14% increase in loans, holding other factors unchanged. The elasticity of equity 
becomes 0.08, vvhich is significant but much smaller than in the profit model, 
indicating that equity has more direct impact on profit than on loans. 
Table 5-3: Results of the production fronticr and Inefficiency Functions 
Dépendent variable: In (loans net of loan loss réserve) 
Variables M L estimâtes T-Value 
A. Production Frontier 
Time(/?,) 0.01 1.17 
Fixed-asset ( ß2 ) 0.02 0.96 
Deposit ( ß3 ) 0.80*** 19.21 
Equity ( Ä ) 0.08** 2.82 
Labor (ßs) 4.87 
WTO entry (ß6) 0.13*** 3.12 
B. Inefficiency Effect Model 
Time ( Sl ) 0.05*** 9.03 
Ownership( ö2 ) -0.15*** -4.50 
Equity/Asset Ratio( <53 ) 0.05*** 7.06 
C. Variance parameters 
Sigma-squared 0.02*** 10.5 
Gamma 0.11*** 9.75 
D. Diagnosis and other information 
LR test 68 
Ln (likelihood) 129 
Number of observations 204 
Number of years 11 
Number of cross-sections 22 
Average technical efficiency 0.89 
Notes: (1) Al l the variables arc in natural logarithms; (2) Negative sign in the inefficiency function indicates 
that the variable has a positive effcct on production efficiency and vice versa; (3) *, **. *** indicatc 
significance level at 10%. 5% and 1% respectively. 
The coefficient on WTO dummy is positive and significant, consistently showing a 
positive impact of WTO entry on bank performance. However, its impact is much 
less than in the profit model as the value of the estimated coefficient in the loan 
model is 0.13, compared to 0.66 in the profit model. Thèse results suggest that 
Chinese banks have focused more on improving profitability after the WTO accession. 
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The average estimated technical efficiency in the loan model is 89%, higher than that 
of the profit model by 20 percentage points. Figure 5.4 plots the average technical 
efficiency for 22 individual commercial banks. Guangdong Development Bank turns 
out as the most efficient bank, followed by Shanghai Pudong Development Bank and 
Shenzhen Development Bank. The most inefficient banks are those small state-owned 
banks' subsidiaries. Banks are substantially indifferent in performance when output is 
measured by loans and most banks locale near the best-practice frontier. The spread 
between best- and worst-performed banks is much smaller than in the profit model. 
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Noie: The numbers on the X-axis represent the same banks as in Figure 5.1 -
The estimated technical efficiency of individual SOCBs is shown in Figure 5.5. The 
levels of SOCBs' technical efficiency have moved similarly with a gradually faster 
declining trend. In terms of extending loans, their performance has been stable over 
the first three years and started a downward slump throughout the rest of the sample 
period since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Surprisingly, BOC is the least 
efficient bank with an average technical efficiency of 85%, whereas A B C turns out as 
the most efficient bank with a higher efficiency of 90%. This is in contrast with the 
results of the profit model as well as the gênerai expectatîon. 
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Figure 5.5 Average tcchnical efficiency of SOCBs (loan modcl) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
A B C B O C - ' C C B C ICBC 
Notes: SOCB = state-owned commercial bank. A B C = Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of 
China. C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation. ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China. 
These puzzling results from the loan model and the inconsistency between the profit 
and loan models give rise to a question of the underlying reasoning. Is this caused by 
the inability of the estimation technique or the deficiency in defining the output 
variable? The answer tends to be the latter when looking at the estimated efficiency in 
conjunction with bank assets quality. The level of NPLs in SOCBs loan portfolio 
helps explain most of the unexpected results. The undesirable output of NPLs has 
inflated efficiency level when it is included in total loans as the output. BOC has the 
lowest average NPL ratio while A B C contains more than 30% of NPLs in its loan 
portfolio, resulting in better performance of A B C over BOC in the loan model. It 
also helps explain why the estimated efficiency in the loan model is much higher than 
that of the profit model, that is, a high proportion of NPLs in loan portfolio has been 
counted as output in the loan model but generating no profits. Moreover, the 
declining trend of the efficiency in the loan model is also attributable to the NPLs 
problem. Since 1998, the authorities have started to address the NPL problem in the 
banking System and have made considérable efforts on reduce NPLs. By taking away 
NPLs from SOCBs, efficiency has declined in the loan model but increased in the 
profit model because of improved assets quality. The effects of NPLs on efficiency 
estimation will be readdressed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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The results from the technical inefficiency effects model, shown in Table 5.3 panel B, 
are of particular interest since they are in connection with testing two theoretical 
hypothèses. The results are consistent with those of the profit model, which provide 
strong évidence supporting both hypothèses under testing and therefore prove the 
économie rationale of bank reform, supported by the agency theory and the budgetary 
constraints theory. To conserve space and avoid répétition, the discussion here will be 
brief. 
The estimated coefficient on the time trend is positive and significant, indicating that 
technical efficiency decreases by 5% per year. The elasticity of E/A ratio is 0.05 and 
statistically significant, indicating a positive impact on inefficiencies. Ownership is 
found to have a négative impact on inefficiency. Its coefficient is statistically 
significant, suggesting a better performance of shareholding banks. The estimated 
technical efficiency is depicted by ownership characteristic in Figure 5.6 for the 
period 1995-2005. JSCBs are more efficient than SOCBs throughout the whole 
sample period. On average, JSCBs outperform SOCBs by 14 %. The efficiency level 
of JSCBs has been relatively stable, whereas that of SOCBs has been decreasing. 
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Notes: JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank: SOCB = slale-owned commercial bank. 
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5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter examines the underlying economic rationale of bank reform in China. 
The data provide adéquate information for constructing a stochastic production 
frontier model. The empirical results support both hypothèses that joint-stock banks 
are more efficient than state-owned banks and banks facing a hard budget constraint 
outperform banks subject to a soft budget constraint. The results provide évidence for 
ownership reform and change in budgetary constraints that could lead to more 
compétition and greater efficiency gains. Therefore, it is rationalized that the 
economic foundations for bank reform have been the agency theory and the budgetary 
constraint theory. 
Moreover, this chapter also examines the impact of WTO entry on the performance of 
the banking industry. Under the incoming threats from foreign banks, Chinese 
authorities as well as banks have positively responded by deepening and widening the 
ongoing bank reform. WTO entry has been found to have significant positive impact 
on bank performance by affecting production technology employed by the banking 
industry. Moreover, the impact of WTO entry is much stronger on improving 
profitability than on lending activities. 
The average estimated technical efficiency is 69% in the profit model and 89% in the 
ioan model. Joint-stock banks are found to outperform state-banks by two percentage 
points in profitability and 14 percentage points in loans. The observed small 
différence in profitability is due to the récent radical SOCBs reform. Three recently 
refonned SOCBs have made significant improvement in profitability during the last 
three years of the sample period, effectively driving up the average profitability of 
SOCBs and narrowing the performance gap between state-owned banks and joint-
stock banks. Being the dominant force in the Chinese banking system, SOCBs still 
operate at a low efficiency level after many years of reforms. After more radical 
reforms started in 2003, the profitability of SOCBs improved dramatically. This 
partially justifies the effectiveness of reform by changing the ownership structure and 
subjecting SOCBs to a hard budget. 
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NPL is an undesirable output of the banking production process and it is am 
important factor in bank efficiency study. We have not paid much attention to the 
problem of NPLs. However. in this regard, an important methodological issue has 
corne into view when comparing the results of the profit and loan models. When 
NPLs ratio is high, the estimated efficiency is sensitive to the définition of Outputs. 
This issue will be further addressed in the next chapter. 
147 
Chapter 6 Technical efficiency of Chinese banks 
6.0 Preamble 
Having investigated the economic rationality of bank reform, the thesis turns to the 
more précise assessment of bank performance and differentiates the effects of reform 
measures on bank efficiency. Employing the same one-step SFA as in the previous 
chapter, this chapter focuses on estimating technical efficiency using a recently 
developed distance function approach. 
Using technical efficiency as performance measure, this chapter investigates the 
impact of various institutional changes on bank performance. The main purposes are 
threefold. The first purpose is to develop a stochastic frontier model by incorporating 
important bank specific variables and overcoming the potential drawbacks of other 
commonly used techniques to estimate efficiency. The second purpose is to provide 
reliable and up-to-date performance measurements for commercial banks China. The 
final purpose is to differentiate the effects of institutional changes on bank technical 
efficiency by jointly analyzing the static, sélection, dynamic effects of governance 
changes. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as foliows. Section 6.1 describes the stochastic 
distance function approach and its application to bank efficiency study. Section 6.2 
defines Output and input variables, spécifies empirical models, and describes data. 
Section 6.3 analyses the empirical results. Section 6.4 draws conclusions and policy 
implications. 
6.1 An output distance function approach 
The distance function approach is a recently developed technique in efficiency 
analysis. Its application is not as populär as the traditional cost function and profit 
function approaches. However, with the growing récognition of the potential 
advantages over traditional approaches. the distance function approach has attracted 
increasing attention in the field of productivity and efficiency in différent industries. 
For example, Cuesta and Orea (2002) employ a stochastic output distance function to 
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examine the temporal variation of technical efficiency for Spanish savings banks. 
Coelli and Perelman (1999, 2000) apply this approach to European railways to assess 
their technical efficiency. Morrison et al. (2000) use it to investigate the impact of 
regulatory reform on efficiency in New Zealand farming, Other applications of the 
distance fonction approach include English et al. (1993), Grosskopf et al. (1995), 
Morrison et al. (2004), Berg and Lin (2006), and Drake and Simper (2003). 
The distance function approach is chosen to estimate technical efficiency because of 
its prominent advantages (Cuesta and Orea, 2002; Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Fare et 
al., 1993; and Grosskopf et ai, 1995). First, the distance function is capable of 
representing a multiple outputs and multiple inputs production technology. This 
advantage facilitâtes efficiency study for industries characterised by multiple-outputs. 
The multiple-output nature of production technology has traditionally been dealt with 
in two ways: (1) aggregating the multiple outputs into a single index of output and 
then applying a single-output modelling technique; (2) applying a dual cost function 
or/and profit function approach. Comparing the distance function approach with a 
single-output model, Coelli and Perelman (2000) find substantial différences in 
parameter estimâtes of the production technology and efficiency rankings, in favour 
of the distance function approach for a multiple outputs setting. 
Secondly, the distance function approach requires less information compared to a 
dual approach like the cost function or profit function approaches. The distance 
function approach requires no price information while accommodating the multiple-
inputs and multiple-outputs production technology. Under some circumstances, price 
information may not be available. Even available, price information may not be 
exogenous as required by a cost or profit function approach. In this regard, the 
distance function approach is advantageous over a cost or profit function approach 
because it avoids the problem of unavailable price information and reducing the 
chance of using unsuitable price information. 
Thirdly, the distance function approach needs no behavioural assumptions. For highly 
regulated industries like railway and banking, certain assumptions of cost-
minimization or/and profit-maximization may be inappropriate. Thus, the dual cost 
and/or profit function approach becomes inapplicable. However, the distance function 
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approach could serve as an applicable alternative while accounting for the multi-
output nature in those industries. 
Finally. the Output distance function is dual to the revenue function, which allows the 
shadow prices to be indirectly derived front the distance function using Shephard's 
Lemma. These can then be used to calculate marginal rates of transformation of 
Morishima elasticities of substitution among Outputs. Examples of such applications 
include Fare et al. (1993) and Grosskopf et al. (1995). 
A distance function that represents the production technology can be defined in terms 
of radial input conservation or output expansion. With multiple Outputs and inputs, 
this représentation becomes a multidimensional problem, in contrast to typical 
empirical représentation of the technology with one output and multiple inputs. This 
multidimensional technological relationship can be represented by the technology set, 
which is a list of the technologically feasible combinations of inputs and Outputs. If 
the vector of M inputs is denoted by x = (x],x2,...,xM) and the vector of N Outputs is 
denoted by y = (y^y2i...,yN), then the technology set can be defined by Equation 
(6.1). 
T = {(x,y) : x e ft+,y e <Hf, x can produce y} (6.1) 
For each input vector x, let P(x) be the set of feasible output vectors y that are 
obtainable from the input vector x: 
P(x) - {y e : x canpfoduce y} (6.2) 
where the technology is assumed to satisfy the standard axioms, such as convexity, 
weak disposability, listed in Fare and Primont (1995). 
Shephard proved the duality between the input distance function and the cost function 
in 1953 and lately introduced the duality between the output distance function and the 
revenue function in 1970. Based on a common définition of production technology 
that transforms inputs into Outputs, the output distance function is defined in terms of 
the output set P(x) as in Equation (6.3). 
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D0(x,y) = min.{0 >0:(y/9)e P(x)}. (6.3) 
where 9 is the scalar 'distance' by which the output vector can be deflated; in 
other words, the output distance function measures the maximum possible 
proportional increase in the observed output vector given that the expanded vector 
must still be an element of the original output set. 
The output distance function, if well-defined, will always satisfy the properties 
of D0(y,x) as summarized in Lovell et al. (1994). These properties include 
monotonicity, non-decreasing in output and non-increasing in input, convexity in y, 
and homogeneity of degree 1 in output. The value ofD0(y,x) will be less or equal to 
one if the output vector, y, is an element of the feasible production set of P(x). If y is 
located on the surface of the production possibility set, the distance function 
D0{y,x)eoud\s one, suggesting the firm is best-practice performer. Ify is interior of 
the frontier, the value of the distance function falls short of 1, indicating the deviation 
of the firm from best-practice production. 
A translog functional form rather than the commonly employed Cobb-Douglas form 
is selected in this study to represent the distance function. The translog functional 
form is flexible and allows the homogeneity of degree 1 in output. Specifically, the 
output distance function with M outputs, K inputs, for I firms is given by Equation 
(6.4). 
M j M M K 
In D0i =aQ+J^ am In >•„,, + - Z Z a»« l n ^« l n ^ + Z A l n *w 
«r = l ^ m = l n=\ k = \ 
+ o Z Z A ' l n l n x " + Z Z l n **,ln ymi /= i ,2,... , n (6.4) 
where "o" indicates an output-oriented distance function and /' denotes the /-th 
firm in the sample. 
Output distance function must theoretically satisfy regularity restrictions of 
homogeneity and symmetry. Restriction on homogeneity of degree one in outputs is 
defined by Equation (6.5). 
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M M M 
j>„ = l , andX« m „=0( m = l,2,...,M), and j> t a = 0 (* = l,2,...,/f) (6.5) 
and restriction on symmetry is shown by Equation (6.6) 
ccmn=ccnm = 1,2,..., a n d ( * , / = 1,2,..., tf) (6.6) 
Following Lovell et ai. (1994), the horaogeneity constraint is imposed by normalizing 
the Output distance function by one of the outputs. The homogeneity property implies 
that D0{x,a)y) = û)D0{x,y) for any a> > 0 , which can be satisfied by output 
normalization using an arbitrary output in empirical practices. If the M h output is 
chosen for normalization and is set at\/yM, then D0{x,yl yM) - D0(xty)f yM . In 
particular, Equation (6.4) becomes 
M-\ | A/-I.W-I K 
!» D0i l yMl = « o + Z a m l n y mi + T Z Z a - ^ b + Z Â l n Xki 
«1=1 ^ fli=l 11=1 k=] 
| A' AT A' M - l 
+ ô Z Z A l n l n * / , + Z Z ^ l n x u I n f = 1 >25...,N (6.7) 
^ ft=l /=1 *=1 m=l 
where ymi = ymi I yM , y'm = ytll I yM . 
Rearranging Equation (6.7) into Equation (6.7a) 
M-l | M-lM-\ t K 
- l n y M, = AQ + Z a>*ln y™+ô Z Z , n j 4 l n ^ + Z â l n X*' 
m=\ m = \ n=\ k=\ 
+ \Èt^ ln*« +ZZV talnxh I n ^ l , -lnö,„ ,= 1,2,...,N ( 6.7a) 
^ ft=] 1=] k=l m=l 
where the summation sign over m implies summing only the M - l outputs not used for 
normalization. If M=l , this function is reduced to the standard one-output translog 
form model. 
Standard stochastic frontier models encompass both a Symmetrie (noise) random error 
term v(.and an asymmetric (inefficiency) error termw,, in which u- are dépendent on 
environmental factors. The key to incorporate a distance function within a stochastic 
production frontier context is to reinterpret the distance, - l n ( D 0 / ) , as a traditional 
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disturbance term in stochastic model. It reflects the différence between the observed 
data points and those points predicted by the estimated production technology. By 
interpreting the distance \n{D0l) in équation (6.7a) as a composed error term with a 
noise (v,) and technical inefficiency (w (), the distance function in équation (6.7a) 
becomes 
\f-\ j A-/-IAY-I A" 
- In y M . = a 0 + £ a m In y m + - Z Z a « « l n y l l n y«, + Z Ä l n **< 
m=l ¿ m=) »=1 t=| 
+ ö Z Z l n l n + Z Z ^<ln x « , n +v< - w ' M >2>- • • ' N (6-7b> 
-¿ 4=1 /=1 A=l m=1 
For the purpose of empirical estimation, the left hand side of the Equation (6.7b) is 
transformed to be ln_v, rather t h a n - l n ^ and it becomes a standard SFA model in 
Equation (6.8). 
In y m = Z a m l n /mi + T Z Z amn l n >C ] n >C + Z A l n * w 
m-l ¿ m=\ n=\ 4=1 
+ ó Z Z Â/ in x w ln x„ + X Z rkm In + v, - u, i= 1,2,... ,N (6.8) 
As noted in Coelli and Perelman (2000) and applied in Morrison et a l . (2000), this 
transformation reverses the signs of the estimated coefficients for a normal distance 
function. However, the interprétation of estimâtes becomes more comparable to those 
of Standard production function models. For example, after the transformation, the 
expected sign of the logarithmic derivative or elasticity d \ n y x l ö \ r \ x k to be positive 
for a marginal product, rather than negative as would be the case if Equation (6,8) 
were defined in terms of-ln_y,. Likewise, the corresponding elasticities of the Output 
variables { y ' m ) are negative, consistent with their interprétation as the slope of the 
production possibility frontier. 
One might have been aware of the possibility of simultaneous équation bias because 
of the appearance of both inputs and Outputs in the distance functions as regressors. 
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Particularly, in an output distance function, the inputs should be treated as exogenous 
and the output will be endogenous, However, the normalization results in the output 
ratios appear in the model rather than output variables. Coelli and Perelman (1996) 
argue that thèse output ratios may be assumed to be exogenous since the output 
distance function is defined for radial expansion of all Outputs, given the input levels. 
Equation (6.8) represents a stochastic translog output-oriented distance function and 
its generalized versions incorporating into BC95 model are: 
Iny m = TL(xl(,y.iyMa,a,ß,y) + v, -u u (6.9) 
n 
TEit = exp(-« (, ) = exp(-z,,<S - sa ) (6.11) 
where the model is re-parameterised by a2 S Ö ; 2 + Ö** and y=—^—r (Battese 
and Corra, 1977). 
The orientation of the efficiency measure is selected dépendant on the arguments 
about the endogeneity and exogeneity of the input and output sets (Coelli and 
Perelman, 1999). This study chooses the output distance function based on the 
following considérations. First of all, this study focuses on the effects of various 
institutional changes in banks on bank efficiency. Institutional changes will generally 
involve changes in the governance structure in order to improve bank performance. 
This can possibly be achieved by cutting cost, whereas costs are more like to increase, 
at least in the short run, in the process of institutional changes. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that banks are more likely to improve performance by focusing 
on output augmentation rather than costs contraction. Secondly, having experienced 
economic development with high speed, the Chinese economy is still marked on the 
round of an uprising period. Given the favourable macroeconomic conditions and the 
scarcity of capital, it is also reasonable to assume that bank production is driven by 
Outputs. Finally, Berger et al. (1993) find that the majority of inefficiency arises from 
déficient revenues rather than excessive costs. 
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Morrison et al. (2000) innovatively embed the distance function approach into a SFA 
framework. They argue that such a model is a somewhat complex but generał and 
rich représentation of production technology to estimate efficiency and its possible 
déterminants. On the one hand, the model is stochastic with a composite error term in 
contrast with a typical econometric approach and a nonparametric or a deterministic 
econometric frontier approach. The former fits a function to the data assuming a 
normal error distribution and the latter lacks statistical inference. On the other hand, 
the model is based on a distance function approach that has a few advantages over a 
dual cost/profit function approach in dealing with multi-outputs and multi-inputs 
production technologies as discussed earlier. 
Borrowing the idea from Morrison et al. (2000), this study has enriched an empirical 
model to provide comprehensive information on efficiency and to differentiate the 
impact of various reform stratégies. Based on the work of Morrison et al. (2000), this 
model applies the output distance function in a flexible translog functional form to a 
one-step stochastic frontier model—the BC95 model. In addition, the method 
proposed by Berger et al. (2005) has been incorporated into the technical inefficiency 
effects model of the BC95 model to jointly examine static, sélection and dynamie 
effects of governance changes on bank efficiency. This comprehensive model inherits 
ail statistical and practical virtues of the distance function approach, one-step 
stochastic BC95 model and Berger et al. (2005) method. Moreover, the technical 
inefficiency effect model also simultaneously examines the effects of bank risk taking 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Such a comprehensive model is 
empirically applicable because of the econometric package—FRONTIER (Version 
4,1c) developed by Tim Coelli. 
6.2 Empirical spécifications and variable définitions 
This study spécifies three différent combinations of inputs and outputs (shown in 
Table 6.1) since efficiency estimâtes are sensitive to the empirical spécification of 
inputs and outputs. Différent spécifications are also for addressing the issue arising in 
the last chapter regarding how to define output in the présence of high level NPLs and 
their effects cannot be properly accounted for. Model 1 is an income-based 
spécification of inputs and outputs which spécifies two inputs—non-interest expense 
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and total interest expense, and two Outputs—net interest income and non-interest 
income. This model has been employed by Sturm and Williams (2004) and Park and 
Weber (2006). 
Table 6.1 Empirical model spécifications 
Model Outputs Inputs Time 
1 Net interest income (yi ) Total interest expense ( .v, ) t 
Non-interest income(^2 ) Non-interest expense (x2 ) 
2 Total Ioans(^ ) Total interest expense ( x, ) t 
Total deposits(Xt) Labor and physical capital ( x} ) 
Non-interest income ( y2 ) 
3 Total loans(y3) Physical capital ( .v4 ) t 
Total deposits(y4) Labour (xs) 
Other earning assets( ) Total interest expense ( x ( ) 
Model 2 and Model 3 are earning asset-based models, in which Outputs are defined 
using balance sheet information on earning assets. It has long been argued that the 
efficiency estimâtes are sensitive to the treatment of deposits. Regarding this 
controversial issue, a dual approach has been proposed and widely employed, which 
treats the stock value of deposits as an output while treating the costs of deposits as an 
input (Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Bauer et al., 1993; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; 
Chen et al., 2005; Cavallo and Rossi, 2001). Following this approach, In Model 2 and 
Model 3, total deposit is defined as an output to measure the service flows provided to 
customers and interest paid on deposit is defined as an input. 
Specifically, Model 2 spécifies two inputs and three Outputs. Two inputs include 
labour and physical capital, and total interest expense, while three Outputs are total 
loans, total deposits and non-interest income. Non-interest income or fee-related 
income is defined as an additional output for capturing the effect of increasingly 
important diversification of bank activities, such as fee income and off-balance-sheet 
activities, rather than traditional bank lending activities. The same model has been 
applied in Rogers (1998) and Park and Weber (2006). Model 3 spécifies three inputs 
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and three Outputs. Three inputs include physical capital, labour and total interest 
expense. Three Outputs include total loans, total deposit, and other earning assets. 
Variables are defined using the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). 
However, input variables specified in Mode! 2 and Model 3 slightly violate the 
standard intermediation approach because of the rather incomplète data on personnel 
expenses and the number of employées. In Model 2, total operating expenses are used 
as a proxy for both the labour and physical capital inputs. In Model 3, overhead is 
used as a proxy for labour input. while fixed assets serves as physical capital input. 
The use of thèse approximations as input variables is the best solution based on the 
theoretical ground and the data availability for Chinese banks. This practice has 
recently become popular in bank efficiency study in developing nations. Examples 
include Patti and Hardy (2005), Fries and Taci (2005), Chen et ai (2005). 
The translog output distance function specified and estimated in this chapter is given 
by Equation (6.12) 
ln ym = aQ + X am In ymi + - X X amn In ymi In yni + X ßk In xki + - X X A / l n */,- ln xki 
m=\ m=l n=\ k<=) k=l t=\ 
K M-] M-\ K 
+ X X y kmln xk, in y m, + X a»t{ln y»>+ X A / l n +/ + v, - ut 
k=\ m=\ m=) *=l 
/=1,2,...5N (6.12) 
where _y*are Outputs normalized by either total loans or net-interest income; xare 
inputs and t is a time trend. 
A summary of descriptive statistics of ail variables in the stochastic distance frontier 
model, and other useful financial ratios are presented in Table 6.2. For variables used 
in the technical inefficiency effect model, risk taking indicators are reported in Table 
6.2. Governance effect indicators representing various institutional changes will be 
summarized in Table 6.3. Four risk taking indicators include the capital leverage ratio 
for capital risk, L L R to total loans ratio for credit risk, interbank borrowing to total 
deposits ratio for market risk, and the total loans to total deposits ratio for liquidity 
risk. Data are taken from banks' annual financial Statements. 
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Table 6.2 Mean values of sample banks by governance type (1995-2005) 
CCBs CCBs FBs JSCBs JSCBs SOCBs SOCBs Listed Sélection Sélection 
A L L NO A L L A L L NO Ai l NO banks foreign listing 
Outputs and Inputs and other financial figures 
Loans* 19 11 1 115 113 1,676 1,501 322 494 757 
Other earning assets* 17 9 1 77 73 1,007 656 208 325 495 
Deposits* 30 16 1 147 149 2,231 1,795 438 673 1,030 
Net interest income 575 306 51 3,163 2,616 42,473 36,853 9,770 12,809 19,658 
Other operating 
income 376 217 35 1,570 1,502 18,662 9,200 4,385 6,391 9,697 
Fixed assets 469 402 31 2,684 2,677 52,024 49,064 10,466 14,493 22,396 
Overhead 387 222 16 2,219 2,035 30,694 32,415 6,692 8,758 13,413 
Interest expense 781 432 71 3,719 4,191 106,420 56,744 11,569 32,283 49,724 
Non-interest expense 414 239 21 2,374 2,160 35,034 36,830 7,339 9,906 15,192 
ROA 1.65 1.78 12.27 1.36 0.94 0.57 0.29 1.29 1.20 1.07 
Cost efficiency 1.14 1.11 0.91 1.20 1.16 1.13 1.48 1.24 1.19 1.12 
Total assets* 39 22 2 200 200 2,886 2,335 555 874 1,336 
Risk taking indicators 
Capital risk 4.90 5.14 31.93 4.65 3.79 4,35 4.08 4.66 4.78 4.57 
Credit risk 1.29 1.26 2.33 2.24 1.24 1.53 0.91 2.31 1.99 2.06 
Market risk 87.94 80.87 . 268.53 38.76 37.88 52.57 40.00 27.12 57.51 39.11 
Liquidity risk 70.32 72.48 131.94 79.74 76.96 81.42 97.20 80.61 76.79 77.97 
Source: BankScope and authors' calculation. 
Notes: (1) R O A = return on assets; L L R = loan loss reserve; Cost efficiency = overhead over total assets. C C B = city commercial bank, FB = foreign bank. JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank. 
SOCB = state-owned bank, NO = no changes. A L L = ail banks in the gronp, Sélection foreign = selccted for foreign acquisition, Sélection listing = sclccted for listing on stock exchanges. (2) 
AU monetary variables have been dcflated to 1995 price level. (3) * Loans, other eaming assets, deposits, and total assets arc presented in billion R M B . other variables are presented in million 
except for ratios. 
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These data provide a preliminary preview for différent types of banks. Foreign banks 
are shown to have very différent characteristics from domestic banks. They are the 
most profitable and cost efficient banks indicated by ROA of 12.27% and a simple 
cost efficiency measure of overhead to total assets ratio of 0.91%. Their risk taking 
indicators are the highest among banks, suggesting relatively low capital risk and 
credit risk, but high market risk and liquidity risk. Data on SOCBs suggest that they 
are the least profitable but more cost efficient than the average of ail JSCBs. This is 
consistent with most of the static research literature on State ownership in developing 
nations that always find unfavourable effects. CCBs turn out as the most profitable 
and cost efficient domestic banks at slightly high ROA and simple cost efficiency 
ratio of overhead to total assels. 
The data also provide information on the effect of the institutional changes. In terms 
of profitability, ail types of banks experiencing no institutional changes (therefore no 
governance changes) during the sample period are less profitable than their 
corresponding entire groups, except for CCBs. The possible reason is that better 
performing banks have been picked up for institutional changes, or that banks have 
improved performance after institutional changes, or both. In terms of financial cost 
efficiency ratio, CCBs and JSCBs without governance changes are more cost efficient 
than their respective group average. This suggests that governance changes generally 
involve excessive costs at least in the short run but the downside effects have been 
fully offset by the improved profitability. 
The effects of institutional changes in SOCBs are more favourable with significant 
improvement in profitability without suffering excessive costs as other types of bank. 
The group average ROA is 0.57, vvhich is double of the ROA of SOCBs experiencing 
no governance changes. The governance changes have contracted costs since SOCBs 
without changes have higher overhead to total assêts ratio than SOCBs experienced 
changes. The data have provided preliminary évidence for the positive effects of 
changing corporate governance as resuit of institutional changes in banks. 
Following existing literature, a number of specific procédures have been applied to 
data wherever necessary prior to the estimation. First, ail monetary variables with a 
negative or zéro value have been added to a constant, where the constant equals the 
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absolute of their respective minimum valúes plus one. The purpose is to avoid taking 
natural logarithm on the negative or zero valué. Secondly, all monetary variables are 
expressed in million Renminbi and they have been deflated by their corresponding 
year CPI to 1995 price level in order to control the inflation effects. Thirdly, all input 
and output variables has been mean-corrected, that is, all data are normalízed by their 
geometric sample mean. Thus, the first order coeffícients can be interpreted as 
distance elasticities with respect to other outputs and the inputs, evaluated at the 
sample means. Finally, the homogeneity constraint has been imposed by normalizing 
all outputs using net interest income in Model I and using total loans in Model 2 and 
Model 3. The choice of normalizing output variable is arbitrary and causes no 
difference in estimation results. This ensures the homogeneity of degree one in 
outputs for all models. The moralization also has the benefits of reducing the problem 
of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. 
The technical inefficiency effects model examines the impact on bank performance of 
risk taking characteristics and various institutional changes in banks in a certain 
macroeconomic environment. In particular, these independent variables are proxy for 
management practice, business environment, operational experience, foreign 
involvement, and ownership structure of individual banks. Among other factors, risk 
management practice and corporate governance structure are two most important 
aspects to improve for Chínese banks to be profitable and viable in the long run. They 
are simultaneously examined in a one-step SFA model—BC95 model. It is assumed 
that that difference in risk taking and institutional changes influence banks' efficiency 
level rather than the production technology structure. The empirical specification of 
the technical inefficiency effects model is given by Equation 6.13. 
u„ = S0 + ¿ ¿>0CG„ + £ SbRisku + S]5GDP + S,tt + ek (6.13) 
a=\ b = \\ 
where t is a time trend variable; CGU is a vector of governance changes indicators 
representing various institutional changes in banks; Riskit is a vector of risk taking 
indicators,; GDP is GDP growth rate representing the macroeconomic condition. 
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Risk taking characteristics are représentée! by a set of financial ratios—the capital 
leverage ratio for capital risk, L L R to total loans ratio for credit risk, Interbank 
borrowing to total deposits ratio for market risk, and total loans to total deposits ratio 
for liquidity risk. These characteristics do not necessarily be causations of 
inefficiency or efficiency, but they might be more popular in efficient or inefficient 
banks' opérations (Mester, 1996). The equity capital ratio reflects managerial risk 
préférences in solving the maximization problem. L L R to total loans ratio measures 
how much banks provide for unanticipated losses because of loan defaults. It reflects 
banks' financial strength since L L R is used as a cushion against possible loan defaults. 
The ratio of interbank borrowing to total deposits measures the extent to which a bank 
dépends on wholesale funding rather than retail opérations. GDP growth is included 
as a proxy for gênerai macroeconomic environment in which banks operate. A time 
trend variable is for capturing common effects on efficiency, i.e. technology change, 
policy change, and regulatory mechanism change, 
A set of governance changes indicators has been defined and employed to estimate 
and diffèrentiate the effects of various institutional changes on bank performance in 
China. Following Berger et al. (2005), différent types of bank ownership are 
considered as forms of governance. Changes in governance include any kinds of 
institutional changes, such as restructuring, foreign acquisition and going public. The 
aim is to investigate whether institutional changes improve performance, and i f any, 
to ascertain which changes have such positive impact. The static governance 
indicators are used to depict the différent effects on performance of having certain 
types of governance structure over the long term. Sélection effect indicators are used 
to discover whether better or poorly performed banks are selected for governance 
changes. Dynamic governance indicators explore the short-run and long-run effects of 
governance changes on performance. The présent study spécifies 11 governance 
indicators (defined as dummy variables in Table 6.3), including five static effect 
indicators, two sélection effect indicators, two short-run dynamie effect indicators and 
two long-run dynamie effect indicators. 
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Table 6.3 Definition of governance effect indicators 
Governance Indicators Definition No. of banks Total assets 
Statte Effect Indicators 
CCBs—No Change Dummy indicating a city commercial bank that underwent no 
changes in governance over die entire sample period. It equals 1 
for such banks and 0 for ail other banks for ail periods. This 
variable is excluded from the régression as the base case when 











Dummy indicating a joint-stock commercial bank that 2(11) 18 
underwent no changes in governance over the entire sample 
period. It equals 1 for such banks and 0 for ail other banks for ail 
periods. 
Dummy indicating a state-owned commercial bank that 1 (4) 25 
underwent no changes in governance over the entire sample 
period. It equals 1 for such banks and 0 for ail other banks for ail 
periods. 
Dummy indicating a foreign-owned commercial bank that 6 (6) 
underwent no changes in governance over the entire sample 
period. It equals 1 for such banks and 0 for ail other banks for ail 
periods. 
Dummy indicating whether a bank is listed or not. It equals 1 for 7(35) 20 




Selection Effect Indicators 
Selected for Foreign Acquisition Dummy indicating a bank that underwent at least one foreign 14 (35) 40 77 
acquisition over the entire sample period. It equals 1 for such 
banks and 0 for all other banks for all periods. 
Selected for Going Public Dummy indicating a bank that underwent IPO since 1995 up to 9 (35) 26 
2006 other than 2005 due to two significant SOCB IPOs took 
place in 2006. It equals l for such banks and 0 for all other 
banks for all periods. 
75 
Dynamic Effect Indicators—ST 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition Dummy indicating the year following a bank's foreign 
acquisition. It equals 1 starting in the year of acquisition for such 
banks and 0 prior to the bank's acquisition and for all other 
banks for all periods. 
Underwent Going Public Dummy indicating the year following a bank's IPO. It equals 1 
starting in the year of IPO for such banks and 0 prior to the 
bank's IPO and for all other banks for all periods. 
Dynamic Effect Indicators—LT 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition The number of years since foreign acquisition. It Starts with 1 
since the year of acquisition for such banks and 0 prior to the 
bank's acquisition and for all other banks for all periods. 
Underwent Going Public The number of years since a bank's IPO. It Starts with 1 since the 
year of IPO for such banks and 0 prior to the bank's IPO and for 
all other banks for all period. 
Note: Figures in parenthèses are the total number of respective types of banks or total banks in the sample. 
163 
Five static effect indicators are CCBs—No Change, JSCBs—No Change, SOCBs—No 
Change, FBs—No Change, and Usted Bank. The former four indicators represent 
banks that underwent no changes in governance over the sample period, 
corresponding to city commerciai banks, joint stock commercial banks. state-owned 
commercial banks and foreign banks. For all periods, these variables equal 1 for 
banks with no governance change and 0 for all other banks. The last static indicator 
shows if banks are Usted in stock exchanges. It equals 1 for listed banks and 0 for all 
other banks for all periods. 
Following the literature (Berger et al, 2005; Williams and Nguyen, 2005), the first 
static indicator, CCBs—no change, is excluded in the estimation as the base case for 
the purpose of performance comparison. One caveat needs to be born in mind that the 
results for CCBs are not representative of the average of CCBs in China but the 
upfront of better performing CCBs. The sample only includes about 15 CCBs out of 
112 CCBs for those whose data are available for at least five years. To some extent, 
the length of the periods for which data are publicly available is indicative of banks' 
better management and data quality. Therefore, these banks are expected to 
outperform the rest of CCBs. Moreover, some of CCBs included in the sample lócate 
in more economically developed cities, such as Bank of Shanghai and Bank of 
Beijing, and in fact these CCBs might even outperform some JSCBs. Another piece 
of evidence for their better performance is the fact that 6 CCBs have been acquired by 
international strategic investors, of which 5 have been included in our sample. As 
later confirm, these investors have cherry-picked better performing banks for 
acquisition, However, as a control group, the sample bias would not affect our 
analysis since our main concern is the relative efficiency level of each type of banks 
rather than focusing on CCBs only. 
As shown in Table 6.3, in terms of the number of banks, 64% of CCBs, 18% of 
JSCBs and 25% of SOCBs remain unchanged in governance. In terms of total assets, 
the percentage of total assets owned by banks without governance change is, 34% for 
CCBs, 18% for JSCBs and 20% for SOCBs. In sum, 41% of domestic banks (12 out 
of total 29 banks) have experienced no governance changes, only accounting for 20% 
of the total banking assets. In other words, 59% of domestic banks controlling 80% of 
the total banking assets have experienced governance changes. The most active banks 
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in governance changes are JSCBs of which 82%. in terms of both the number of 
banks and total assets, have undergone governance changes during the sample period, 
These striking figures suggest that institutiona! changes (therefore governance 
changes) in Chinese banking System are prevail and significant. As to the listing 
Status of Chinese banks. only 7 banks out of 35 banks are listed on stock exchanges, 
possessing only 27% of the total banking assets. 
The sélection effect indicators, Selected for Foreign Acquisition and Selected for 
Going Public, represent banks that have been selected for foreign acquisition or IPO 
during the sample period, The purpose of sélection indicators is to capture the 
performance effects associated with being selected by foreign investors or for IPO. 
Variables equal 1 for all periods for such a bank and 0 for all other banks for all 
periods. Some banks experienced both foreign acquisition and going public changes. 
In thèse cases, both changes are accounted separately. Selected for Foreign 
Acquisition indicator is employed to account for possible factors underpinning foreign 
investors' acquisition décision, such as performance, size, market share, and nation-
wide network. There has been a surge of foreign investment in domestic banks and 
banks' IPOs up to 2006. A number of various foreign institutions have acquired stake 
or have been negotiating to acquire stake in domestic banks, covering all types of 
domestic commercial banks. As shown in Table 6-3, 14 out of 35 banks have been 
selected by foreign Strategie investors, of which 5 are CCBs, 6 are JSCBs and 3 are 
SOCBs. These 14 banks possess 77% of the total banking assets. 
Selected for Going Public indicator is to scrutinise the performance of banks being 
selected for going public. IPO of banks is another important banking reform strategy 
undertaken by Chinese govemment. Although only 9 domestic banks have been 
selected for IPO, they control 75% of the total banking assets. When looking at static 
indicator of Listed Bank and sélection effect indicator Selected for IPO shown in 
Table 6-3, two more banks are included for aecounting the sélection effect and listed 
banks' share of total banking assets has increased from 27% for Listed Bank indicator 
to 75% for Selected for IPO indicator. The reason is that Listed Bank aecounts for the 
listing status up to the end of 2005, while Selected for Going Public up to the end of 
2006 in order for considering the effect of two large SOCBs' IPOs—Bank of China 
and Industrial and Commercial Banks of China. 
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Dynamic effect indicators attempt to examine the effects of governance changes by 
comparing bank performance before the changes with their subséquent performance 
after the changes. Two short-term dynamic effect indicators, Underwent Foreign 
Acquisition-ST and Underwent Going Public-ST, measure the timing following the 
governance changes in order to capture short-term effects of governance change on 
bank performance. The dummy equals 0 prior to the governance change and 1 starting 
in the year following the change. Two long-term dynamic effect indicators, 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition-LT and Underwent Going Public-LT, measure the 
number of years following a governance change. Long-term dynamic variables equal 
0 prior to the governance change for all banks and Start with 1 in the year of the 
change. Existing literature suggest deleting the observations in the year and the year 
following governance change to help mitigate transition effects, whereas it is 
impractical for the présent study given a large proportion of governance changes took 
place within the last two years of the sample period. 
It is important to distinguish the long-term effects from the short-term effects since 
transition costs incurred during the governance changes may last more than one year. 
Moreover, banks may return back to prior behaviour after a governance change rather 
than on the track of the predicted ways. Results from dynamic effect indicators might 
have policy implications. For instance, a change from a short-term favourable effect 
to an adverse long-term effect may suggest that governance changes do not persist in 
functioning as expected and observed in short term for a longer period of time. Thus, 
actions could be taken to investigate the reasons and amend the policy when 
necessary. 
6.3 Empirical results 
6.3.1 Results of the stochastic frontier model and bank performance 
Variations of the frontier model have been estimated in order to gauge the sensitivity 
of différent Outputs and inputs combinations. Estimated average levels of technical 
efficiency are generally consistent with each other as shown in Table 6.4. Since the 
sign of the dépendent variable in the output distance function lias been transformed 
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into positive prior to estimation, the signs of the coefficient estimâtes have been 
reversée! which become consistent with the estimâtes from the standard output 
distance function. Most input and output variables are highly significant at 1% level. 
Eslasticities in ail three models have the expected signs. that is, eslastickies for output 
variables are positive and those for input variables are négative. Thus, the 
monotonicity of distance function has been fulfilled in addition to the homogeneity 
constraint imposed prior to the estimation. Furthermore, the second-order output and 
cross-outputs have the correct signs, suggesting that the transformation curve has a 
concave shape. Because the models have been estimated in a translog functional form, 
thèse estimated eslasticities do not have direct économie interprétation. 
The overall fitness of models is judged by Maximum likelihood estimâtes for the 
parameters. Gamma ( y = cr /<y] + a; ) are more than 0.82 for ail models at 1% 
significance level. Results of LR test of one-sided error are greater than 160 for ail 
three models, highlighting the existence of the one-sided error vvithin the error ternis. 
Thèse estimated parameters demonstrate that inefficiency is the main source of the 
déviation and a classical régression model of production function is inadéquate to 
represent the data. The positive coefficient on the time trend in the production frontier 
function indicates that the production frontier moved upward. In balance, the 
régression results suggest that the models are well estimated with good fitness of the 
output distance function presenting the bank production technology in China. 
One of the virtues of distance functions is that it allows the computation of scale 
eslaticities. Following Fare and Primont (1995) and Coelli and Perelman (1999), the 
scale elasticity is given by Equation (6.14) 
(6.14) 
167 
Table 6.4 Estimated parametcrs of stochastic Output distance function 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Net interest income yl 
Non-interest income y2 0.462 (9.12)*** 0.198 (3.47)*** 
Total loans y3 
Total deposits y4 0.859 (5.23)*** 0,256 (1.55)* 
Other earning assets y5 0.298 (1.95)** 
Total interest expense xl -0.442 (-5.6)*** .0.415 (-4.7)*** -0.578 (-7.9)*** 
Non-interest expense x2 -0.314 (-3.7)*** 
Labour and physical capitalxJ -0.404 (-4.5)*** 
Physical capital x4 -0.191 (-2.2)** 
Labour x5 -0.047 (-3.1)** 
T 0.003 (0.13) 0.012(1.12) 0.024(1,05) 
7 0.888 (29,6)*** 0.860 (27.9)*** 0.818(22.1)*** 
LR test 194 166 161 
Mean Technical Efficiency 73.43 69.98 73.18 
y2*y2 -0.141 (-7.5)*** -0.139 (-6.1)*** 
y2*xl 0.068 (1.82)** 0.017(0.39) 
y2*x2 -0.062 (-1.6)* 
y2*x3 -0.049 (-1.2) 
y2*t 0.003 (0.33) -0.008 (-0.8) 
y4 * y4 -0.110 (-2.5)** -0.222 (-2.7)** 
y4*y2 0.275 (3.83)*** 
y4*xl 0.110(2.35)** -0.016 (-0.4) 
y4*x3 0.075 (1.41)* 
y4*x4 0.008 (0.08) 
y4*x5 0.077 (0.66) 
y4*t 0.046 (2.55)** -0.019 (-0.8) 
y5*y5 -0,141 (-2.2)** 
y5*y4 0.377 (3.56)*** 
y5*xl 0.095 (2.02)** 
y5*x4 0.136(1.98)** 
y5*x5 -0.301 (-4.2)*** 
y5*t 0.026(1.22) 
xl *xl 0.144 (0.71) 0.053 (1.79)* -0.023 (-0.8) 
xl*x2 0.002 (-0,04) 
xl*t -0.019 (-1.8)* -0.004 (-0.3) -0.025 (-2.3)** 
x2*x2 0.019(0.81) 
x2*t 0.030 (265)** 
x3*x3 0.050 (1.91)** 
x3*xl -0.090 (-1.7)* 
x3*( 0.013 (1.01) 
x4*x4 0.058 (1.49)* 
x4*xl 0.063 (1.16) 
x4*x5 -0.180 (-2.5)** 
x4*l -0.002 (-0.4) 
x5*x5 0.097 (2.21)** 
x5*xi -0.013 (-0.2) 
x5*t 0.043 (2.33)** 
Notes: Figurcs in parcnthesis are t-values. '***' significs significance at 1%, ***' at 5% and at 10% levels. 
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The négative sign of the sum of the first-order input coefficients in the output 
distance function is an indicator of returns to scale in the production process. A value 
greater than one indicates the présence of increasing returns to scale at the rnean, 
while a value less than one suggests decreasing returns to scale. This indicator takes 
the values of 0.75, 0.81 and 0.81 in Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 respectively, 
consistently suggesting decreasing returns to scale at the mean in the Chinese banking 
industry. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, bank performance has been steadily improved over the 
sample period. The average estimated technical efficiency is about 70% in ail three 
models, indicating the Chinese banking industry produces less than they would at the 
maximum possible level by 30%. The efficiency level falls into the reasonable range 
reported in the efficiency literature. The most efficient bank is China Merchants Bank 
in Model l , Bank of Communications in Model 2 and Bank of China in Model 3, with 
the estimated technical efficiency of 93%, 89% and 93%, respectively. Although 
différent models identify différent most efficient banks, the rank order of thèse banks 
is relatively stable. China Merchants Bank is ranked at the seventh in Model 2 and the 
forth in Model 3, while Bank of Communications is the second best in Model 1 and 
Model 3. 
Figure 6.1 Overall technical efficiency of Chinese banks 
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Ai l three models have identified the most inefficient domestic bank as China 
Evergrowing Bank whose efficiency level is as low as at about 40%. Wide efficiency 
differentiations across banks indicate that there are substantial rooms for performance 
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improvement. Given similar results from earning assets-based Model 2 and Model 3, 
only Model 2 will be further analyzed along with income-based Model 1 unless 
otherwise stated. 
The estimated technical efficiency for différent bank groups is plotted in Figure 6.2 (a) 
for Model 1 and Figure 6.2 (b) for Model 2. The efficiency level of différent groups 
tends to increase in both models but more convergent in Model 1 than in Model 2. 
Foreign banks are the most inefficient group in both models and they are more 
efficient in the income-based model than in the eaming-assets based model. Our 
results support the home field advantage hypothesis of Berger et al. (2000), there is 
no clear eut as to whether foreign banks outperform or under-perform domestic banks 
in literature. On average, CCBs are the least technically efficient domestic banks 
except for the first two years. The possible explanation for this exception is that only 
a small number of better performed CCBs are included in the sample for early years. 
Figure 6.2 Mean technical efficiency by bank types (1995-2005) 
1595 19% IM m M m ara M m 
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Notes; C C B = cily commercial bank. FD = foreign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = state-
owncd commercial bank. 
JSCBs and SOCBs have shown similar movements in technical efficiency in both 
models. JSCBs are the most efficient banks in Model 1, consistent with findings of 
most efficiency studies on Chinese banks as well as the expectation that JSCBs are 
reasonably expected to outperform other banks. JSCBs are subject to less intervention 
from local and central govemments and have no historical financial burden as in 
SOCBs. Interms of profitability, despite of notable progresses, SOCBs still operate at 
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relatively low efficiency level compared vvith JSCBs, not in line with the considerable 
reform efforts made by the government. As in previous discussions on the reasons 
why state ownership is generally associated with low efficiency. government 
intervention persists on SOCBs' lending decisión. State banks have to satisfy 
contradictory objectives even after many years of reform (Dobson and Kashyap, 
2006). SOCBs need to finance SOEs and infrastructure investment to support the 
nation's overall economic development project. On the other hand, banks are 
formally required to transform themselves into commercially viable corporate entities 
to pursue profitability and efficiency of their operations. The contradiction provides 
rooms for the moral hazard problem that result in poor performance. Our results 
suggest that government influence is still substantial and is a main source of its low 
efficiency. 
SOCBs have turned out as the most efficient banks in Model 2. This finding is same 
as that in Chen et al. (2005). However, it is inconsistent with majority of efficiency 
literature in developing countries and transition economies where state ownership has 
been generally found to be associated with lower level of efficiency. JSCBs are more 
efficient in income generation while SOCBs are more efficient in earning assets 
growth. The average efficiency scores of JSCBs and SOCBs are 81% and 72% in 
Model 1, and 75% and 81% in Model 2. Different results from two different models 
for a same bank group reflect the difference in banks' operation and management. 
JSCBs tend to be more cautious in extending loans and investing activities and to be 
more profit-oriented in their operations, while SOCBs tend to focus on earning assets 
growth with less attention to their quality and profitability. 
Perceived differences in efficiency estimates from two models have shed important 
lights on research methodology regarding empirical model specification. Model 1 
focuses on the efficiency on income generation (profitability), while Model 2 devotes 
more attention to the efficiency of earning assets growth (loans growth and deposit 
collection). Two models measure the efficiency of banks' operations from different 
angles. Efficiency estimates should be interpreted with caution, especially for 
Chinese banking industry where the percentage of non-performing assets is much 
higher than the internationally acceptable level of 1-2%. Although the growth of 
earning assets is important, they are intermediary outputs to be used subsequently for 
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generating income. High efficiency in earning assets expansion does not necessarily 
resuit in high efficiency in income génération. Efficiency estimâtes from the earning 
assets-based model could be inflated by high level of NPLs being included in the total 
loans as the output. Since NPLs generate no income but extra costs, the efficiency 
estimated by income-based model vvill be low. 
The efficiency curves are flatter in Figure 6.2 (a) than in Figure 6.2 (b) until 2001, 
indicating that banks have focused on earning assets growth rather than the 
profitability and recoverability of thèse earning assets. Thereafter, the curves become 
relatively steeper in Figure 6.2 (a) compared with those in Figure 6.2 (b), suggesting 
that banks have become more profitability conscious instead of pursuing rapid 
growing of earning assets. During the second half of the sample period, unchanged 
efficiency in earning assets growing is associated with increased efficiency in income 
génération. The suggestion is that assets quality has been improved, consistent with 
the progresses being made in solving NPL problems. Our results demonstrate a real 
improvement in bank efficiency for the banking system as a whole. 
SOCBs are the bedrock of the Chinese banking System and it is imperative to 
examine their performance in more détail. The average technical efficiency of 
individual SOCBs is plotted in Figure 6.3 (a) for Model 1 and Figure 6.3 (b) for 
Model 2. The performance of SOCBs has been improved with similar pattern in both 
income-based model and the earning-based model. Wider dispersion in performance 
observed in Model 1 implies greater différences among SOCBs in the ability to 
generate income. In Model 2, the performance of individual SOCBs was very 
différent during the first three years, while becoming almost identical for the rest of 
the sample period. 
Specifically, on average, BOC and CCBC have out-performed ICBC and A B C in 
both models. Figures show that BOC was hit more seriously than other SOCBs by 
systematic shock of Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 perhaps because it was involved 
more deeply in international businesses, The technical efficiency of A B C has 
increased slightly in the income-based Model 1, but much faster in the earning assets-
based Model 2. A B C has been identified as the least efficient bank and its average 
efficiency is lower than other SOCB by about 20% in Model 1. However, it has been 
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almost as efficient as other SOCBs in Model 2. The resuit shows that higher 
efïiciency in earning assets growth does not necessarily lead to high effîciency in 
generating income. 
Figure 6.3 Mean technical effîciency of SOCBs 
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Notes: SOCB = state-owned commercial bank: A B C - Agricultural Bank of China, B O C = Bank of China, 
C C B C = China Construction Bank Corporation, ICBC = Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 
Based on above argument, one methodological conclusion could be made that the 
income-based model is superior to the earning assets-based models in measuring bank 
performance as far as our sample banks are concerned, while the latter provides 
additional useful information. In the présence of high level of NPLs, if its effects on 
effîciency cannot be effectively controlled because of the insufficient data, income-
based model is recommended to provide more reliable effîciency estimate while 
earning assets-based model could be used as complément. 
Literature on the relationship between bank size and effîciency is not conclusive and 
the évidence is mixed. Positive relationship lias been reported in Leightner and Lovetl 
(1998) for Thailand, Kraft et al. (2006) for Croatia, Yildirim (2002) for Turkey and 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) for US. However, Leightner and Lovell (1998) lind 
medium-sized banks are the most efficient banks in Malaysia, while Girardone, et al. 
(2004) find no clear relationship between assets size and bank effîciency in Italia. 
In order to investigate the relationship between bank effîciency and banks size, banks 
are classified into four groups based on their size measured by total assets. The 
•-+-ABC -«-BOC-t-CCB-*- ICBC' - • - A B C - * - B 0 C - * - C C B - x — I C B C ' 
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criteria used to group banks are îhe same as Chen et al. (2005). Group 1 consists of 
banks whose total assets are greater than 1 trillion RMB (about 125 billion USD), 
including four SOCBs and Bank of communication. Group 2 contains banks whose 
total assets are less than 1 trillion RMB but greater than 100 billion R M B ($ 12.5 
billion to $125 billion), consisting of ail JSCBs except for China Evergrowing bank 
and Bank of Communications and two CCBs—Bank of Beijing and Bank of 
Shanghai. Group 3 includes CCBs mainly whose total assets lie between 10 billion 
and 100 billion RMB ($ 1.25 billion to 12.5 billion). Banks in group 4 are foreign 
banks with total assets less than 10 billion RMB ($ 1.25 billion). 
The estimated mean technical efficiencies for differently sized banks from différent 
models are presented in Table 6.5. In gênerai, large and medium-sized banks in 
Group 1 and Group 2 outperform smaller banks in Group 3 and Group 4. Model 1 and 
Model 2 yield différent best performing bank group. Medium-sized banks are more 
efficient than large banks in income-based model, while large banks outperform 
medium-sized banks by in earning assets-based model. In other words. large banks 
enjoy économies of scale in earning assets génération and deposits collection, while 
medium-sized banks are superior in Controlling costs and generating income. Given 
the superiority of the income-based model, the results are consistent with literature 
that medium-sized banks are generally more efficient than large banks. Excessive 
costs on administration, overstaffing, remote controls for larger banks outweigh the 
gains from économies of scale claimed for them. 
Table 6.5 Mean technical efficiency by bank size (1995-2005) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Model 1 0.76 0.85 0.65 0.60 
Model 2 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.41 
Model 3 
0.86 0.78 0.71 0.52 
Group I: total assets>! trillion R M B ; Group 2: 100 billion RMB<lotal assels<l trillion R M B : Group 3: 
10 billion RMB<total assets<100 billion R M B : Group 4: total assets< 10 billion R M B . 
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6.3.2 Results of the technical inefficiency effects model 
The results of the technical inefficiency effects model (shown in Table 6.6) explore 
the relationship between bank performance and institutional changes and banks' risk-
taking characteristics. Information from thèse relationships is more relevant to policy 
makers by differentiating effects of différent forms of governance structure and its 
changes. In Table 6.6, the exogenous variables are presented and will be discussed in 
the order of (1) four static effect indicator, FBs—No Change, JSCBs—No Change, 
SOCBs—No Change, and Listed Banks; (2) two sélection effect indicators, Selected 
for Foreign Acquisition and Selected for IPO; (3) four dynamic effect indicators, 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition and Underwent IPO, of which two for capturing 
short-term effects and two for long-term effects; (4) four rîsk taking indicators, Equity 
Leverage Ratio, LLR to Total Loans Ratio, Interbank Borrowing to Total Deposits 
ratio, Total loans to total Deposits ratio; (5) a time trend t and GDP. The first static 
indicator, CCBs—No Change, is omitted for comparison purpose. The control group is 
city commercial banks with no governance changes, which is not the group of entire 
CCBs. The négative coefficient on the time trend in the inefficiency function reveals 
that the inefficiencies of production tended to decrease by 5% per year. The négative 
sign of the coefficient on GDP growth suggests that favourable macroeconomic 
condition of an economy has a positive impact on bank performance. 
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Table 6.6 Estimated parametcrs of technical efficiency effects model 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coefficient [-ratio Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient l-ratio 
Governance Effect Indicators 
Static Effect Indicators 
FBs--No Change ( J , ) 0.156 0.895 -0.043 -0.341 -0.254 -1.357 
JSCBs--No Change ( £ 2 ) -0.665*** -4.494 -0.495*** -4.433 -0.392** -2.637 
SOCBs--No Change (S3 ) -0.256 -1.087 -0.576** -2.853 -0.472** -1.873 
Lislcd Banks (ÖA ) -0.743*** -3.946 0.026 0.249 0.330** 2.253 
Selection Effect Indicators 
Selectcd Cor Foreign Acquisilion (S5) -0.431*** -4.097 -0.207** -3.290 -0.221** -2.570 
Seleclcd for]]>0(<56) 0.099 0.494 -0.406*** -3.639 -0.715*** -4.953 
Dynamic Effect Indicators 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition—ST ( S1 ) -0.351 -1.078 0.242* 1.733 0.090 0.433 
Underwent IPO—ST(SB) -0.707* -1.557 -0.792*** -3.493 -0.445 -0.200 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition—LT (S l)) -0.079 -1.03 -0.220*** -7.674 -0.156*** -3.769 
Underwent IPO—LT {S]Q) 0.064 0.523 -0.039 -0.314 0.003 0.005 
Risk Taking Indicators 
Capital Risk( Sn ) -0.287*** -3.859 0.004 0.068 0.083 1.192 
Credit Risk (S,2) -0.050* -1.347 -0.023 -0.910 -0.061* -1.652 
Market Risk (ön ) 0.088** 2.167 0.173*** 5.838 0.237*** 4.668 
Liquidity Risk {SH ) 0.099 1.246 0.596*** 4.329 0.099 0.684 
-0.096*** -5.364 -0.124*** -6.532 -0.106*** -4.771 
-0.219 -0.587 -0.077 -0.321 -0.058** -1.859 
Notes: ( 1 ) CCBs-no Change is omitted as base case; (2) *, **, *** indicate significance Icvel at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (3) Negative sign of the estimated coefficient indicates 
that the particular variable lias a positive effect on production efficiency and vice versa. 
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The estimated coefficients on static effect indicators measure the long-term 
performance effects of maintaining a constant ownership structure by comparing with 
the control group—city commercial banks that underwent no governance changes 
over the whole sample period. Coefficients on FBs—No Change (ôx) from three 
empirical model spécifications are insignificant with mixed signs, suggesting that the 
performance of foreign banks is not significantly différent from that of the control 
group. Coefficients on JSCBs-No Change(ô2) are négative and highly significant at 
5% or higher level in ail models, indicating that JSCBs are significantly more 
efficient CCBs by 66 % in income-based model and by more than 40% in earning 
assets-based models. Régression results on SOCBs—No Change (ô3) from Model 1 
show that the performance of SOCBs with no governance change are not significant 
différent from the performance of the control group in terms of profitability. However, 
SOCBs are more efficient than the control group in terms of earning asset growing at 
the significance level of 5% in Model 2 and Model 3. SOCBs are less efficient than 
JSCBs, suggested by relatively less significant estimated coefficients. 
The coefficient on Listed Banks (ô4) is significant and négative in Model 1, 
suggesting listed banks are on average significantly more efficient in income 
génération than CCBs with no governance changes by 74 %. In contrary to this resuit, 
they are less efficient in producing earning assets perceived in Model 2 and Mode! 3. 
Looking at results of three models together, it is indicative that listed banks opérate 
more prudentially in investment and crédit expansion relative to other banks. Better 
performance is the expected conséquence of better controlled asset quality and 
superior management in listed banks. 
Moving on to the sélection effects indicators, coefficients of the sélection effect 
indicators, Seiectedfor Foreign Acquisition (ô5) and Selectedfor IPO ( Sb). quantify 
the différences in performance before banks being selected for foreign acquisition or 
going public. Coefficients on Selected for Foreign Acquisition {Ss) are négative and 
significant at 1% or 5% levéis in ail three models. Foreign investors have carefully 
cherry-picked domestic banks that on average outperformed the control group by 
43% in income-based Model 1 and by 20% in earning assets-based Model 2 and 
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Model 3. The magnitude of estimated coefficients demonstrates that foreign investors 
emphasise more on the efficiency of income génération than the efficiency of earning 
assets production. Thèse results provide strong évidence for the présence of sélection 
effects that foreign investors have chosen better performed domestic banks to acquire. 
Coefficients on Selectedfor IPO (Sh) indicate that banks selected for going public are 
not significantly more efficient than the control group in income-based Model 1, 
suggesting no sélection effects in IPO in terms of profitability. When eliminating the 
effects of two most récent IPOs of BOC and ICBC in 2006. the régression results 
show a significant sélection effect for going public in the same model. highlighting 
the effects of récent SOCBs reform. In earning assets-based Model 2 and Model 3, 
banks being chosen for IPO are significantly more efficient that the control group 
since coefficients on Selected for IPO (<56) are négative and statistically significant at 
1% level. The explanation for thèse results is that IPO has been recently used by 
Chinese govemment as a strategy of SOCBs reform rather than choosing banks on the 
pure financial considérations. The technical efficiency of SOCBs is low in generating 
income but relative high in earning assets growing, which has influenced the 
estimated coefficients on sélection effect indicators. 
The exploration of the dynamic effects of governance changes on bank performance 
could provide more fruitful information on banking reform in China. Coefficient on 
dynamic effects indicators measures the différence in performance before and after 
governance changes. Underwent Foreign Acquisition-ST (ô1) and Underwent IPO-
ST (ô%) account for short-term effects and Underwent Foreign Acquisition-LT (ô9) 
and Underwent IPO-IT (Sl0) account for the effects realizable in a longer time 
period. 
Estimated coefficients on Underwent Foreign Acquisition-ST (S7) have mixed sings 
and insignificant. A négative coefficient in Model 1 suggests a possible short-term 
efficiency gain in income génération following the foreign acquisition. In contrast, 
coefficients are positive in earning assets-based Model 2 and Model 3, suggesting 
efficiency losses in production of earning assets after foreign acquisition. The 
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explanation for this lowered performance could be the results of more prudential 
practice in lending and investing activities compared with previous careless ones. 
However, foreign acquisition has found to have more favourable effects on 
performance in a longer term, suggested by the negative coefíicients on Undenvent 
Foreign Acquisition-LT (Ó\) in all three models. Both Model 2 and Model 3 suggest 
that insignificant short-term efficieney losses have been turned into efficieney gains 
in the long-term, vvhile Model 1 has yet shown such an improvement in performance. 
Thus, a conclusión is that the strategy of foreign acquisition has a positive effect on 
the banking performance but it is realized in a longer term. This ñnding is consistent 
with Hasan and Marton (2003) that fínd banks with higher foreign bank ownership 
involvement were associated with improved efficieney. 
The impact of the strategy of IPO has been found to be different from that of foreign 
acquisition. A short-term positive effect on performance has been found as the 
coefficients on Underwent IFO-S'F (S&) are negative in all three models and 
significant in Model 1 and Model 2. However, these efficieney gains tend to fade in 
the long-term as the coefficients on Underwent IPO-LT (¿>l0) become positive in all 
three models although not significant. In other words, improvement in performance 
is not sustainable in the long run. 
There are a number of possible explanations for this unexpected result. The first 
explanation is that as time goes by, the increase in extra costs outweighs the 
efficieney gains from being Usted. Such costs may include ageney costs, costs on 
complying with regulations of the stock markets, and costs on more extensive 
disclosure and reporting requirements. The second explanation is that the short-term 
efficieney gains are the result of beautifying effects of measures taken in order for 
attracting investors before and shortly after the IPO. Over a longer period, the true 
performance surfaces since beautifying effects cannot last for long without 
fundamental improvement in their operations and management. The final explanation 
is that banks have performed better after going public with new professional 
behaviours because of better corporate governance and market discipline in place. 
However. as time elapses, it is likely that banks behave as their previous inefficient 
routine since no clear evidence has been found to suggest that SOCB have changed 
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behaviours and have become market oriented in their management and opérations 
(Podpiera, 2006). 
The findings from thèse governance effect indicators, especially four dynamic effects 
indicators, have shed important lights on policy implications regarding banking 
reform in China. Attracting foreign stratégie investor is one major strategy taken by 
the government in the process of SOCBs privatization. Our empirical results have 
shown the long term positive effect on bank performance after short-term losses, 
providing strong évidence for this strategy. IPO is the other important privatization 
strategy implemented by government in banking reform. Domestic banks, especially 
SOCBs, have been encouraged to be listed on stock exchange. Through IPO, banks 
could raise much-deeded capital in domestic and international markets. Meanwhile, 
IPO could impose market pressure on banks to improve performance. Our empirical 
results show that IPO itself cannot resuit in better performance. Without fundamental 
changes in management and opérations, without effectively fonction in g corporate 
governance in place, any gains are temporary. One suggestion is that the reasons for 
the négative long-term effects of IPO should be followed up. If necessary, steps 
should be taken to assist in the future implementation of the IPO strategy or amend it. 
The coefficients on risk taking indicators show the relationship between risk taking 
préférence of banks and performance. Capital risk ( £ , , ) is found to be positively 
associated with performance in Model l , while the opposite is true in Model 2 and 
Model 3. Crédit risk (Su) is negatively associated with performance for ail three 
model. A higher the L L R to total loan ratio indicates a low crédit risk, which in turn 
brings a better performance. Both market risk (£) ) 3)and liquidity risk ( J u )a re found 
to be negatively associated with banks' technical efficiency and most are statistically 
significant for ail three models. Banks are less efficient if they dépend more on 
borrowings from the wholesale market than collecting deposits from the retail market. 
They also tend to be less efficient when facing more liquidity risks. 
The coefficients onthe time trend variable in the technical inefficiency effects model 
are négative and significant for ail three empirical spécifications. That implies bank 
efficiency has bank improved by about 10% per year. GDP growth is also found to 
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have a positive impact on banks efficiency in all three empirical models although not 
all coefficients are statistically significant. Hence, a favourable macroeconomic 
condition of an economy has a positive impact on bank performance. 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter examined the technical efficiency of the main Chinese commercial 
banks over the period 1995-2005. This period featured with drastic and intensive 
bank reforms, including significant institutional changes in all types of commercial 
banks. The relationship between bank performance and institutional changes is 
examined. The primal approach is the estimation of a stochastic distance function 
which requires no behavioural assumptions imposed on producers. 
This chapter makes two contributions to the research methodology. The first 
contribution is the development of an empirical model to estimate technical efficiency 
based on a distance function, the one-step stochastic frontier model and the method of 
Berger et al. (2005). The model is constructed by incorporating advantages and 
avoiding disadvantages of those existing approaches and methods. The second 
contribution is the examination of different specifications of the income-based model 
and the earning assets-based model. Various models combining different output and 
input variables depict different aspects of bank efficiency. The income-based model is 
proved to be superior to the earning assets-based model, at least for our dataset from 
China. The choice of empirical model is important when studying bank efficiency, 
especially in developing countries and transition economies where assets quality is 
generally low. Our suggestion is that both models should be used to analyze banks 
efficiency. Different estimates from alternative models could yield more valuable 
information and draw a more complete picture on bank performance. 
The estimated average efficiency is moderate at 70%, implying that there exists 
significant room for efficiency improvement. Joint-stock commercial banks are found 
to be the most efficient group, while foreign banks are the least efficient (static 
effects). Notwithstanding considerable reforming efforts made by the government, the 
performance of SOCBs is still poor (static effect), requiring a continuous in-depth 
reform. 
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The underlying reason for low efficiency of SOCBs is likely to be the persistence of 
the govemment intervention in lending décision, albeit explicitly. It is uncertain 
whether this implicit intervention could be reversed in the near future. The 1 l I h Five-
Year Plan approved by the National People's Congress in 2006 addresses the growing 
rural-urban and regional inequality and projects to balance the urban and rural 
development through urbanization. There are more needs for employment to absorb 
surplus labour force from rural-urban migration. The rôle of SOCBs is uncertain and 
they are more likely to be expected to assist in the achievement of the overall goals 
and to provide necessary finance. In this regard, their economic objectives of 
profitability and efficiency might give way to the overall national development goal. 
The implication is that government influence might remain and the reform of 
transforming SOCBs to truly commercial banks might take longer. 
Strong cherry-picking effects have been found for the foreign acquisition strategy, 
that is, foreign investors have selected well performed banks for acquisition. The 
foreign acquisition strategy is found to have positive impact on bank performance in 
the long run after suffering from short term efficiency losses. Institutional changes in 
the form of foreign equity participation in domestic banks have forced banks to 
become more efficient. Our results have provided economic justification for the 
strategy of foreign acquisition. 
As for the going public strategy (i.e., IPO), it is aslo found to have a sélection effect. 
The sélection effect, however, is not as strong as that of the foreign acquisition 
strategy. Going public, or IPO, was used by the government as an important reform 
method to fundamentally transform the SOCBs. Although the intention of IPO is 
similar to that of foreign acquisition, the latter differs from the former in that foreign 
investors only select the best domestic banks for stratégie investment, irrespective of 
whether the domestic banks are listed or not. The sélection effects in IPO were 
diluted by two SOCBs' IPOs in 2006. Our empirical results show that banks realized 
efficiency gains in the short run but such gains appear to fade in the long run. While 
the effects are insignifiant, the deteriorating trend is worrisome. The government 
should follow up this adverse trend and correct it by taking steps to make 
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fundamental changes in management and opérations in order to build up good 
corporate governance for the listed SOCBs. 
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Chapter 7 Cost and profit efficiency of Chinese banks 
7.0 Preamble 
Employing the same one-step SFA BC95 model, this chapter assesses the 
performance of Chinese banks using the concepts of cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency. Behavioural assumptions are that producers are cost minimisers or profit 
maximisers. or both. As producers may behave differently, there are déviations of 
actual performance from the best practice. The déviations are called 'inefficiencies' 
which are usually represented by the composite errors in a particular cost or profit 
function in empirical analysis. 
A dual approach that estimâtes a cost or profit function rather a production function is 
commonly employed in empirical efficiency study on industries producing multiple 
outputs. When behavioural assumptions of cost minimization or profit maximization 
are appropriate, a cost or profit function is used as the représentation of the structure 
of a multi-outputs production technology. Against the estimated cost and/or profit 
frontier, cost or profit efficiency can be derived (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). 
Thèse économie efficiency concepts are based on économie foundations since thèse 
measures account for not only the use of technology in the production process but 
also the production optimization for the given market priées and compétition 
condition (Berger and Mester, 1997). The assumptions of cost minimization and 
profit maximization are considered to be appropriate during our sample period 1995-
2005 because ail banks are legally defmed as commercial banks under the Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks since 1995. The main objective of 
commercial banks is clearly defmed as profit maximization, which apparenlly 
requires cost minimization at the same time. 
The purposes of this chapter are threefold. First, it addresses a methodological issue 
by investigating the effects on efficiency estimâtes of choosing a particular functional 
form for the cost or profit function. Secondly, it investigates the différence in the use 
of market average input priées or banks' spécifie input priées by comparing their 
impacts on estimated efficiency. Finally. this paper provides more précise 
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performance assessment for Chinese commercial banks in terms of cost and profit 
efficiency. 
Thls chapter is set out as follows. Section 7.1 reviews the literature on bank cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, including methodological issues in the estimation of 
the stochastic cost and profit frontiers. Section 7.2 describes methodology, including 
the définition of Outputs and input price and the spécification of empirical models. 
Section 7.3 discusses estimation results and Section 7.4 draws conclusions. 
7.1 Brief literature review on cost and profit efficiency study 
Cost efficiency is an aggregate measure of performance since its changes indicate 
relative progress that a bank has made with its specific characteristics within the 
gênerai economic environment. ïhere are three principal reasons for the investigation 
of bank cost efficiency (Fries and Taci, 2005). First, the improvement in cost 
efficiency may be the conséquence of the changes in incentives and constraints in 
banking. structural and institulional reforms, and the more efficient provision of 
public services by the state. Second, the improvement in cost efficiency of a banking 
System could contribute directly to the overall economic development through 
reducing the usage of resources in the opération of payments Systems and the 
intermediation of savings into Investments. Third, the improvement in cost efficiency 
could contribute indirectly to other aspects of bank performance and to the overall 
economic development as a whole. For instance, more productive loans made by 
banks in a more cost efficient manner could promote performance of other sectors. 
Cost efficiency is defined as the ratio of minimum feasible cost to actual cost 
observed, which is bounded between zéro and unity. It measures how close a bank's 
costs to the costs of a best practice bank for producing the same bündle of Outputs 
using the same bündle of inputs under the same conditions, adjusted for random 
errors. Cost efficiency can be obtained by estimating a cost function, in which the 
dépendent variable is the total cost and explanatory variables include input priées, 
output quantifies, and any fixed inputs and Outputs. The disturbance term is assumed 
to have two components: vl( representing measurement error and other uncontrollable 
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factors, and un representing cost inefficiency. The frontier approach asserts that 
managerial or controllable inefficiencies («,,) increase costs above the frontier (the 
best-practice levels), which are themselves subject to random fluctuations ( vu ). 
Estimated cost inefficiencies can be further decomposed into input-oriented technical 
efficiency and input allocative efficiency. The former is caused be excessive 
utilization of inputs quantifies and the latter is due to relative higher prices of inputs 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Berger and Mester, 1997). 
A generalized form of a cost function is given in Equation (7.1) 
I n Q =/(w, r >' / r z t t S v t t ) + lnM„ +lne j 7 (7.1) 
where In dénotes natural logarithm; Ctr measures the i-th bank's total costs for 
the period f; /(.) represents a functional form; w is a vector of input prices; y is a 
vector of Output quantifies; z is the quantifies of any fixed netputs; uu is an 
inefficiency factor measuring possible increased costs beyond the best-practice 
level; and eH is random errors. 
Profit efficiency can be derived by estimating a profit function based on the duality 
theory. A standard profit function assumes that both input prices and output prices are 
exogenous to banks. That is, banks are price-takers in both input and output markets. 
The profit maximization can only be achieved through altering the combination of 
controllable input and output quantifies (Berger and Mester, 1997; Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). Compétitive market argument could ensure the exogeneity of input and 
output prices, whereas perfect compétition for banks sometimes is questionable. 
In response to the circumstances where the assumptions underlying a standard profit 
function are not satisfied, an alternative profit efficiency measure has been developed 
by assuming that banks can exercise a degree of market power in setting output prices. 
The alternative profit function approach is regarded to be advantageous in studying 
efficiency in the banking industry over a standard profit function approach (Berger 
and Mester, 1997 and DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). First, it enables the estimation of 
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profit efficiency when the prices of certain outputs, such as transaction services and 
fee-based transactions, are unavailable or hard to be measured reliably. Secondly, the 
variation in output quantities is likely to be more variable across banks than the 
variation in output prices. Thirdly, the unmeasured differences in the quality of 
services provided by banks could be better controlled in the alternative profit function. 
The extra costs spent on improving output quality are offset against extra 
corresponding revenue in the alternative profit function, while these costs are 
accounted as inefficiencies in a cost function. Finally, alternative profit efficiency 
better control for the heterogeneity in bank size by including output quantities rather 
than output prices. Alternative profit efficiency reflects the bank's ability to generate 
profits at the same output levels for different-sized banks. This approach could reduce 
possible scale bias in profit efficiency estimation when optimal output levels cannot 
be reached by small banks. 
A logged form alternative profit efficiency function is given in Equation (7.2). 
In (/r,, + 9) = f{w„ .yt! ,z, , v, ) + In uu - In eu (7.2) 
where nk measures the /th bank's profit for the period /; 9 is a constant added to 
every firm's profit to avoid taking logarithm on a negative or zero value. A l l other 
variables are the same as in the cost function in Equation (7.1) except for the 
disturbance term that is (v„ + uu ) in a cost function due to the fact that managerial 
inefficiency increases the total costs above the best practical level, while it 
becomes (yu-uu)'m a profit function because managerial inefficiency reduces 
profits below the best practice level. 
Similar to cost efficiency, profit efficiency is defined as the ratio of actual profit to 
predicted maximum profit. It measures how close a bank's profit to the profit of a 
best practiced bank for producing the same bundle of outputs using the same bundle 
of inputs with given input and output prices, adjusted for random errors. For many 
banks, profit maximization is an ultimate goal. Hence, profit efficiency is considered 
more suitable to evaluate the overall performance since it simultaneously addresses 
efficiency in cost savings and efficiency in revenue generation (Berger and Mester, 
1997; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Moreover, the shortfall in profits from maximal 
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levels is caused by deficient revenues rather than excessive costs, since output 
efficiencies are generally found to be lower than input efficiencies (Berger et al., 
1993; Akhavein et al., 1997). 
A one-step BC95 model for estimating a cost function is shown as Equation (7.3). 
toQ, =//jCw,j/,z>v) + M i ( +£u (7.3) 
where the uh are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations of the 
N(mil,crl!) distribution and mlt=zltS where z„ is a px \ vector of variables 
which may influence the efficiency of a bank and S is a 1 x p vector of parameters 
to be estimated. 
The essence of SFA is the pre-specification of production, cost or profit function in 
an appropriate functional form. While the Cobb-Douglas and translog forms are 
commonly employed in the literature, more recent studies have increasingly 
employed a Fourier Flexible functional form, for example, Altunbas et al. (2000), 
Rao, (2005), DeYoung and Hasan, (1998), and Mitchell and Onvural, (1996). Fourier 
flexible functions are first introduced by Gallant (1981). It adds non-parametric 
Fourier series to a translog function that only represents a second-order Taylor series 
and local approximation for an arbitrary function. Variables are transformed into 
trigonometric terms of the 0, 2K (radians interval), providing a global approximation 
and therefore a better fit of a broader range of curves. Fourier functional forms are 
stable because they contain a translog specification which centres on the sample 
average, while they are flexible due to the Fourier trigonometric terms which consider 
observations far away from the average. The flexible Fourier form represents a semi-
non-parametric approach to the problem of using the data to infer inter-relationship 
among the variables when the true functional form of the relationships is unknown. 
More recently, researchers have been in favour of the global approximation of the 
Fourier flexible functional forms rather than the local approximation of a translog 
form in bank efficiency study because of its smaller approximation errors and the 
resultant more precise estimates of efficiency measure (Kraft et al., 2006; McAllister 
and McManus. 1993; Girardone, et al., 2004; Huang and Wang, 2004; Elbadawi et al., 
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1983 and Chalfant and Gallant, 1985). However, other studies, such as Berger and 
Mester (1997), find the difference betvveen the translog form and Fourier Flexible 
form are negligible. The literature has a consensus regarding which functionat form is 
better over others and this is one of the objectives of this chapter to examine the 
effects of employing different function forms on efficiency estimation. 
Two methodological issues have recently arisen in bank efficiency study. The first 
issue is whether to estímate an industry 'best practice' frontier or to estimate sepárate 
frontiers for different ownership categories. The former is a commonly used approach 
based on the argument that alí firms in the marketplace face the same external 
macroeconomic environment and they are subject to similar market conditions 
regardless of ownership types. Estimated efficiency scores are comparable since they 
are derived against the same industry 'best practice' frontier. The latter approach 
argües that different types of firms may adopt different production technology and 
therefore using pooled industry frontier could confound ínefficiencies and the effects 
of technology choice (Mester, 1993). This more rigorous approach timits cross-firm 
comparison to the same ownership type and fails to compare the efficiencies of 
different types of firms. Thus, it is of limited usefulness when concerning bank 
liberalization and privatization (Altunbas et al., 2001). The research interest of this 
study is to differentiate the impacts of bank reform measures (mainly ownership 
change) on performance at the industry level. Thus, a single frontier approach appears 
more appropriate which enables the comparison of efficiencies among banks with 
different ownership types and helps identify better performing ownership. 
The second issue is the input price misspecification first noticed by Mountain and 
Thomas (1999). The cost function approach assumes some substitutability between 
inputs through a choice of technologies. ít thus implicitly assumes that banks face 
imperfect factor markets, such as labour and capital markets, where input prices vary 
among banks. Factor prices are usually calculated by dividing total cost attributable to 
a factor by the number of units utilized. Mountain and Thomas (1999) observe that 
labour prices obtained in such a vvay is out of the reasonable range and they attribute 
a wide variety of labour prices to labour heterogeneity. They argüe that financial 
capital price might also be mis-specified. They suggest mis-specified input price 
variables should be dropped in a cross-sectional study, while in a panel analysis input 
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prices should be properly specified. This is another issue addressed by the present 
study by examining the effects of using different price specifications on the cost and 
profit efficiency estimation. 
7.2 Variable definitions and enipirical model specifications 
7.2.1 Variable definitions 
The same as in chapter 6, input and Output variables are defined using a modified 
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), which treats interest costs on 
deposit as an input along with capital and labour inputs. and treats total deposits as 
an Output. The cost function and alternative profit function contain identically defined 
input and Output variables. They have three Outputs—total loans, other earning assets 
and deposits; two variable inputs—cost of fund and cost of labour; and one fixed 
netput—equity. To capture the Hicksian neutral technical progress on efficiency, 
linear and quadratic trend terms as well as its interaction terms are included in the 
cost and alternative profit models. Table 7.1 provides a summary statisücs for input 
prices and Outputs used in the cost and profit frontier models. The definitions of 
Outputs, inputs prices are given in the notes to Table 7.1. 
The price of funds is defined in a normal way as the ratio of total interest expenses to 
total interest bearing funds. Theoretically, the price of labour and the price of physical 
capital should be measured separately in the estimation of cost and profit efficiency 
models. Because data on the number of employees and personnel expenses for 
Chinese banks in the sample are unavailable, this study uses available data to. 
construct one best price approximation for labour and physical capital together—the 
ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets. It is a common approach to define 
labour and physical capital prices in bank efficiency literaturę, especially for 
researchers investigating bank efficiency in transition and developing countries using 
BankScope as a major data source. The approach is first used by Hasan and Marton 
(2003) and followed by Fries and Taci (2005), Patti and hardy (2005), Bonin et al 
(2005a, b). 
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Foliowing Mester (1996), equity capital is included in the model to contro] for the 
différence in risk préférences, which are expected to improve the accuracy of bank 
efficiency estimâtes. Berger and Mester (1997) support the inclusion of equity in the 
cost function. They argue that equity acts as a cushion to absorb losses and so the 
level of equity affects bank insolvency risk. Bank insolvency risk. in tum, affects the 
bank costs because an insolvent bank needs to have a risk premium on the funds. The 
inclusion of equity in a cost function is particularly important in transition économies 
since the insolvency risk of banks is high due to high level NPLs. Moreover, equity 
needs to be considered in cost efficiency estimation since it is more costly as an 
alternative to deposits and interbank borrowing in financing loans. 
Both cost and profit functions assume that banks face exogenously determined input 
priées in compétitive factor markets so that the behavioural assumptions of costs 
minimization and profit maximization become reasonable (Fare and Primont, 1995). 
However, in most cost and profit efficiency studies, input priées are calculated by 
dividing total factor expenses by the total units of factors employed, resulting in bank 
specific inputs priées. For instance, the price of funds is the ratio of interests paid on 
deposits and interbank borrowings to the total borrowed funds. By implicitly 
assuming imperfect factor markets, conventional endogenously computed input priées 
could be mis-specified, which could resuit in biased efficiency estimâtes (Mountain 
and Thomas, 1999). 
Only a few studies have attempted to construct exogenously determined market priées 
to estimate cost and/or profit efficiency in the awareness of the potential problem of 
endogenously calculated input priées. Such studies include Patti and hardy (2005), 
Berger and Mester (2003), DeYoung and Hasan (1998), Bos and Kool (2006) and 
Koetter (2005). Among thèse studies, only Bos and Kool (2006) and Koetter (2005) 
investigate the impact of différent input price measurements on cost and profit 
efficiency. They find that the issue of input price measurement matters and they 
suggest the use of proper defined market input priées. 
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Table 7.1 Mean sample descriptive statistics and variable définitions 
by govemance indicators in R M B million in 1995 prices 
CCB_all CCB_no FB_all JSCB_all JSCB_no S O C B _ a l l S O C B _ n o Listed Fortsei List sei 
Outpuls and Inputs and other financial figures 
Total costs (C ) 1,479 1,185 253 6,911 6,863 151,156 96,086 20,806 45,728 70,150 
Profit (TT ) 461 348 164 1,863 1,711 16,972 6,575 5,049 6,166 9,443 
Total loans (yt ) 19,106 14,770 1,752 114,949 112,553 1,675,942 1,500,546 322,294 493,743 756,860 
Other earning assets ( y2 ) 17,352 12,685 1,500 77,283 72,679 1,007,263 656,118 208,258 324,532 494,679 
Total deposits (y3 ) 30,427 22,732 2,109 147,254 148,634 2,230,996 1,795,032 437,873 672,955 1,030,032 
Equity (z,) 1,776 1,339 562 7,472 6,600 126,041 90,083 23,772 38,650 59,015 
Total assets (z,) 38,851 29,702 3,361 199,740 200,000 2,885,792 2,335,387 555,494 873,774 1,336,357 
Price of labour and 
physical capital (w, ) 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Price of fund ( w2 ) 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Market price of labour and 
physical capital ( w, ) 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Market price of funds( w2 ) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Risk Taking Indicators 
Capital risk 4.90 5.14 31.93 4.65 3.79 4.35 4.08 4.66 4.78 4.57 
Credit risk 1.29 1.26 2.33 2.24 1.24 1.53 0.91 2.31 1.99 2.06 
Market risk 87.94 80.87 268.53 38.76 37.88 52.57 40.00 27.12 57.51 39.11 
Liquidity risk 70.32 72.48 131.94 79.74 76.96 81.42 97.20 80.61 76.79 77.97 
Source: BankScope and authors' calculation. 
Notes: ( 1 ) C C B = cily commercial bank, FB = forcign bank, JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, S O C B = staic-owncd commercial bank. N O * no changes, Sélection ibreign = sclcclcd ibr 
foreign acquisition, Sélection listing = selected for listing. 
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(2) Variable définitions: 
Total costs (C): in teres t costs, and non-interest expenses that ¡nclu.de costs of labour, physical capital, and loan !oss provisions. 
Profit (rc): profit befnre tax with a constant added to. The constant c-quals the absolute of minimum profit before tax plus one in order to avoid taking natural loganthm on a 
negative value. 
Total loans (y{ ): gross loans including short-ierm loans, medium and long-term loans, impaired loans, and loan loss reserves. 
Other earning assets ( y2 ) : s u m of deposils with central bank and banks, short-term and long-tcnn investments. 
Total deposils ( y^ ): sum of short-ierm customer deposits and long-term deposits. 
Equity { Z[ ): banks' equity capital including capital reserve, capital surplus, paid in capital and retained profits. 
Price of labour and physical capital ( Wl ): the ralio of bank specific non-interest expenses to bank total assets. Non-interest expenses include overhead, olher operaling expense 
and loan loss provision. Because the loan loss provisions are not reported separately from overhead in the earlier periods. they are included in tlie later period lo ensure 
consistency. 
Price of fund ( W2 )'• the ralio of total interest expenses to total interest bearing funds. Intercst expenses include intercsls paid on deposits and inierbank borrowings, while total 
interest bearing funds include deposits. short-term fundingand other funds. 
Market price of labour and physical capital ( w¡ ): the un-weighted average of labour and physical capital priées of other banks for each type of banks excluding the bank own 
price. 
Market price of funds ( W 2 ): the un-weighted average of fund priées of other banks in the market excluding the bank own price. 
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Specifying market average input priées is considered to be advantageous over 
conventional bank specific priées in efficiency study (Berger and Mester, 2003). 
Market average input priées are derived from other banks; data in the market 
excluding the data of the bank under concern. Therefore, they are more exogenous to 
the bank than those priées derived from the bank's own data. Market priées are the 
average priées the bank may face rather than the actual priées paid by the bank. 
Moreover, using market average prices as a benchmark, inappropriate input priées 
taken by banks are treated as inefficiencies rather than being treated as random errors 
resulting from good or bad business conditions. Furthermore, market average prices 
could average out some measurement errors of individual banks. 
This study addresses this issue and investigates the impact of différent input price 
measurements by specifying two sets of inputs prices—conventional bank specific 
prices and market prices. The purposes are twofold. First, it attempts to investigate 
the effects of différent price spécifications on efficiency estimation. The second 
purpose is to obtain more reliable efficiency estimâtes by properly specifying input 
prices. This helps ensure the reliability and quality of further analysis on the effects of 
institutional changes on bank performance. In theory, market prices are expected to 
resuit in better estimation since both cost and alternative profit function assume that 
banks face exogenous input prices prévalent in compétitive markets, rather than bank 
specific input prices. 
When approximating exogenous market input prices, a main issue is to define factor 
markets. Existing studies adopt différent criteria to define factor markets. One 
common way of defining market is by regional location as DeYoung and Hasan 
(1998) and Berger and Mester (2003) where Metropolitan Statistical Areas and non-
M S A counties are defined as markets for the US banks. In addition to geographical 
régions, Bos and Kool (2006) consider the degree of urbanization of the region. 
Koetter (2005) takes account of bank types to define markets by assuming large 
banks in Germany competing in one fédéral input market. Patti and Hardy (2005) 
assume one single market in Pakistan and simply compute the weighted average of 
prices of other banks as exogenous market input prices, where the weights are market 
shares of relevant inputs and Outputs. 
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This study takes into account both the theoretical rationale and the realities of the 
Chínese banking industry when defining factor markets. One single national fund 
market is assumed based on the fact that interest rate structure in China is set by the 
central bank. Fund prices are mainly determined by central bank's interest rate policy 
and commercial banks have been strictly restricted in setting interest rates paid on 
deposits and borrowed funds. Moreover, geographical segments of financia! markets 
with divergent interest rates and asset prices are not commonly reported in China. 
Therefore. one single market for funds is a reasonable assumption. By assuming one 
single fund market. the market average price of fund is computed as the un-weighted 
average price of other banks excluding the bank own price. 
As to labour and physical capital factors, the market is defined by bank types— 
SOCBs, JSCBs, CCBs and FBs. Regional divisions are considered to be inappropriate 
for Chínese banks. Only a small number of banks opérate in one particular market, 
unlike in the US and other developed countries where a large number of similar banks 
opérate in one market. The management of four state-owned banks and most national 
wide joint-stock commercial banks are centralized, which also make the regional 
división impossibíe. Foüowing a bureaucratíc structure, the same bank operates in a 
similar way in setting wages and acquiring physical assets across different regions. 
City commercial banks are local banks located in particular cities. They are subject to 
similar regulations set by central banks and CBRC. Their managerial operations are 
broadly in a similar fashion, although differences exist among CCBs that lócate in 
different áreas such as east coastal and inland áreas. Defining markets by bank types, 
market average prices of labour and physical capital is constructed as the un-weighted 
average prices of other banks excluding the bank own price for each bank type. 
7.2.2 Empirical model specifications 
In cost and profit efficiency studies, the most popular functional form is the translog 
form. Though recent studies have shown an increasing trend using Fourier flexible 
functional form. empirical evidence has been inconclusive regarding which functional 
form is better than the other. This study specifies cost and alternative profit models in 
both translog and Fourier flexible functional forms for two purposes. First it attempts 
to identify better presentation for the production technology employed in the Chínese 
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banking industry by comparing results from translog and Fourier Flexible 
spécifications. Another purpose is to obtain more accurate efficiency estimâtes, which 
in turn, enhance the reliability of findings. 
Translog spécification 
The spécification for the cost fonction in translog form is shown in Equation (7.4) 
l n ( r C / W 2 z 2 ) = a + i > , ln(y;/z 2) + ]>>* l n ( ^ / w 2 ) + X ^ In(2, /z 2 ) + T,r 
/=] k=\ i=\ 
+ 7 Z X P n l n t f 122) ' z*H ^ X Z V * . />v2)ln(^ / w2) 
^ 1 = 1 J = ] ^ * = ] OT=] 
+ 1 Z Z A . I n ( 2 , / 2 2 ) / z 2 ) + i r n r 2 
+ X X E T » HY, / z , ) l n ( ^ / W j ) + i X ^ l n ( y . 7 Z 2 > L N ( Z ' ' ^ ) 
+ Z X ^ l n ( ^ ; wi ) l n ( Z r ' Z 2 ) + Z 7,Mr, i H )T 
tc = l r=] l = ) 
where ln7"C is the natural logarithm of a bank's total costs in a given year; lnK, 
is the natural logarithm of bank outputs quantifies; lnJ^ i s the natural logarithm 
of input priées; l nZ r i s the natural logarithm of fixed netput quantifies; Tïs a time 
trend variable; et is a identical and independently distributed random variable 
which is independent of the //, : pt is a non-negative random variable that is 
assumed to account for inefficiencies. a, fi, y/, <j>, r,w, K, a, and n are unknown 
coefficients to be estimated. 
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According to the duality theorem, a cosl fonction requires standard restrictions of 
linear homogeneity in input priées, which can be imposed by normalizing the total 
costs and input priées by one arbitrarily chosen input price. This study chooses the 
priée of fund as a normalization variable to divide total costs, profits, and labour and 
physical capital price. Thus, 
E n = l ; Z r i - = 0 M "U « ; = 0 for ail j. (7.5) 
k=] k=] Jt=] 
Moreover, the second-order parameters must be symmetric and so 
P„ = Pj, for all iJ\ Wkm = V»,k M ail m,k. (7.6) 
Fourier flexible spécification 
A Fourier flexible model extends the standard translog model by adding Fourier terms. 
Restrictions in Equation (7.5) and Equation (7.6) with respect to the translog model in 
Equation (7.4) need to be held for the translog portion of the Fourier flexible model. 
The spécification of the cost function in Fourier flexible functional form is shown in 
Equation (7.7): 
l n ( rC /w 2 z 2 ) = a + £ / 7 , ln(F,. /z2) + ln(*FA / w 2) + ln(Z r / z 2 ) + rj 
i=l *=1 r=l 
+ ~ Z Z P , / H ) Wt ! *i ) + \ Z Z V*. HWk i W j ) ln(^, / w2 ) 
+ ^ Z Z ^ 1 ^ , / 2 2 ) l n ( 2 . , / z 2 ) + i r „ r 2 
+ Z Z l n t f 7 z2 ) w 7 ^ ) + Z Z l n « 1 z2 ) l n ( z r 1 Zl ) 
i=1 r=l 
+ Z Z HW* / w2 ) ln(Z, / z 2 ) + X lntf / z 2 )7 
* = l r=l 
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+ Trh HWk ( w2)T + 5> r ln(Z r / z , ) r 
3 3 3 
+ X Z Z a w cos(** + xn + XH ) + è"/v, sin(xn + * p + xq ) 
M = l f>=l ((=1 
3 3 
+ Z Z % c o s ( - v « + xp ) + è » p s i n ( * « + \> ) 
3 
+ X flw cos(>„ ) + 6„ sin(x„ ) + In e + In p (7.7) 
where lnTC, l n ^ , lnW f e, l n Z r . T .£i, and fxtare same as defined in Equation 
(7.3); X„are adjusted values of the log of Outputs so that they fall within the 
interval [0.1x2^,0.9x2^] ' ; a, ß , y/, <f>, T,ZU, K, a, r\,a,andb are 
coefficients to be estimated. 
Following the literaturę (Berger and Mester, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2000; Girardone et 
al. 2004 and Williams and Nguyen, 2005), Fourier terms are applied for output 
variables only, leaving the effects of input priées to be determined by the translog 
terms alone. This practice not only limits the number of Fourier terms in the model, 
but also facilitâtes ihe imposition of the usual homogeneity restriction on input priées. 
Total costs, profits, output variables and netput variables are normalized by total 
assets for adjusting scale biases between institutions and controlling 
heteroskedasticity. This normalization also leads to an economically meaningful 
dependent variable of ROA for the alternative profit model. Although equity can also 
1 \n{Yt/z2) are rescaled so that each x „ t e r m falls into the interval o f [0,2*] . Fol lowing Berger and 
Mester (1997), both end of the interval [0.2n] are eut o f f by 10% so that xnto span an interval of 
[0-1 x 2n, 0.9 x 2n ] for reducing approximation problems near thèse endpoints. According to Berger and 
Mester (1997), the rescaling formula is 0.2 - / / t x a, + / / , x ln(y, / r , ) where [a, b] is the range of 
\n(Y,/z2) over the entire 1 l-year time interval, a n d ; / . = (o.9x 2x-0.1 x 2K)/(b, ~at) • 
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be used as the normalization variable, Patti and hardy (2005) suggest thaï the 
normalization by total assets is more appropriate when there are changes in capital 
requirements and provisioning régulations and when there are capital injections into 
the state-owned banks. 
By assuming that banks face exogenously determined output quantities and input 
priées so that they maximize profits through altering output priées and input 
quantities, thïs study estimâtes alternative profit efficiency for the Chinese banks. The 
spécifications of the alternative profit model are identical to the cost models shown in 
Equation (7.4) and Equation (7.7) except for some minor changes. The dépendant 
variable, total cost, is replaced by profit and the inefficiency term becomes - u rather 
than +win the cost function. Although the restriction of linear homogeneity in input 
priées is unnecessary for alternative profit function, it is imposed for keeping the 
functional forms équivalent (Berger and Mester, 2003 and Patti and hardy, 2005). 
The inefficiency effects model of a one-step SFA BC95 model is used for 
investigating the effects of institutions changes on bank cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency. It is shown in Equation (7.8), which is identical to Equation (6.13) in 
Chapter 6. The définitions for variables in Equation (7.8) are also the same as those 
used in Chapter 6 where they have been discussed in detail. For the sake of brevity, it 
is skipped but readers are referred to Chapter 6.3 and Table 6.3 for detail. 
u„ = S0 + J ôaCG„ + £ S„Riskk + SI5GDP + S,tt + s„ (7.8) 
a=\ b = \\ 
where t is a time trend variable; CGU is a vector of governance indicators 
representing various institutional changes; RiskH is a vector of risk taking 
indicators; GDP is the GDP growth rate, representing macroeconomic condition. 
7.3 Empirical results 
7.3.1 The choice of functional form and proxies for input prices 
Estimated parameters and average efficiency from the cost function and profit 
function in both translog and Fourier-flexible forms are reported in Table 7.2 (fuli 
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results are reported in Appendix 1-1 and 1-2). Individual estimated parameters are 
difficult to interpret because of the coilinearity resulting from the présence of second 
order and interaction variables in translog spécifications and additional trigonométrie 
terms in Fourier-flexible spécifications. In efficiency analysis, the coefficients of 
individual variables are of less importance since the main focuses are error terms 
from which to dérive cost and profit inefficiencies. Following conventional practices, 
individual coefficients are not discussed and the overall explanatory power of the 
models is judged by utilizing the re-parameterization of Battese and Corra (1977) in 
the process of maximum likelihood estimation. They replace a] and G] with 
a2 = a2 + cr1- and / = cr02/cr; + cr] . Specifically, o~2 is the sum of squared standard 
déviations of random errors and squared standard déviations of inefficiencies. y is 
the ratio of the standard déviation attributable to inefficiency to the sum of standard 
déviations of random noise and inefficiencies, indicating the proportion of 
inefficiency within the total composite error term. 
In Table 7.2, the estimated parameters for translog (shown in columns 1 and 3) and 
Fourier flexible functional forms (shown in columns 2 and 4) are reported in pairs for 
cost and alternative profit frontiers using différent input priées. On average, both 
translog and Fourier flexible functional forms provide fair présentation of the 
technology structure of the bank production process in China. In gênerai, there is no 
significant différence between two functional forms in terms of likelihood estimâtes 
and the significance of coefficients within each model spécification. The values oïy, 
log likelihood function, and LR tests for one-sided errors are reasonably high and ail 
statistically différent from zéro. The finding is consistent with Rao (2005) and Kraft 
(2006) that compare translog SFA model and Fourier flexible SFA model for 
choosing a better functional form. 
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Table 7.2 Estimated paramcters of cost frontier and profit frontier 
Bank specific input prices Market average input prices 
Translog (1) Fourier-flexible (2) Translog (3) Fourier-flexible (4) 
Panel A: Cost function 
Total loans (y[ ) 0.41+(1.48) 0.45*(1.68) 1.06 (0.65) 2.19** (2.22) 
Other caming assets (y2 ) 0.56**(2.30) 0.58**(2.47) 0.61 (0.39) 1.78** (1.90) 
Total deposits (_y3) 0.09(0.52) 0.06(0.32) 3.78*** . (3.70) 1.04* (1-39) 
Labour and physical capital price( w, or wl) 0.46***(6.79) 0.44***(6.65) 1.81** (2.55) -1.57** (-2.21) 
Equity (z,) -0.02(-0.92) 0.006(0.07) -0.48 (-1.28) 1.94*** (4.14) 
Time trend (/) -0.01(-0.12) -0.0U-0.76) -0.05 (-0.44) 0.52*** (4.00) 
Gamma (y) 0.69*** 0.77*** 0.97*** 0.99*** 
Sigma-squared (<r2) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 
Log likelihood function 560 574 41 80 
LR test of one-sided error 217 215 247 210 
Mean cost efficiency 0.94 0.94 0.54 0.75 
Panel B: Alternative profit function 
Total loans (yi ) 2.01 (1.29) 3.02*** (3.98) -0.36 (-0.39) 1.84 (1-13) 
Other earning asset (y2) 0.90 (0.60) 2.41** (3.05) -3.72*** (-4.31) -2.07* (-1.55) 
Total deposits (_y3) 2.19** (2.72) 2.19** (3.24) 3.14*** (3.49) 2.36** (2.89) 
Labour and physical capital price( vv, or w]) 0.18 (0.66) 0.64** (2.82) -0.63 (-0.81) -0.98 (-1.13) 
Equity (z,) 1.90*** (3.91) 1.21** (2.61) 3.64*** (6.49) 3 9 2 * * * (5.54) 
Time trend (/) -0.62***(-3.90) -0.56***(-6.20) -0.07 (-0.36) -0.04 (-0.25) 
Gamma (y) 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.76*** 0.86*** 
Sigma-squared (er 2) 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.41*** 0.56*** 
Log likelihood function 123 91 !68 152 
LR test of one-sided error 191 231 133 140 
Mean profit efficiency 0.62 0.61 0.71 0.75 
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Notes: (1) Figures in parenthesis arc t-values. signifies significance at 1%, at 5% and - at 10% levels. (2) Full results are shown in Appendix 1-1 and 1-2. 
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The estimated efficiency levels are not fundamentally différent between the translog 
form and the Fourier flexible form, indicating that the choice functional form does not 
affect efficiency measures significantly. However, with a closer look at the estimated 
Parameters, Fourier flexible spécifications have resulted in somewhat improvement. 
This is especially true for the cost function estimation using market average input 
priées where Fourier flexible form provides better estimation over the translog form. 
Consequently, Fourier flexible functional form is finally chosen by this study to 
présent production technology. 
In addition to the choice of an appropriate functional form, it also examines the 
différences between the market average input prices and bank specific input priées. 
Estimated parameters are reported in Table 7.2 under the heàdings of bank specific 
input prices and market average input prices. Columns (1) and (2) in Panel A of Table 
7.2 shows régression results using bank specific input prices. Although most 
parameters are statistically high. the critical parameter—the size of the standard 
deviation-squared of composite error terms is rather smail. These results raise some 
doubt on the explanatory power of the model and thus the précision of the 
inefficiency estimâtes that are supposed to be derived from thèse composite errors. 
When using market average input prices, régression results from cost frontiers 
improve significantly and fall into a reasonable range. Most estimated parameters of 
the first order variables shown in Columns (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table 7.2 as well 
as the second order and interaction variables (not shown) are statistically significant. 
y is 0.97 and 0.99 for the translog and Fourier-flexible spécifications respectively, 
indicating a large part of residuals attributable to inefficiencies. This is further 
justifïed by the significant LR tests for one-sided errors. 
Estimated parameters of alternative profit frontiers are reported in Panel B of Table 
7.2 and results are in favor of the use of market average input prices. Although the 
impact of using différent input prices is much less compared with results from cost 
frontiers, the explanatory power of the model is improved. Log likelihood values 
increased from 231 and 91 to 168 and 152 for the translog and Fourier-flexible 
spécifications, respectively. y is significantly différent from zéro for ail profit 
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frontiers, indicating that the proportion of profit inefficiencies to total errors is 
significant no matter how input priées are specifîed. The magnitudes of y and a are 
larger for models using bank specific input priées than using market average input 
priées, indicating that différent input prices affect the distribution of inefficiency 
estimâtes as in Koetter (2004). The use of market average input priées also affects the 
level of profit inefficiency. The use of bank specific input prices overstates profit 
inefficiencies by about 10%, a downward bias for those banks whose labour and 
physical capital prices above the market average. Koetter (2005) and Bos and Kool 
(2006) find similar effects for cost efficiency but not for profit efficiency. They argue 
that profit efficiency is more likely to be driven by sub-optimal output choices, Our 
explanation is that in China tight régulation on interest rates gives limited room to 
individual banks for setting output prices, which in tum limits the driving force of 
sub-optimal output choices for individual banks. Therefore, the impact of market 
prices on profit efficiency becomes relatively prominent in China. 
On balance, our results show that the exogeneity/endogeneity of input prices matters 
in efficiency estimation. It provides évidence for the use of market average input 
prices, which would lead to more précise efficiency estimâtes. The différent inputs 
prices are found to influence not only the estimated inefficiency levels (observed in 
profit efficiency) but also the distribution of estimated inefficiencies (observed in 
both cost and profit efficiency), consistent with findings in Bos and Kool (2006). 
Similar to Koetter (2005), cost efficiency is found to be more sensitive to the use of 
différent input prices than profit efficiency. This is because changes in input prices 
are expected to have more direct influence on costs than on profits (Bos and Kool, 
2006). Based on the above arguments and empirical évidence, our finalized cost and 
alternative profit model is in a Fourier flexible functional form using market average 
input prices. The following discussions will be based on the results from thèse models 
unless otherwise stated. 
7.3.2 Overall cost and profit efficiency 
Table 7.3 provides statistics of cost and profit efficiency estimâtes in terms of both 
efficiency level and rank order, Rank order is created based on the cost (profit) 
efficiency levels for each year using the formula(o/*öferJ./ ~\)/(nl -1) , where orderit is 
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the place in the ascending order of the ith bank in the fth period and n{ is the number 
of banks in the country in the period (Berger et al., 2007 and Williams and Nguyen, 
2005). The lowest rank of 0 [(1 - 1 ) / ( / 7 ( _ , ) ] présents the vvorst performance of a 
particular bank, while the highest rank of 1 [(/?, ~\)l{nt -1)] indicates the best 
performing bank. 
Table 7.3 Statistics of estimated cost and profit efficiency 
CE order CE level PE order PE level 
N Valid 35 35 35 35 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean .4688 .7474 .5259 .7501 
Median .5181 .7873 .5683 .7990 
Mode .03(a) •37(a) .02(a) •27(a) 
Std. Deviation .22998 .15050 .22800 .14938 
Skewness -.144 -.986 -.236 -1.556 
Std. Error of Skewness .398 .398 .398 .398 
Minimum .03 .37 .02 .27 
Maximum .98 .96 .96 .92 
Notes: (1) (a) indicates multiple modes exist and the smaltest value is shown. 
(2) C E = cost efficiency, PE = profit efficiency. 
The mean cost efficiency is in the order of 75% and the dispersion is about 60% from 
the least performing bank of 37% to the best of 96%. The distribution of cost 
efficiency level and rank order is found to be negatively skewed (left-skewed) as 
suggested by SFA efficiency literature where a larger proportion of banks operate 
fairly close to the 'best practice' frontier. The skewness is more clearly shown in 
Figure 7.1 (a) and (b). 
The average profit efficiency is also about 75%, Profit efficiency estimâtes distribute 
left-skewed but with wider dispersion of 65% than cost efficiency. This suggests that 
more banks are located close to the best practice while the gap between the best and 
the worst performing banks increases due to a more volatile nature of earnings than 
costs. Both rank order of cost efficiency and profit efficiency have lower means, 
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higher standard deviations, less skevvness and wider dispersión, relative to profit 
efficiency. 
Figure 7.1 Distribution of cost and profit efficiency level and rank order 
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Although rank order has recently been used in the literature, efficiency level is 
preferred over rank order for two reasons. First, the cost (profit) efficiency level of a 
bank is computed by comparing actual costs (profits) with the best-practice minimum 
costs (máximum profit) to produce the same bundle of outputs. The efficiency 
essentially reflects the distance from the actual bank performance to the best frontier 
in a more interpretable sense, while efficiency rank lacks interpretability. Second, it is 
argued that efficiency rank is more comparable over time in cross-country studies 
(Berger et al., 2004). This study focuses on bank performance in a single country— 
China. It concerns the magnitude by which efficiency is improved as a result of past 
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reforms or can be improved in the future. In addition, the employed one-step 
procédure is used to dérive estimated inefficiencies rather than rank order against a 
set of variables. 
The estimated cost efficiency and profit efficiency are plotted in Figure 7.2. The 
banking system enjoyed gains in cost efficiency during the first four years and then 
remained stable for the following three years. A major driver of this improvement is 
considered to be the declining interest rates manipulated by the central bank. For 
instance, interest on one-year deposits dropped from 10.98% in 1995 to only 2.25% in 
2001. Banks have also become concerned with cutting operational costs, especially 
SOCBs that have implemented effective costs saving projects by cutting off branches 
and labour redundancies. 
Figure 7.2 Mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency (1995-2005) 
1.0 
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In 2002. a sudden drop wiped out all previous gains, as a result of tightened 
regulatory reąuirements and prudential accounting practices. At the beginning of 
2001, loan loss provisions were reąuired to reflect the ąuality of assets ąuality. Loan 
loss provision could be up to 100% compared with the previous requirement of 1%, 
resulting in a substantial inerease in costs. After 2003, cost efficiency inereased 
steadily for the rest of the sample period and reached a peak at 83%) by 2005. This 
recovery is considered to be the positive effects of deepened and broadened bank 
reform from 2003 onward. 
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The movement of profit efficiency can be broken into two periods. The first five-year 
was a decreasing period in which profit efficiency decreased from 76% in 1995 to 
63% in 1999. In contrast to increasing cost efficiency, banks appeared to control costs 
better but failed to generate sufficient profits. The reason for this decline is the 
worsened asset quality. Massive non-performing loans were accumulated during this 
period, reaching RMB3.3 trillion in 1999, accounting for 43% of the total loans and 
40% of GDP in that year. It could be argued that decreasing profit efficiency is the 
result of interest rates cutting. However, lower interest rates did not appear to have 
any effect on profitability because the interest rate spread between loans and deposits 
was relatively stable, or even increased. For instance, the interest rate spread between 
six-month loans and deposits increased from 2.52% in 1996 (9.72% - 7.2%) to 3.42 % 
(5.58% - 2.16%o) in 1999. The rest six-years were an increasing period in which profit 
efficiency increased steadily, reaching the highest level 84%, in line with 
comprehensive bank reform. Among other factors, the most significant factor is the 
two rounds of NPLs divestments, which had an immediate and direct positive impact 
on profit efficiency. 
Profit efficiency and cost efficiency appear to move in opposite direction until 2003. 
The high level of NPLs and the later divestments could explain this opposite 
movement. In the presence of high level NPLs, cost efficiency is inflated by including 
NPLs in total loans as outputs. Meanwhile, profit efficiency is deflated because no 
profit could be generated from these NPLs. The divestment of NPLs from the banking 
system reduced the output level by deducting NPLs, while the profitability increased 
because of improved asset quality. Therefore, during 1999-2002, cost efficiency 
declined but profit efficiency increased. After 2003, cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency moved in parallel along a healthy upward trend. 
Banks perform differently because different types of banks are associated with certain 
efficiency advantages and disadvantages relative to one another. Mean cost efficiency 
and profit efficiency by bank types are plotted in Figure 7.3, showing the movement 
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of performance for each type of banks2. In term of cost efficiency shown in Figurę 7.3 
(a), SOCBs are the most efficient banks with average cost efficiency of 83%, and 
JSCBs are second to them with only one percentage lower in cost efficiency. CCBs 
are the most inefficient bank group with average cost efficiency at 68%. Foreign 
banks performed better than CCBs by seven percentage points but much worse than 
SOCBs and JSCBs. In terms of profit efficiency shown in Figurę 7.3 (b), the results 
somehow appear opposite. The most efficient bank group is foreign banks. Their 
average profit efficiency is 83%, folio wed by CCBs at 81%. SOCBs turn out as the 
worst performer at 46%, while the average profit efficiency of JSCBs is moderate at 
71%. When considering both cost efficiency and profit efficiency, JSCBs performed 
outstandingly over other types of banks in China. 
Figure 7.3 Mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency by bank types (1995—2005) 
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Notes: C C B = cily commercial bank, FB = foreign bank: JSCB = joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB = state-
owned commercial bank. 
The opposite effects of NPLs on cost efficiency and profit efficiency become 
apparent in the SOCBs. The majority of NPLs was due to the SOCBs, which helped 
explain the puzzling phenomenon that SOCBs were associated with the highest 
average cost efficiency at 83% but the lowest level of profit efficiency at 46%>. On 
the other hand, the divestments of NPLs explained why the profit efficiency of 
SOCBs increased after 2001. In this regard, our results support the notion that profit 
2 Discussions here are based on cstimated efficiency levels of différent types o f banks, while the 
statistical inference regarding each ownership type wi l l be made with référence to régression results 
from the inefficiency effects model in next section. 
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efficiency as an overall performance measure is superior to other efficiency concepts 
(Berger and Mester. 1997 and Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Profit efficiency 
measure takes into account the costs contracting and revenue augmenting effects of 
banks activities at the same time. It is considered to be more appropriate in China and 
other emerging and transitional économies where NPLs are normally high and their 
effects are hardly to be incorporated into the estimation of performance due to the 
lack of data on NPLs. 
Mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency for banks of différent sizes are presented in 
Table 7.4. Banks are classified into four groups using the same criteria as in Chapter 
6. The relationship between size and performance is very différent in terms of cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency. Large banks (Group 1) are the most cost efficient 
banks, whereas they are the least profitable banks, suggesting that large banks 
enjoyed the économies of scale on the costs side of their opérations, but diseconomies 
of scale in generating revenues. Medium-sized banks also enjoyed he same 
économies of scale in production costs as large banks, while they performed much 
better than large banks in terms of profit efficiency. These banks emphasized on 
contracting costs as well as on raising revenues. Small banks in Group 3 and Group 4 
are the least cost efficient banks, while they surprisingly turn out to be the most profit 
efficient banks. These banks tend to be more profit-oriented than large and medium-
sized banks but they are less able to control costs. The main conclusion is that on 
average medium-sized banks (Group 2) are the most efficient banks in the Chinese 
banking industry as far as cost efficiency and profit efficiency are concerned. 
Table 7.4 Mean cost and profit efficiency by bank si/e (1995-2005) 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
Cost efficiency 0.84 0.84 0.65 0.71 
Profit efficiency 0.50 0.73 0.81 0.87 
Group 1 : total assets >1 trillion R M B : Group 2: 100 billion RMB<total assets<l trillion R M B : Group 3: 
10 billion RMB<total assets<100 billion RMB: Group 4: total assets<!0 billion R M B . 
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7.3.3 Results of the inefficiency efïect model 
The technical inefficiency model attempts to assess die impacts of institutional 
changes on bank cost and profit efficiency. Results of the inefficiency effects in 
Equation (7.8) are reported in Taie 7.5. Regarding différent bank types, five static 
effect indicators, CCBs-No Change, FBs-No Change, JSCBs-No Change, SOCBs-
No Change, and Listed Banks: are defined for investigating the effects on 
performance of maintaining a particular ownership over the long term. The 
inefficiency effect model also includes two sélection effect indicators, Selected for 
Foreign Acquisition and Selected for IPO; and four dynamic effect indicators, 
Undenvent Foreign Acquisition and Undenvent IPO, along with a set of risk taking 
indicators and macroeconomic environmental indicators. The first indicator is 
excluded for comparison purpose. 
Coefficients on FBs—No Change ( öx ) are negative and insignificant in the cost 
model, but positive and significant in the profit model, that is, foreign banks are not 
significantly more cost efficient but significantly less profit efficient than the control 
group CCBs—no changes. When looking at the magnitude and significance level of 
estimated coefficients, foreign banks appear slightly more efficient than JSCBs and 
far more efficient than SOCBs in the profit model, providing évidence for the global 
advantage hypothesis (Berger et al., 2000). In the cost model, foreign banks perform 
indifferently from SOCBs with no governance changes but are significantly less 
efficient than JSCBs. Thus, foreign banks are more profitable but associated with 
excessive costs than domestic banks, implying that the cost side of their opérations is 
an area for future efficiency improvement. 
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Table 7.5 Estimated paramcters of thc inefficiency effects models 
Cost mode! Alternative profit model 
Static Effect Indicators 
FBs—No Change (<?,) -0.06(-1.27) 1.42(1.96)** 
JSCBs—No Change (S2) -0.11(-2.06)** 1.44(3.54)*** 
SOCBs—No Change (^ 3 ) -0.05(-1.06) 3.10(5.02)*** 
Listed Banks (SA ) -0.09C-1.87)** -l.34C-2.88)** 
Selection Effect Indicators 
Selected for Foreign Acquisition ( £ 5 ) -0.22(-4.02)*** 0.85(2.91)** 
Selected forIPO(<?6) -0.06C-1.15) 1.75(3.95)*** 
Dynamic Effect Indicators 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition—ST (S7) -0.003C-0.06) -1.45C-2.61)** 
Underwent I P O — S T ( J g ) 0.03(0.64) 0.11(0.14) 
Underwent Foreign Acquisition—LT (S9) -2.16C-5.52)*** 0.46(4.66)*** 
Underwent IPO—LT (Sl0) . -0.01C-0.06) -0.74C-5.33)*** 
Risk taking and environmental indicators 
Capital Risk (öu) -0.96(-2.86)** -1.22C-3.60)*** 
Credit Risk (<yi2) -0.72(-3.27)** 0.15(1.10) 
Market Risk (<513) -0.14C-1.35)* 0.19(1.50)* 
Liquidity Risk (<5I4 ) 0.01(0.04) -0.35C-0.86) 
T ( 4 3 ) -0.06C-1.25) -0.07C-1.46)* 
GD?(S]6) -0.62C-3.66)*** -0.51C-3.94)*** 
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Noies: (l)FB=forcign bank, JSCB=joint-stock commercial bank, SOCB=stalc-owncd commercial bank, IPO=initia1 public offering, CCBs--no change is omitted as base case; (2) *, *+, *** 
indicate significance level at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively; (3) Négative sign of the estimated coefficient indicatcs thaï the particular variable has a positive effect on cost or profit cfficiency 
and vice versa. 
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Coefficients on JSCBs—No Change (S2) show that JSCBs are the most cost efficient 
banks as it is the only bank group that are more efficient than the control group at 5% 
significance level. In the profit model, although JSCBs are less efficient than the 
control group and slightly less efficient than FBs, they are far more efficient than 
SOCBs. Thus, joint-stock ownership is generally associated with better performance 
as expected. State-ownership is identified as the least efficient static governance 
structure by the sign and magnitude of estimated coefficients on SOCBs~No Change 
(S3 ). SOCBs without governance changes are the least profitable banks and their cost 
efficiency is also low. 
The last static effect indicator—Listed Banks (S4) tracks the relationship between 
banks' listing status and their performance. Listed banks are found to be more 
efficient than non-listed banks in terms of both cost and profit efficiency at 5% 
significance level, consistent with the literature that publicly traded banks are found 
to outperform non-listed banks in cost efficiency and profit efficiency (Berger and 
Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003a; and Girardone, et ai, 2004). 
Two selection effect indicators—Selected for Foreign Acquisition (c?5) and Selected 
for IPO ( £ 6 ) examine the performance of banks before they are selected by foreign 
investors and selected for going public. Coefficients on Selected for Foreign 
Acquisition (S5) show a significant (1%) selection effect for foreign acquisition in 
the cost model, while these selected banks are significantly less efficient than those 
unselected in the profit model. Foreign investors tend to base their decisions more on 
a bank's cost efficiency rather than profitability. This appears to be a rational and 
strategic choice since foreign banks are less cost efficient but more profit efficient 
than domestic banks in China. By selecting banks this way, foreign banks could 
benefit through incorporating their cost disadvantages and profit advantages with the 
cost advantages and profit disadvantages of target banks. 
The selection effects of the IPO strategy ( <56 ) are much weaker because banks 
selected for IPO are not significantly cost efficient but profit inefficient. This implies 
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that the govemment may have used IPO as a reform instrumení to transform SOCBs 
which are less profitable than the non-state owned banks. 
Four dynamic effect indicators, of which two are for the short-term effects and two 
for the long-term effects, are designed to examine the performance changes after 
governance changes take place. The estimated negative coeffícients on Underwent 
Foreign AcquisilionST (¿>,) indícate that in the short run there is no significant 
improvement in cost effíciency but profit efficiency is improved dramatically. The 
coefñcient on Underwent Foreign Acquisition—LT (d9) suggest that in the long run 
the short-term gains in cost efficiency are subsequently Consolidated and foreign 
acquisition has a significant positive impact on cost efficiency. In contrast, short-term 
gains in proñt efficiency fade and turn out as losses in the long run, suggesting that 
the foreign acquisition strategy has a long term negative impact on bank profit 
efficiency. The favourable short-term effect on profit efficiency is likely to be the 
NPLs divestment before foreign acquisition takes place. It may take a longer time to 
see a positive effect of foreign investors' participation on bank profitability by 
fundamentally improving assets quality and management, especially for SOCBs. 
The coeffícients on Underwent IPO—ST (Sg) in cost and profit models are positive 
but statistically insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that IPO has very little 
short term impact on cost or profit efficiency. For a longer time, as suggested by the 
coeffícients on Underwent IPO—LT ( £ l 0 ) , the IPO strategy has a significant and 
positive impact on profit efficiency, implying that the positive effect of IPO on 
profitability can only be realised in the long run. Although insignificant, the short-
term negative impact on cost efficiency is tumed into a long-term positive impact. In 
an effort to privatise SOCBs, the Chinese govemment ailowed three SOCBs (CCBC, 
BOC and ICBC) to be listed on the stock markets in 2005 and 2006. Our consistent 
results from the cost and profit models provide strong evidence supporting the IPO 
strategy with a long-term forward-looking view. 
Four risk taking indicators are used to examine the relationship between bank 
efficiency and their risk taking behaviours to reflect managerial quality from different 
aspects. A general hypothesis regarding capital risk (Su ) is that banks with sufficient 
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capital generally reflect higher management quality and better control in risking 
taking and thus higher level efficiency. This hypothesis has been supported in the 
literature that generally shows a positive association between the level of capital and 
efficiency (Rao, 2005; Spong et al., 1995; and Berger and Mester, 1997). This study 
also provides strong évidence supporting this hypothesis in both the cost model and 
the profit model. The causality could go both ways (Berger and Mester, 1997). More 
profitable banks could contribute more to equity than less profitable ones. On the 
other hand, owners with less capital to loss may have less incentive to properly 
monitor bank opérations, resulting in inefficiencies and therefore, less profitability. 
Crédit risk (¿> | 2 ) is found to be significantly and positively associated with cost 
efficiency but unrelated with profit efficiency. The coefficients on market risk (Su) 
are statistically différent from zéro at 10% significance level, while it is négative in 
the cost model and positive in the profit model. The suggestion is that banks using 
more wholesale purchased funds tend to be more cost efficient but less profit efficient. 
This finding is consistent with Berger and Mester (1997) who find banks dépendant 
more on purchased fund tend to have higher cost efficiency but lower profit 
efficiency than other banks. Isik and Hassan (2003a) also find that banks with higher 
a proportion of purchased funds are associated with higher cost, technical, pure 
technical and scale efficiencies. Liquidity risk (Su) is found to be unrelated to cost 
or profit efficiency. 
The coefficients on the time trend variable (ôl5) suggest that on average bank cost 
and profit efficiency improved over time at a rate of 6% and 7% respectively. 
Although performance catching up is insignificant measured by cost efficiency, it is 
significant at 10% level when measured by profit efficiency. GDP growth is used as a 
proxy for macroeconomic conditions. Favourable économie conditions are supposed 
to have a positive impact on the demand and supply of banking services, and are 
expected to improve bank efficiency. The estimated coefficients on GDP ( S]6 ) 
indicate that GDP per capita is significantly and positively associated with cost and 
profit efficiency, consistent with expectations as well as empirical findings as in 
Grigorian and Manóle (2002). 
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7.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter investigates a few methodological issues, which help improve the quality 
and robustness of frontier estimation and enhance the reliability of comprehensive 
analyses based on those efñciency estimates. Based on better addressed 
methodological issues. this chapter examines cost and profit efñciency of Chinese 
commercial banks for the period 1995-2005. It differentiates the impacts on 
efficiency of various institutional changes associated with comprehensive ongoing 
banking reforms in China. Main fmdings and conclusions are drawn below. 
In estimating the cost and alternative profit frontier models, two methodological 
issues are investigated through the choice of functional form and the choice of input 
prices measurement. First, no fundamental difference is found betvveen the standard 
translog and Fourier flexible functional forms. The Fourier flexible form is preferred 
because of its slightly better explanatory power. Second, due to the exogeneity of 
input prices in the cost and profit functions, this chapter examines the impacts of 
using different input prices proxies—bank specific input prices and market average 
input prices. The measurement of input prices appears to influence not only the level 
of estimated inefficiency but also the distribution of inefficiencies. Our conclusión is 
that market average input prices should be used in the estimation of the cost and 
profit models. 
Mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency are about 75%, in line with the literature. It 
suggest that Chinese banks either utilize 25% more inputs or genérate 25% less 
profits compared with the 'best practice' frontiers. Both cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency improved over the data period, but they tended to move in opposite 
directions for much of the sample period. The major explanation is the presence of the 
large NPLs in the banking system. NPLs Ínflate cost efficiency because they are 
included in total loans as an output, and depress profit efficiency because they bring 
in no profits but extra management costs. The opposite influences of NPLs on cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency become more prominent in SOCBs, In this regard, we 
support the notion that profit efficiency is superior to cost efficiency in measuring 
overall performance. However, we suggest the use of both as cost efficiency provides 
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more detailed complementary information by breaking down the aggregate measure 
of profit. 
Using the method proposed by Berger et al, (2005), this chapter investigates the static, 
selection, and dynamic effects of governance changes simultaneously. JSCBs are 
identified as the most efficient banks when taking into account of both cost and profit 
efficiency. SOCBs are second to JSCBs in terms of cost efficiency but they are the 
least efficient in profit, with average profit efficiency lower than the industry average 
by 30 percentage points (static effects). The selection effects of foreign acquisition 
are unclear. However, their investment strategy is considered as rational by picking 
up more cost efficient banks for investment. Negative selection effects of IPO are 
found in terms of profit efficiency, consistent with the argument that the government 
may have used IPO as a reform instrument to fundamentally transform the SOCBs 
which are less profitable than other domestic banks. 
In terms of cost efficiency, the foreign acquisition strategy is found to have a positive 
impact on performance in both the short and long terms. Foreign acquisition appears 
to lead to a win-win situation, that is, foreign investors expect to overcome their cost 
disadvantages while domestic banks may benefit from foreign banks' international 
best practice and technologies. However, the expected positive impact on domestic 
bank profitability remains to be seen as foreign acquisition appears to have an adverse 
impact on profit efficiency in the long-term dynamic indicator. It might take an even 
longer time to consolidate foreign banks' comparative advantage in profitability. IPO 
is proved to have improved performance in terms of both cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency. The empirical evidence justifies the IPO strategy, which is grounded on 
the economic argument that market disciplines could help improve bank performance 
by eliminating the negative effects of agency problems and soft budget constraints. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions and policy implications 
8.0 preamblc 
This study contributes to the well-established efficiency literature with respect to 
transition and developing counties by being the first study that comprehensively 
analyzes bank efficiency and differentiates the effects of various on-going bank 
reforms in China. The dataset consists of 310 annual observations for the period 
1995-2005 on 35 commercial banks in China and the sample coves more than 90% of 
the country's total banking assets. By revievving the literature on the Chinese banking 
System, this study provides rich evolutionary information on the history, régulation, 
and market environment of the Chinese banking industry. Using simple fmancial 
ratios, this study assesses the current state of the Chinese banking system and the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese banks. Employing more 
sophisticated SFA, this study has also évaluâtes bank performance in terms of 
technical efficiency, cost efficiency and profit efficiency. Thèse évaluations are the 
reflection of the banking reform in China over past 20 years and it is not the end story 
of this study. Since 2003, the Chinese government has speeded up banking reform 
and has partially privatized three of the state-owned banks through attracting foreign 
stratégie investors and IPOs. In order to gain a better understanding of the ongoing 
bank reform, this study differentiates the effects on bank performance of various 
reform stratégies. Based on the analysis and empirical results, this study discusses 
policy implications regarding on-going bank reform and provides policy 
recommendations to future reform in China. 
The methodology employed is robust and sound, including financial ratio analysis 
and more sophisticated stochastic frontier analysis. Within SFA, this study has chosen 
estimation methods, models and procédures that are considered to be best suit to each 
research task. Although the main objective of this study is to examine the 
performance of banks in China and the effects of bank reform, this study has paid 
proper attention to a number of methodological issues in the literature in order to 
enhance the reliability of efficiency estimâtes and the usefulness of policy 
recommendations wherefrom. It has developed a more comprehensive empirical 
stochastic distance fonction model when estimating technical efficiency. Moreover, 
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this study uses market input priées rather than bank spécifie input priées when 
estimating cost efficiency and profit efficiency. It also employs différent functional 
forms to obtain better estimâtes. 
Drawing overall conclusions for this study, this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 8.1 summarizes the current state of the Chinese banking system. Section 8.2 
ascertains the économie rationale of bank reforms and assesses the performance of 
banks in China in terms of technical efficiency. cost efficiency, and profit efficiency. 
Section 8.3 summarizes différent effects of institutional changes on bank performance. 
Section 8.4 addresses the contributions of this study to efficiency research 
methodology. Section 8.5 highlights policy implications and proposes policy 
recommendations for future banking reform in China. 
8.1 The current state of the banking system 
Under the macro-prudential analysis framework, financial ratio analysis is employed 
to assess the current state of the Chinese banking system in four dimensions— 
profitability, capitalization, assets quality, and liquidity. Having experienced major 
reforms over past a quarter of century, the Chinese banking system is moving towards 
a modem System. Improvements have been made in each dimension, especialiy after 
récent radical SOCBs reforms from 2003. Profitability has improved steadily in terms 
of ROA and more rapidly in terms of ROE. Most Chinese commercial banks have 
become more profitable, given their rather low previous profitability base. A few 
joint-stock commercial banks and restructured state-owned commercial banks have 
recently reached or surpassed the internationally well performing banking institutions 
in profitability. Bank of China and China Construction Bank, for example, have 
become as profitable as the internationally renowned banks after 2003 and the latter 
even became the most profitable bank Worldwide in 2004 and 2005. Chinese banks 
are found to be more operationally cost efficient than international banks measured by 
a simple cost to income ratio. 
Considérable reform efforts made by the government have effectively rectified the 
historically low capitalization problem in the Chinese banking system. By 2005, 53 
banks including most major commercial banks have reached or exceeded the 
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minimum international capital adequacy requirement of 8%. Increased capital base in 
individual banks has consequently strengthened the overall solvency of the banking 
system. The most significant progress has been made in improving assets quality. 
There has been enormous reduction in both NPL ratio and the absolute value of 
outstanding NPLs. NPL ratio was lowered from about 42% in 1999 under the four-
category loan classification system to about 5% in 2005 under the five-category loan 
classification system for most major Chinese commercial banks except for 
Agricultural Bank of China whose NPL ratio was 26%>. The outstanding NPLs were 
cut down by more than two-thirds from RMB 3.3 trillion in 1999 to R M B 1 trillion in 
2005. Increasing LLR to gross loan ratio also indicates improved financial strength 
of Chinese banks. In contrast, average liquid assets to total assets ratio of major 
Chinese commercial banks has declined over time from more than 40% in 1995 to 
less than 15% in 2005. Decreased liquid asset has a positive impact on profitability 
but a negative impact on the ability to meet short-term liabilities. 
Despite of improvement and enhancement, the Chinese banking system is still in a 
poor and vulnerable condition when benchmarking to the peer group of 7 selected 
international banks. Compared with international banks, Chinese banks are generally 
associated with low profitability, low capitalization, poor asset quality, and less 
liquidity. The ROA of most Chinese banks are less than half of that of the 
international banks. The average capital adequacy ratio of Chinese banks has been 
increased to about 10%, which is still lower than international level of about 12%. 
The average E/A ratio has decreased over time to about 4% in 2005, lower than 
international level of 6%. Asset quality has been an area being significantly improved, 
while the progress is far insufficient for Chinese banks to catch up international banks. 
The NPL ratio of Chinese banks has been remarkably cut to 8.6% by 2005, which, 
however, is still four times or even more of that of international benchmarking banks. 
As to different banks, foreign banks are on average the financially soundest bank 
group measured in all four dimensions, perhaps inherited from their parent banks. 
This group has limited influence on the overall state of the Chinese banking system 
due to its small size of total assets only accounting for 2% of the total banking assets. 
Small-sized CCBs generally outperform SOCBs but are inferior to JSCBs in all 
dimensions except for capitalization. SOCBs and SOPBs have been on the other 
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extreme on the spectrum being the least profitable banks with the worst asset quatity 
and less liquidity but SOCBs have higher capital adequacy ratio over other domestic 
banks due to central government's generous subsidies. Poor state of SOCBs is due to 
complicated and interlinked múltiple causes and most are incident to the state 
ownership. Following more radical reforms taking place since 2003} SOCBs have 
made significant improvements in term of profitability. asset quality and capital 
adequacy ratio. 
Medium-sized JSCBs is the outstanding domestic bank group with better profitability, 
good assets quality and better liquidity, Five principal factors are considered to have 
driven JSCBs to excel. First, the joint-stock ownership facilitates JSCBs to construct 
good and functioning corporate governance. Secondly, except for the recent three 
IPOs of SOCBs, all Usted banks have been JSCBs and they are subject to public 
scrutiny. Thirdly, JSCBs have been actively attracting foreign ownership and 
importing advanced western management, operational practice, and accounting 
standards. Fourthly, JSCBs are subject to less government intervention as well as 
protection, resulting in more commercial sense in their operations. Finally, JSCBs are 
under threat of closure since they are not 'too big to fail* as SOCBs. In balance, 
JSCBs' relative better performance is not simply because of diversified ownership, 
but also due to competitions and market scrutiny, more advanced managerial and 
operational skills, less government intervention, and the threat of possible closure. 
8.2 Economic rationale of banking reforms and bank cfficiency in China 
Employing SFA, this study has examined the rationale of banking reforms in China 
and bank performance using more sophisticated measure of efficiency. The sample 
spans 11 years from 1995 to 2005 encompassing 35 large commercial banks. The 
sample period is characterised with remarkable reforms and incentives given by the 
authorities to the banks. Two hypotheses have been tested for examining whether 
bank reforms over past a quarter of century are theoretically grounded on the 
principal-agent theory and the budgetary constraint theory. The first hypothesis is that 
joint-stock banks are more efficient than state-owned banks, which ascertains whether 
joint-stock ownership could better solve the agency problem. The second hypothesis 
is that banks subject to a hard budget are more efficient than those facing a soft 
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budgett, examining whether soft budget constraints is a source of inefficiency. A 
single-output production function frontier in Cobb-Douglas form is estimated using a 
sub-sample that includes state-owned commercial banks and joint-stock commercial 
banks only. Empirical results provide sufficient evidence supporting these hypotheses. 
Hence, we conclude that the government has implemented the ongoing banking 
reform on the economic grounds of agency theory and soft budget constraint theory. 
Ownership reform and changing a soft budget to a hard one are expected to result in 
greater efficiency gains for the Chinese banks, especially the SOCBs. 
Having ascertained the economic rationale of reform, bank performance is examined 
in term of technical efficiency, cost efficiency and profit efficiency. These measures 
are estimated based on careful consideration regarding estimation techniques, 
variables definitions, and model specifications. The sample includes 35 commercial 
banks, which are classed into four mutually exclusive groups, namely state-owned 
commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks and foreign 
banks. Technical efficiency is derived from a stochastic output-oriented distance 
function using three different specifications. The income-based model tends to be 
superior to the earning assets-based model but the latter could provide 
complementary information on efficiency of other aspects of bank operations. The 
estimated technical efficiency steadily improved from 61% in 1995 to 87% in 2005. 
Average technical efficiency is 73%, suggesting that the outputs of Chinese banks are 
below the maximum possible outputs by 27%. On average, JSCBs are the best 
performing bank group at an average technical efficiency level of 81%, while foreign 
banks are the least efficient bank group operating at 59% technical efficiency. CCBs 
and SOCBs perform at 74% and 72%, respectively. 
Since the commercial bank law was enacted in 1995—the first year of our sample 
period, all banks were defined as commercial banks with the main goal of profit 
maximization except for state-owned policy banks. Therefore, behavioural 
assumptions of cost minimization and profit maximization are appropriate. Based on 
properly constructed market average input prices, a dual cost approach and alternative 
profit approach are employed to estimate cost efficiency and profit efficiency. 
Estimated cost efficiency and profit efficiency are both at 75%, suggesting Chinese 
commercial banks expend more costs by 25% but earn less profits by 25% compared 
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to the industry 'best practice'. Both cost efficiency and profit efficiency fluctuated 
over time between 60% and 80% during 1995-2004 ending up with an increase to 
84% in 2005. In terms of cost efficiency, SOCBs and JSCBs are found to be the best 
performing bank groups operating at 83% and 82% efficiency levéis, while CCBs are 
the least efficient bank group with 68% efficiency level. Foreign banks perform better 
than CCBs but worse than SOCBs and JSCBs. In terms of profit efficiency, foreign 
banks présent the best practice with estimated profit efficiency level at 83%, while 
SOCBs are the worst performers at 46% efficiency level. 
From rigorous and robust performance assessments, two particular findings are 
presented below. First of ail, the average technical efficiency, cost efficiency and 
alternative profit efficiency are consistent with each other at about 75% and they 
improved over the sample period. These estimâtes fall into reasonable range of 
reported efficiency levéis in the bank efficiency literature. For example, the average 
efficiency score is about 80% for the US banks (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). One 
conclusion could possibly be made that efficiency estimâtes at industrial level are 
stable and consistent, regardless of the efficiency concepts used. The dispersion of 
efficiency level across différent bank types is found to be substantially wide for ail 
efficiency measures, suggesting great potential for future improvement. The largest 
performance différence between the best and the worst performing banks is found in 
profit efficiency amounting 37%. It is found that more banks perform poorly and 
lócate away from the theoretical profit frontier. The smallest performance gap lies on 
cost efficiency measurement by 15%, indicating that more banks opérate closer to the 
cost frontier. The différence in technical efficiency between the most and the least 
efficient banks is moderate at 21%. The results imply a promising area for banks to 
improve performance. 
The second finding is concerned with the relationship between size and efficiency. 
The existing literature has been inconclusive and our findings are différent depending 
on différent efficiency concepts under review. The medium-sized banks are found to 
benefit from size advantage in terms of technical efficiency and cost efficiency. They 
are the most efficient banks outperforming large banks and small banks, consistent 
with a commonly claimed flat U-shape average cost curve for the US banks in the 
literature. However, it is in contradiction to Chen et al. (2005) who find large and 
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smali banks are the most technical efficient and medium sized banks are least 
technical efficient in China. The explanation is that Chen et al. (2005) employ an 
earning-assets based model in which high level of NPLs in larger Chinese banks has 
the inflationary effect on estimated technical efficiency. In terms of profit efficiency, 
the resuit is opposite as smali banks appear to be most efficient and large banks the 
least efficient, supporting the findings in Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey (1993) that 
report increased inefficiency with large asset size. 
8.3 The effects of institutional changes on bank efficiency 
This study evalúales not only the performance of Chinese banks, but also the effects 
of différent bank reform stratégies on performance. This part of the study is of 
particular importance since it sheds important light on policy implications. The 
Chinese banking system experienced significant institutional changes in all types of 
commercial banks. especially during the last few years of data period. The method 
proposed by Berger et al. (2005) is employed to jointly explore the static, sélection 
and dynamie governance effects on bank performance in a single model. Eleven 
governance effect indicators representing various institutional changes in différent 
types of banks are defined, of which five are static effect indicators, two sélection 
effect indicators and four dynamie effect indicators. 
The first four static effect indicators are concerned with the effect of having a certain 
type of ownership structure over a long time. To draw more complete conclusions, 
the estimated coefficients need to be interpreted in conjunction with estimated 
average efficiency level. Static effect indicators focus more on governance structure, 
while the average efficiency reflects the efficiency level for an entire group. The 
performance of CCBs is mixed measured by différent efficiency concepts. They are 
the most profit efficient domestic banks even surpassing JSCBs by 8%, whereas they 
are the worst cost controller with the lowest estimated cost efficiency of 68%. Foreign 
banks perform poorly in terms of technical efficiency and cost efficiency, but they 
perform best in profit efficiency among ail the banking groups. 
JSCBs are the best performing bank group in the Chinese banking industry, consistent 
with the resuit of the previous ratio analysis. They are the most technical efficient and 
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cost efficient banks. Although they are the third profitable bank group, profits earned 
are healthy due to better assets quality. As to SOCBs, notvvithstanding considerable 
preferential reform efforts, they are the most inefficient domestic bank group. They 
perform outstandingly in terms of cost efficiency, presenting their relative strength 
and attractiveness to foreign stratégie investors to take equity stake. SOCBs are 
currently undergoing more drastic institutional changes and their performance is 
expected to be improved in the near future. 
The fifth static indicator suggests that listed banks are consistently and significantly 
more efficient than unlisted banks for ail efficiency measures under study, in line with 
the general expectations that public scrutiny drives banks to excel. This resuit is also 
consistent with the empirical literature where publicly traded banks are found to be 
more efficient than unlisted banks. 
Two sélection effect indicators particularly examine whether better performing 
banking are selected for foreign acquisition or/and going public. Attracting foreign 
stratégie investors and going public are two important partial privatization stratégies 
initiated by the government during the most récent bank reform. Strong sélection 
effects are found in foreign acquisition, as foreign investors appear to select domestic 
banks based on technical efficiency and cost efficiency rather than on profit 
efficiency. The Investment décision is rational because foreign banks are found to be 
more profit efficient but cost and technical inefficient than the domestic banks. By 
targeting banks with better technical and cost efficiency, foreign banks attempt to 
combine their comparative profit advantage with domestic banks' comparative cost 
and technical advantages to achieve overall high efficiency. On the other hand, this 
strategy helps domestic banks obtain much needed capital, advanced technology and 
managerial skills to improve their profitability, The strategy of foreign ownership 
participation appears to have created a win-win situation for both parties. 
No sélection effect is found for the partial privatization strategy of going public in 
terms of technical and cost efficiency. In terms of profit efficiency, adverse sélection 
effect is found as less profitable banks are selected for iPO. This resuit seems 
unreasonable but it is consistent with the fact that the Chinese government 
encouraged the least profitable SOCBs to be listed on the stock exchanges. Using IPO 
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as an important reform instrument to fundamentally transform the SOCBs, the 
government could raise more capital while hardening the budget constraint on SOCBs 
by subjecting to a free market compétition. The bullish stock markets in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen from the second half of 2006 up to 2007 proved that the IPO strategy was 
unexpectedly successful, although a cautious note needs to be served to small 
investors that they need to be careful not to bear the entire cost of bank reform in 
China. 
Dynamic effect indicators gauge short-term and long-term effects of institutional 
changes on bank performance. The empirical results are mixed when using différent 
efTiciency concepts. Foreign acquisition is found to have positive short-term effects 
on bank performance since ail estïmated coefficients are negative. The coefficients 
are statistically significant for profit effïciency but insignificant for technical 
efficiency and cost effïciency. Over the long run, the short-term cost effïciency gains 
appear to have consolidated into significant long-term positive effect while gains in 
technical efficiency remain insignificant. Significant short-term gains in profit 
efficiency caused by foreign acquisitions appear to have caused significant long-term 
losses. Short-term gains in profit efficiency are possibly the results of a cleaning up 
effect before implernenting the privatization stratégies. Banks are financially 
restructured by receiving substantial subsidies from the government just before the 
foreign acquisition, which have a direct positive impact on profitability. However, 
thèse effects are short-term and thèse banks appear to become less profitable in the 
longer term. The expected profit advantage from foreign ownership seems to take an 
even longer time to be realized since the scale of foreign ownership in domestic banks 
may be insufficient to turnaround thèse less profitable domestic banks into profitable 
ones in a short period. It would take more time to solve those deep-rooted problems 
such as dis-functioning corporate governance, poor assets quality, and immature 
managerial skills. 
Likewise, IPO is found to have différent impacts on différent efficiency measures. 
IPO has resulted in significant gains in technical efficiency, while thèse gains have 
faded in a longer term. On the other hand, IPO has caused little losses in cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency in the short-term. These losses have been reversed 
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into fruitful long term gains and the effects on profit efficiency even become 
statistically significant. 
To sum up, two major partial privatization stratégies—foreign acquisition strategy 
and IPO strategy are currently being implemented by the Chinese government to 
reform its banking System. These stratégies are underpinned by the agent-principal 
theory and soft budget constraints theory. This study provides strong empirical 
évidence supporting thèse stratégies. Bank performance has improved, although some 
expected positive effects may take a long time to be realized. Thus, we conclude that 
banking reform in China has been in the right direction since foreign ownership 
reform and IPO are proved to be two effective and promising stratégies. 
8.4 Findings with respect to research methodology 
This study cornes up with some conclusions, contributing to the development of 
research methodology by paying particular attention to four main issues. Although 
thèse conclusions are based on the Chinese banks, they have more gênerai 
applicability, at least in developing and transition économies where the banking 
System shares certain commonalities with China. First, a comprehensive stochastic 
distance function is developed to estimate technical efficiency by combining the 
advantages of existing approaches, models, methods and procédure in the literature. 
The model has three principal attributes. The first attribute is that the model is based 
on a recently developed stochastic distance function approach. This approach has the 
advantages of accommodating multiple-output production technology and requiring 
no price information and behavioural assumptions. It overcomes one limitation of the 
primai approach to estimate technical efficiency for industries with multiple-outputs 
production technology. For such an industry, a traditional dual approach has been 
widely used by estimating a cost function or/and a profit function. However, thèse 
dual approaches require price information and behavioural assumptions of cost 
minimization or profit maximization. Under some circumstances, price information 
may not be available or/and optimizatîon assumptions may mot be appropriate. 
The second attribute of the newly developed empirical model is that it incorporâtes a 
method proposed by Berger et al. (2005) that simultaneously examine the static, 
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sélection, and dynamic effects of governance changes on bank performance in one 
single model. It enables us to differentiate the effects of various institutional changes, 
providing valuable information for policy makers regarding the on-going banking 
reform in China. The final attribute of the newly developed empirical model is that 
the distance function approach and Berger et al. (2005) method have been estimated 
using a one-step procédure proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). This one-step 
procédure overcomes serious Statistical problem suffered by the commonly used two-
step procédure caused by contradictory assumptions made in two separate steps. This 
comprehensive model has been applied to data of Chinese banks and it has been well 
estimated. Technical efficiency estimâtes fall within the reasonable range and 
consistent with cost and profit efficiency estimâtes. It can be concluded that the 
model is robust, providing richer information and reliable estimâtes of bank 
efficiency. 
The second methodological issue addressed by this study is the sensitivity of 
efficiency estimâtes to différent model spécifications that combine différent Output 
and input variables. This study has estimated both the income-based model and the 
earning assets-based modeî. The former addresses the ability to generate income 
revenue based on data from income Statements, while the latter focuses on earning 
assets growth by taking data from balance sheets. In other words, the earning assets-
based model reflects the first phase of bank production process that attracts funds and 
then invests in loans or other earning assets, while the income-based model describes 
the second phase of bank production process that générâtes incomes from those loans 
and earning assets. Higher efficiency in earning assets growth does not necessarily 
resutt in higher efficiency in rising income. For banks with poor assets quality, 
estimated technical efficiency by the earning assets-based model has been much 
higher than that estimated by the income-based model, This finding has important 
methodological implications relating to the choice of models to investigate bank 
efficiency, especially in developing countries and emergîng économies where assets 
quality of banks is generally low. We argue that the income-based model is superior 
to the earning assets-based model, at least for our dataset from China. However, we 
suggest the use of both models when analyzing banks efficiency, which would 
provide more valuable information and draw a more complète picture on bank 
performance. 
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The third methodological issue addressed by this study is the measurement of input 
priées, an area which has been generally neglected or mis-conducted by previous 
studies. Particular attention has been paid to the exogeneity of input priées and the 
différent measurements of input priées are found to influence both the level and the 
distribution of estimated inefficiencies. Market average input prices are found to be 
more appropriate than bank specific input prices when estimating cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency. When defining cost and alternative profit function, banks are 
assumed to face compétitive markets vvhere input prices are exogenously determined. 
This is a pre-condition for the costs minimization and profit maximization to be 
reasonable. Howe ver, most cost and profit efficiency studies employ bank specific 
inputs prices by dividing total factor expenses by the total units of factors employed. 
This contradiction has been firstly noticed by Mountain and Thomas (1999). To 
knowledge, there are only a few studies investigating the measurement issue of input 
prices. The présent study is considered to be the third one that spécifies both market 
average input prices and bank specific input prices and compares their impacts on the 
level and distribution of estimated cost and profit efficiency. 
The final methodological issue addressed by this study is concerned with the 
superiority between cost,efficiency and profit efficiency as performance measures. 
Profit efficiency has been found to be superior to cost efficiency in measuring overall 
performance, consistent with the literature. This finding is especially important for 
efficiency study in banking Systems where the level of NPLs is high, for example, in 
China. Estimated cost efficiency for Chinese banks is found to move in the opposite 
direction of profit efficiency except for the last four years of the study period when 
both of them increase. Paradoxically. SOCBs have the highest estimated cost 
efficiency but the lowest profit efficiency. The reason for thèse unusual results is that 
NPLs have been included as Outputs. NPLs have an infiationary effect on cost 
efficiency while deflationary effect on profit efficiency because of losses from NPLs. 
Although profit efficiency is a superior aggregate performance measure to evaluate 
overall achievement, cost efficiency provides segmentai and complementary 
information by breaking down the profit. Thus, we suggest the use of both cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency to assess bank performance. 
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8.5 Policy implications, remaining problems and possible solutions 
The study has addressed the hot-red banking reform in China with a particular focus 
on policy concerns through empirically evaluating the effects of various institutional 
reforms on bank performance. Results from this comprehensive and in-depth analysis 
have shed important lights on policy implications and thereby induces policy 
recommendations for the future reform of the Chinese banking System. 
The most récent reform strategy is partially privatizing SOCBs through attracting 
foreign investors and IPOs. Literature generally shows improvements in performance 
after privatization in developing countries and transition économies. Consistent with 
literature, this study has also found évidence that those privatization stratégies tend to 
have positive impacts on bank efficiency. The privatization of the state banks appears 
to be a right move to modernize the Chinese banking system. Following the reform, a 
modem banking system has taken shape and SOCBs have been reconstructed into 
modem banking enterprises with sound financial good govemance structure in place. 
Chinese banking reform has achieved notable progresses and the reform seems on 
track with a right direction, whereas this study cannot form a conclusion whether the 
reform has succeeded and achieved its ultimate goal. After more than 20 years' 
reform as well as récent séries of re-capitalization, financial restructuring, and IPOs 
implemented to major commercial banks, it is still too early to make such a 
conclusion as remaining problems are still many and difficult. Much has been done, 
while much more need to be done for the ultimate success of the Chinese banking 
reform. 
Next step reform should first consolidât^ the up-to-date achievements. Current proven 
reform policies should be reinforced to ensure their positive impacts could last in the 
long term. Banks need to be closely monitored and overseen whether they are 
operated and managed in line with the goals of the banking reform. CBRC has set out 
guidance for good corporate govemance and detailed requirements for performance 
by benchmarking to the top 100 largest global banks. Authorities should ensure the 
enforcement of thèse measures. Any déviations should be followed up and adjust 
carefully ongoing reform measures where necessary. While consolidating up-to-date 
achievements, authorities should proceed with and deepen the banking reform by 
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implementing more effective measures to solve remaining and new emerging 
problems. These problems are tougher since easy ones have already been tackled, but 
they are fundamental to the success of the Chinese banking reform. 
As the dominant of the Chinese banking system, SOCBs are still in the forefront of 
the future reform. Despite of significant progress, SOCBs are faced with a number of 
problems that hinder them to become modern banking enterprises and make future 
banking reform tougher. Constructing good corporate governance has been a hot topic 
in banking reform. The Chinese government has implemented a series of concrete 
measures to reform SOCBs and now three of them have good governance structure in 
place. Nevertheless, what is more important is that these corporate governance 
mechanisms are functioning and effective. To achieve this, a number of issues need to 
be properly addressed and dealt with from the deep-rooted causes. 
The first issue is the persistence of government interventions in SOCBs' operations. 
After more than two decades of banking reform, it is evident that SOCBs still subject 
to government interventions, although less explicit than previous practice. In order to 
pursue multiple social objectives, such as supporting overall economic development, 
providing employment and maintaining social stability, government has incentive to 
direct banks lending to political preferred projects rather than profitable alternatives. 
SOCBs continue to finance (essentially provide fiscal subsidy) to underperforming 
SOEs to keep them in operation. This casts suspicion on whether SOCBs are able to 
behave as true commercial banks that are expected to use market principles to 
evaluate and manage their operational risks and to make lending decisions 
independent of political consideration and personal connections. It is uncertain 
whether, or if so, how soon the government would step away from SOCBs. It is 
therefore important that government should stop intervening SOCBs' operations and 
provide them a real commercial atmosphere to operate in. 
The second issue is concerned with the partial privatization policy that the Chinese 
government has partially privatized state banks. Even after foreign acquisitions and 
IPOs, the state remains majority ownership in SOCBs. Policy literature and empirical 
studies in developing countries and transition economies both suggest full 
relinquishment of government ownership in state banks. Partial privatization has 
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shown to have no positive impacts on bank performance in the long-term. Majority 
government ownership could result in corporate governance dysfunction although it is 
well established. It also facilitates government intervention on banks' operation, 
especially iending decisions. The solution could be speeding up the pace of 
privatization, which would help reléase SOCBs from government interventions and 
provide environment and room for corporate governance to be functioning. 
The third issue is the built-in connection between sénior management of SOCBs and 
the governmental/political system. Sénior management is appointed based more on 
politicat considerations rather than being selected according to their experience and 
track record in banking management. Sénior managers also have ranks in the politicai 
system and most of them are transferred from government officials to manage the 
SOCBs on the behalf of the state. They could be promoted as higher-ranked officials 
in the politicai system if they improve SOCBs' overall performance, while the 
performance here has certain non-commercial ingredients, such as personal 
relationship with government officials. These sénior managers might have incentive 
to keep good relationship with government. They could provide finance to industries 
or project preferred by government with no or few commercial considerations. This 
problem is much easier to deal with compared with previous two problems. 
Government could cut the tie by either selecting sénior management from markets or 
stop granting bank management politicai ranks. The former is preferred since it opens 
to the possibility to select sénior management from international market with desired 
experience and advanced managerial skiíls. The latter has the advantage of in-depth 
knowledge of the banking system and Chinese speciality but managers are 
disincentive because something will be taken away from their pockets. 
The fourth issue is SOCBs have a preference to extend credits to inefficient SOEs 
rather than profitable non-state private firms, There is an invisible tight tie between 
SOCBs and SOEs, partially due to the third issue discussed above and partially due to 
their historical role to finance SOEs. Although the government started SOE reform 
earlier than banking reform, the reform has been partial and incomplete. Most SOEs 
are less profitable or even still making losses. Lending to these underperforming 
SOEs not only undermines SOCBs' profitability but also increases the risk of new 
NPLs in the future. More importantly, inefficient allocation of capital is detrimental 
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to the economy. This issue involves changing conventional behaviours in banking 
operations and it will take time. However, if above three issues could be properly 
addressed, that is, SOCBs free from government intervention. good corporate 
governance functioning, and the tie between SOCBs management and governments 
weakened, the process of changing behaviour vvould be much quicker. 
The fifth issue is SOCBs are 'too big to faiF or 'too important to fail'. SOCBs are 
strategically important to the Chínese economy, making closure and bankruptcy 
costly and therefore highly unlikely even they have made significant losses and/or 
produced huge amount of NPLs. Essentially, SOCBs are faced with a soft budget 
constraint just the same as theiv main clients—SOEs. The soft-budget constrains 
always lead to moral hazard problem and it is fertile soil for inefficiency. The 
government is expected to bailout SOCBs when SOCBs are in fmancial distress as it 
always did in the past. Management have well understanding and therefore has less 
incentive to pursue better performance. It is not an easy question to answer as indeed 
even in advanced economies with well established banking system, government 
bailout is not unusual and the central banks act as the lender of last resort. However, 
in order to reduce the downside effect of a soft budget constraint, government should 
ensure effective mechanisms in place to restrict the implementation of government 
bailout. 
The last issue is concerned with the SOCBs themselves. Chínese government has 
done much to reform the banking system—essentially SOCBs. Their overall 
performance has improved and their fmancial position has much strengthened. 
However, these achievements are largely attributable to direct government subsidies 
in the forms of capital injections and NPLs off-loading. In the future, banks need to 
stand on their own feet wíthout government subsidies. The success of the banking 
reform in China depends on whether banks, especially SOCBs, can fundamentally 
improve their management and operational skills, and how they will deal with 
remaining problems as well as newly emerging problems. A concrete training plan 
would well solve the problem. Banks could recruit new staff with desired skills while 
providing training courses for existing staff to develop their skills. 
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Apart from above problems. SOCBs are also faced with problems that are common to 
all commercial banks in the Chinese banking system. The first problem is that 
Chinese banks have an operational weakness that they are overwhelmingly dépendent 
on traditional lending activities instead of more profitable fee-based activities. More 
than 90% of gross income is raised from net interest revenue, compared to 50% of the 
selected international banks. The performance of the banks is rather sensitive to the 
performance of their clients. Lack of diversification in business activities undermines 
banks' operational independence when making lending décisions. This problem is 
particularly prominent in SOCBs vvhere a lager proportion of loans have extended to 
underperforming SOEs. The diversification of income is a particular area for banks to 
make more efforts in order to be more profitable. Banks should explore and develop 
new businesses to diversify their product portfolio. 
The second problem faced by Chinese banks is the underdeveloped accounting and 
auditing practice in terms of procédures, standards, and internai and external controls. 
Information infrastructure is underdeveloped and accounting and auditing profession 
are lack of enforcement power. Financial information could be easily manipulated 
and both managers and accountants carrying out such practice are hardly punished. 
When bank management has an incentive lo distort fmancial information, it is 
technically achievable while avoiding breaking accounting rules or violating 
régulations. Under high pressures to eut down NPL ratios, SOCBs tend to extend 
more loans (conventionally to underperforming SOEs) or/and to hide problematic 
loans using the leeway in the classification of loans. The former would lead to 
potential new NPLs in the future while the latter does not solve the existing NPLs 
problem at all. Moreover, it is not unusual practice for SOCBs to extend new loans to 
underperforming SOEs who pay back the money to banks as the interest payments for 
their old loans. In so doing, NPLs are effectively hidden in short term while new 
loans are likely to become new NPLs. Without reliable fmancial information, reform 
measures that aim at solving particular problems might well départ from their original 
goals at the end. This issue has airead y been addressed and new accounting standard 
has been adopted since 2008, 
The third problem faced by banks is the interest rates control. Being the price of fund, 
interest rates are mainly driven by market forces in a mature fmancial market. With 
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flexible interest rates, banks are able to adjust différence in associated risks when 
pricing loans. In China, interest rates are still set by the central bank while giving 
commercial banks very limit room in setting interest rates on loans but not on 
deposits. Limited flexibility in setting interest rates makes banks unable to adjust 
interest rates to reflect the risks. Without pricing loans in accordance with their 
associated risks. it is hardly to say that SOCBs could opérate on a commercial basis. 
Moreover, Goodhart and Zeng (2006) argue that Chinese banks' interest rate margins 
are considered to be too low to genérate proper return on capital and strengthen the 
capital adequacy ratio. The operational environment is not yet to be supportive for 
Chinese banks to become true commercial banks. This is another intractable problem 
as interest rates liberalization is linked to foreign exchanges rate as well as capital 
control. There is no policy recommendation on interest rates liberalization as interest 
rates are beyond the scope of this study. 
The fourth problem faced by banks is the lack of capital sources to improve their 
capital adequacy. The gap between capitals needed by Chinese banks to meet the 
minimum capital requirement of 8% and funds available domestically and 
internationally is huge. Government used to be the main capital provider for banks, 
especially for SOCBs, while recent reforms implicitly indícate such capital would no 
long be available. It becomes banks' responsibility to raise capital, which is going to 
be a real problem as banks could hardly find way out. Banks are unable to raise 
sufñcient fund internally given their generally low profitability. Meanwhile, capital 
market in China is still too thin and available foreign capitals are limited. Even 
foreign capitals available, the limit for maximum foreign shareholding of 25 % might 
prevent banks from raising capitals internationally. How Chinese banks will increase 
capital adequacy remains uncertain. Privatization could be a possible solution with 
increased the foreign shareholding limit. 
The fifth problem faced by banks is to improve corporate governance structure and 
risk management. The corporate governance is the way how banks are run and 
operated. Historically Chinese banks (most of them are with majority of state-
ownership) had no modem corporate governance in place. Even some banks now 
have good corporate governance structure; it is not fully functioning given their 
récent move toward modem banking enterprises. Moreover, Chinese banks generally 
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lack of experience and expertise in risk management. Chínese banks have 
traditionally extended loans vvithout proper risk assessment exercise. It is argued that 
even with flexible interest rates in pricing loans. banks may not have the ability to 
accurately measure, assess and price those associated risks. 
The final problem faced by banks is the NPLs problem. The Chinese government has 
made significant progress in solving the NPL problem in banking system and both 
NPL ratio and absolute amount of NPLs have dropped dramatically. The progress, 
however, is mainly attributable to the transfer of NPLs frorn banks to AMCs. Without 
the effective role of risk management exercise in lending decisión as weil as 
functioning corporate governance and internal controis in place, how banks could 
control NPLs from new loans is questionable. Moreover, the massive amount of 
NPLs has been transferred to AMCs that have made no essential progress on the 
disposal of the NPLs (see detailed discussion in Chapter 5). The end results from 
AMCs are estimated to be the same as the amount of NPLs transferred to them. 
Therefore, when looking at the financial sector as a whole, the threat of NPLs to the 
economy still remains, although not being faced by banks. Again NPLs issue is not 
discussed in detail and no constructive recommendation could be made (leaving for 
future research) 
These interrelated problems faced by Chinese banks are not exhaustive. Without 
properly address the deep-rooted causes of these problems and fundamentally solve 
them in the near future, the chance of successful banking reform is very small. Any 
progresses would be in the short-term. just like any buildings without a firm 
foundation in place, all else would be built on moving and sinking land. The ultimate 
success of the reform not only depends on how the governments implement effective 
reform measures to solve those fundamental problems but also depends on how banks 
(especially SOCBs) respond to reform measures. There is no catholicon to remedy all 
problems in one go and the banking reform will take more time. It is arguably to say 
that the Chinese banking reform now is just about to crack the hardcore of the 
banking reform since remaining and potential problems are tough. Future research 
should pay more attention to these problematic áreas on an on-going basis. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1-1 Estimated parametcrs of second order and intersect terms for 
frontiers in translog functional form 
Bank specific input prices Market averaj; »e input prices 
Cost function Profit function Cost function Profit function 
y l * y l 0.029(0.34) -0.193(-0.53) 0.425(1.25) -0.77**C-2.16) 
yl*y2 0.175(1.28) -0.358C-0.54) -1,003**(-2.16) -1.61**(-2.60) 
yl*y3 -0.034(-0.4) 0.584(1.28) -1.540**(-2.13) 0.76*(1.59) 
y l * w l -0.063*(-1.65) -0.188(-1.29) 1.223**(2.55) -0.96**(-2.16) 
y l * z l 0.006(0.13) -0.258***(-4.31) 0.656*(1.77) -0.03(-0.30) 
y l * t -0.022**(-2.39) 0.498**(2.40) -0.435*(-1.63) 0.93***(3.58) 
y2*y2 0.131*0-89) -0.685**(-1.83) 0.459*(1.70) -1.80***(-4.81) 
y2*y3 -0.009(-0.14) 0.665*(1.77) -0.017C-0.21) 0.71*(1.65) 
y2*wl -0.031(-1.07) -0.176*(-1.57) -0.176C-0.46) -0.62*(-1.56) 
y2* z l -0.027(-0.69) -0.204***(-3.56) 0.925**(2.65) -0.03C-0.34) 
y2*t -0.027***(-3.47) 0.369**(2.49) 0.562*(1.51) 0.26(1.02) 
y3*y3 0.043**(2.31) 0.239**(2.59) -0.232(-0.97) 0.58***(3.86) 
y3*wl -0.036**(-1.96) 0.104(1.26) 0.214(1.00) 0.28*(1.33) 
y3* z l -0.027(-0.93) -0.062**(-2.28) -0.047f-0.67) -0.07*(-1.64) 
y3* t 0.003(0.46) 0.188(1.29) 0.439**(3.25) 0.33*0.68) 
w l * w l 0.082***(13.8) 0.184***(5.94) 0.485**(3.10) -1.78**(-2.06) 
w l * z l -0.010(-0.97) -0.035**C-2.17) -0.181*C-1.54) 0.02(0.68) 
wT* t -0.001(-0.55) -0.153**(-2.42) 0.144(1.14) 0.08(0.59) 
z l * z l 0.001(0.16) 0.019***(5.89) -0.069**(-1.83) 0.40***(5.58) 
z l * t 0.000(0.03) -0.OOH-0.04) 0.057(0.64) 0.001(0.05) 
t*t -0.001**(-2.15) 0.162**(3.11) -0.117**(-1.88) 0.001(0.20) 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. '***' signifies significance at 1%, '**' at 5% and at 10% 
levels. 
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Appendix 1-2 Estimated parameters of sccond order, intersect and trigonometric terms for frontiers in Fourier-flexible functional form 
Bank specific input prices Market average input p rices 
Cost funetion Profit funetion Cost funetion Profit funetion 
yl *y l 0.048(0.56) 0.266(1.08) 2.676***(5.75) -0.090(-0.18) 
yl*y2 0.176(1.29) 0.936**(2.16) 0.047(0.14) -0.416(-0.52) 
yl*y3 -0.047(-0.52) 0.441*(1.31) -0.860*(-1.69) 0.327(0.70) 
y l * w l -0.065*(-1.81) 0.018(0.11) -0.256(-0.67) -1.207**(-2.54) 
y l * z l 0.017(0.37) -0.266***(-6.08) 0.401(1.14) 0.003(0.033) 
y l * t -0.019**(-2.12) 0.059(0.28) -0.428*(-1.88) 1.120***(3.81) 
y2*y2 0.127*(1.85) -0.030(-0.11) 0.754**(2.87) -1.456***(-3.54) 
y2*y3 -0.017(-0.25) 0.422*(1.39) 0.183**(2.34) 0.4710-21) 
y2*wl -0.041*(-1.40) 0.002(0.014) 0.201(0.68) -0.733*(-1.73) 
y 2 * z l -0.008(-0.19) -0.228**(-4.92) -0.167(-0.61) -0.022(-0.27) 
y2* t -0.023**(-2.92) 0.062(0.30) 0.496*(1.72) 0.350(1.23) 
y3*y3 0.033(1.29) 0.362**(2.92) -0.395**(-2.05) 0.477**(3.I7) 
y3*wl -0.045**(-2.33) 0.125(1.27) 0.428**(2.27) 0.208(0.94) 
y 3 * z l -0.020(-0.67) -0.067**(-2.68) 0.123**(2.15) -0.076*(-1.76) 
y3* t 0.005(0.83) 0.260*0.47) 0.395**(2.55) 0.240(1.32) 
wl *wl 0.080***(12.74) 0.175***(3.73) 0.648***(3.99) -0.192**(-2.39) 
w l * z l -0.014*(-1.32) -0.048**(-2.57) -0.235***(-3.63) 0.018(0.58) 
w l * t -0.001(-0.37) -0.121**(-1.95) -0.072(-0.66) 0.034(0.22) 
z l * z l 0.001(0.10) 0.015***(5.66) -0.011(-0.52) 0.407***(5.30) 
z l * t 0.001(0.50) 0.024(1.30) -0.663***(-4.32) -0.002(-0.06) 
t*t -0.001*(-1.70) 0.167***(3.61) 0.755***(4.31) 0.001(0.11) 
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Appendix 1-2 Estimated parameters of second Order, intersect and trigonometric terms for frontiers using Fourier-flexible functional 
form (continued) 
Bank specific input prices Market averag e input prices 
Cost function Profit function Cost function Profit function 
cos(xl) -0.006*(-1.31) 0.019(0.70) 0.423***(4.09) -0.070*01.87) 
cos(x2) -0.003(-0.73) 0.048*(1.63) 0.084***(4.03) 0.022(0.58) 
cos (x3) 0.007*(1.60) -0.015(-0.69) -0.324***(-4.86) -0.022C-0.59) 
cos(xl+xl) 0.002(0.35) 0.004(0.18) -0.192**(-2.37) -0.039(-1.00) 
cos(xl+x2) -0.007*(-1.59) 0.031(1.07) -0.038**(-2.03) 0.010(0.28) 
cos(xl+x3) -0.002(-0.55) 0.004(0.18) 0.151***(6.24) 0.047(1.27) 
cos(x2+x2) 0.007*0-53) 0.035(1.16) 0.002(0.15) 0.019(0.50) 
cos(x2+x3) 0.002(0.46) 0.070**(2.93) -0.006**C-2.17) 0.077**(2.07) 
cos(x3+x3) 0.002(0.42) -0.013(-0.44) 0.008(0.58) -0.024(-0.64) 
cos(xl+xl+xl) -0.005(-1.07) 0.044*(1.78) -0.010(-0.83) -0.000(-0.009) 
cos (x2+x2+x2) -0.004(-1.00) 0.005(0.25) 0.001(0.09) 0.054*(1.53) 
cos(x3+x3+x3) -0.000(-0.02) -0.036*(-1.6l) 0.060***C5.42) -0.017(-0.46) 
sin (xl) 0.001(0.16) 0.014(0.74) 0.042***C3.80) 0.006(0.16) 
sin (x2) -0.002(-0.48) 0.025(1.03) 0.025**(2.22) 0.006(0.16) 
sin (x3) 0.002(0.45) -0.012(-0.53) -0.012C-0.99) -0.064*(-1.72) 
sin (xl+xl) -0.001(-0.34) 0.080***(3.59) 0.008(0.62) 0.052*(1.43) 
sin (xl+x2) 0.001(0.26) -0.025(-0.96) -0.014(-1.00) 0.010(0.27) 
sin (xl+x3) 0.003(0.81) 0.043**(1.99) -0.007C-0.56) -0.003C-0.O8) 
sin (x2+x2) -0.002(-0.54) -0.012C-0.59) -0.018*(-1.60) 0.033(0.95) 
sin (x2+x3) 0.001(0.25) -0.013C-0.54) -0.010(-0.97) -0.054*(-1.48) 
sin (x3+x3) -0.004(-0.91) 0.028(0.99) -0.019*(-1.60) 0.031(0.77) 
sin (xl+xl+xl) 0.006(1.26) -0.035(-0.98) -0.003C-0.19) -0.045C-1.18) 
sin (x2+x2+x2) -0.001(-0.26) -0.047**(-1.82) -0.03**(-2.43) -0.043(-1.17) 
sin (x3+x3+x3) -0.005(-1.20) 0.008(0.30) 0.034***(3.46) 0.000(0.005) 
Notes: Figures in parenthesis are t-values. ' * * * ' signifies significance at 1%, ' * * ' at 5% and '* ' at 10% levels. 


